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This study aims to understand the determinants of Zimbabwe’s economic policies on 
socio-economic development from 1980 to 2015. Since independence, a number of 
economic policies have been developed and achievement of policy objectives has 
been varied. It is the purpose of this study to understand the critical success factors of 
any policy that may be developed and implemented in Zimbabwe. The qualitative 
research method was utilised, and the triangulation was applied from data collection 
and analysis to the recommendations of the study. The findings explore that there are 
some shortcomings in the execution of the three roles of government: political, 
administrative and economic. In spite of legal, constitutional and legislative provisions 
on Public Finance Management and the Office of the Auditor General’s role in 
reinforcing transparency and accountability in the management of public funds, 
economic and political governance have remained challenges for Zimbabwe, leading 
to numerous problems. The study articulated the determinants of economic policies 
on socio-economic development in Zimbabwe, these being: good governance and 
democracy; conflation of party and government; politicisation of civil service and 
patronage; clear separation of powers; accountability; transparency; fiscal discipline; 
political stability; responsive public institutions; political will; broad consultation and 
involvement; shared vision, inclusive goals and objectives; coordination; policy clarity; 
corruption and economic sanctions.  The thesis, therefore, proposes an analytical 
framework on the determinants of economic policies on socio-economic development 
in Zimbabwe. The main outcome of the study will be the adoption of critical success 
factors that are `required to improve economic policies for socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe. 
Key words: economic policies, public policy, determinants, political will, socio-
economic development, Zimbabwe. 
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GENERAL SCIENTIFIC AND METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION  
TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
This study aims to understand the determinants of Zimbabwe’s economic policies on 
socio-economic development from 1980 to 2015. Since independence, a number of 
economic policies have been developed and achievement of policy objectives has 
been varied. It is the purpose of this study to understand the critical success factors of 
any policy that may be developed and implemented in Zimbabwe. This chapter looks 
at the background of all Zimbabwe’s economic policies, also known as the national 
economic policies or macro-economic policies that were launched by the Government 
of Zimbabwe since 1980. The chapter further moves on to closely assess these 
policies highlighting their areas of success and challenges, linkages of policies and 
the reasons why new policies were being introduced. The chapter also looks at the 
rationale for the study; research problem; research questions and objectives; research 
methodology and methods; unobtrusive research techniques; data collection 
techniques applied for the purposes of this thesis; limitations and significance of the 
study; terminology clarification; ethical considerations; and outline of the thesis.  
1.2 Background, rationale and problem statement 
Zimbabwe “gained its independence from the British colonial rule in 1980. The new 
government inherited an economy that was fraught with inequalities in income and 
wealth distribution; where agriculture, mining, education, health, manufacturing 
industry and banking sectors were most visibly affected” (United Nations Development 
Plan (UNDP) (1980:37). Within the Southern Rhodesian (name for Zimbabwe before 
independence) agricultural sector, (that was the central feature of the economy) policy 
regarding land and associated policies concerning settlement patterns had been the 
major causes of gross inequalities in the distribution of income (UNDP 1980:37). The 
legislative measures that governed land settlement in Southern Rhodesia were the 
Land Tenure Act (1969) and its predecessors, the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and 
Land Husbandry Act (1951). Their purpose was to allocate land along racial lines. The 
Land Tenure Act (1969) divided the country into three areas: European Area, African 
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Area and Northern Area. Initially the total acreages allocated to each group were more 
or less equal. Because of the larger population size of the Africans, they would, by 
law, always be allocated only a fraction of the European unit, and these units would 
continue to grow relatively smaller as the African population expanded (UNDP 
1980:97). It was also stated by the UNDP (1980:97), that “the mining legislation in the 
colonial era was designed to encourage private enterprises. Almost all the major 
operating companies in the industry were either of British or South African origin”. The 
UNDP (1980:97) further highlights that “the mining industry contributed to the 
maintenance of a very high standard of living for the minority of Europeans. On the 
other hand, the social philosophy of the government did not allow the African 
population to derive much benefit from these spinoffs from the mining industry”.  
Within the social services sector, the UNDP (1980:97) further states that “the 
education system evolved strictly as an integral part of a minority settler society and 
for the manifest purpose of both serving and consolidating that society”. The budgetary 
allocations for African primary and secondary education during the early 1960s 
remained extremely inadequate. The populations in the rural areas, in particular, had 
virtually no access at all to formal education.  In the health sector the bulk of the 
expenditure voted for health services was spent on running hospitals and clinics; on 
treating preventable diseases rather than on preventive measures (UNDP 1980:97). 
The gap between urban and rural medical services became even wider as did that 
between services for Europeans and those for Africans as private practice and medical 
aid societies flourished in the towns almost entirely to serve the European population. 
The government health care service for Africans virtually stagnated over the years and 
provided a far from comprehensive coverage (UNDP 1980:97).  
Public policy is a mirror that guides government in its actions. This is because 
government without a definite plan of action, is like a traveller without a destination 
(Oni 2016:328). Public policy “provides guidance to governments to deal with clusters 
of entangled and long-term problems.  Thus public policies link the government with 
the citizenry. However, policies vary in terms of national priorities and other factors 
that might influence the policy making process.  ‘Public policy’ is not a precise term. 
The phrase ‘public policy’ is however associated with the ‘public’ rather than ‘private’ 
spheres” (Sapru 2012:2). It is further stated by Sapru (2012:4) that the “policy itself is 
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something which takes different forms. It may take the form of a declaration of goals; 
a declaration of course of action; a declaration of general purpose; and an authoritative 
decision”. 
Other scholars in the field of administration have tried to define the word policy in 
different ways: Dror (1989) defines policies as “general directives on the main lines of 
action to be followed”. Similarly, Vickers (1968) states that “policies are decisions 
giving direction, coherence and continuity to the courses of action for which the policy 
was supposed to utilise and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realise an 
objective or a purpose”. Self (1972) defines policies as “changing directives as to how 
tasks should be interpreted and performed”. Self (1972) also argues that “public 
policies are more ‘political’ than public administration. It is an effort to apply political 
science to public affairs but has concerns with processes inside the field of public 
administration”. Sapru (2012:5) adds that a “policy may be general or specific, broad 
or narrow, simple or complex, public or private, written or unwritten, explicit or 
inexplicit, discretionary or detailed, qualitative or quantitative. Here the emphasis is on 
‘public policy’ which is what government chooses as guidance for action”. However, 
for the purpose of this study, public policy is therefore defined as: A deliberate 
intervention by the Government of Zimbabwe to address problems at hand using   
defined strategies and a course of action to attain set targets. Whereas there have 
been many public policies in Zimbabwe since 1980 (ranging within the fields of social, 
political, cultural, and regulatory, among other sectors), this study only focuses on 
national economic policies commonly referred to as economic blueprints. 
It is noted that Zimbabwe has developed and implemented several national economic 
policies since independence, which however, suffer from lack of implementation. In 
most cases, the policies are aborted at conception or during the course of their life or 
merely suffer a natural death with little or no documented reasons for their termination. 
According to Toole (2000:273), “what matters in policy is what happens between the 
establishment of policy and its impact in the real world”. Although the prime aim of all 
Zimbabwe’s economic policies developed since 1980 was to improve the socio-
economic development of the people, statistics reveal that Zimbabwe has experienced 
an unfavourable Human Development Index (HDI), as shown in table 1.1 below. The 
HDI is a “summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human 
4 
development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent 
standard of living” (UNDP 2020:1). 
Table 1.1: Human Development Index 
Year 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018 
HDI 0.367 0.498 0.472 0.452 0.425 0.472 0.543 0.549 0.553 0.563 
Source: (UNDP Human Development Report 2019) 
Zimbabwe’s HDI when discounted for inequalities, shows the citizens have become 
worse-off. The discounted HDI portrays a realistic picture about development in the 
country where some people have more resources than others. As highlighted by the 
UNDP (2019:5), “Zimbabwe’s HDI for 2018 is 0.563. However, when the value is 
discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.435, a loss of 22.8 percent due to inequality 
in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices”. The general trend indicated in table 
1.1 above shows that Zimbabwe’s developmental path has been unfavourable. There 
is a missing link when it comes to public policy achieving its set goals, which are meant 
to improve the citizens’ well-being in totality. The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
(ZimStat 2013:46) indicates that as at 2012, the “individual poverty prevalence rate 
stood at 75.6% for the entire nation. The hardest hit individuals were found in the rural 
areas where the rate was 82% in the same year. The individual prevalence rate of 
extreme poverty stood at 47.2% for the whole nation”. In 2017, the poverty rate at the 
national poverty line for Zimbabwe was 70% (World Data Atlas 2020). Extreme poverty 
is estimated to have risen from 29% in 2018 to 34% in 2019, an increase from 4.7 to 
5.7 million people (World Bank (WB) 2020). The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Human Affairs (UNOCHA 2020:1-2) articulates that “the 2020 
Zimbabwe Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), launched on 2 April 2020, indicates 
that 7 million people in urban and rural areas are in urgent need of humanitarian 
assistance across Zimbabwe, compared to 5.5 million in August 2019. Since the 
launch of the Revised Humanitarian Appeal in August 2019, circumstances for millions 
of Zimbabweans have worsened”. The UNOCHA (2020:1-2) further details that, 
“drought and crop failure, exacerbated by macro-economic challenges and austerity 
measures, have directly affected vulnerable households in both rural and urban 
communities. Inflation continues to erode purchasing power and affordability of food 
and other essential goods is a daily challenge. The delivery of health care, clean water 
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and sanitation, and education has been constrained and millions of people are facing 
challenges to access vital services”.   
These statistics testify that there has not been any improvement in the developmental 
trajectory of the nation, yet several policies have been promulgated since 1980 to 
improve the welfare of the citizens. This study therefore seeks to identify the critical 
success factors that need to be considered when implementing public policies in 
Zimbabwe, emphasising economic policies, to improve the socio-economic 
development of the nation. 
Given this background, post-independence Zimbabwe “inherited national policy- 
making systems and processes which needed to be transformed from minority-
focused to majority-focused institutions” (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012:213). According to 
Basheka and Vyas-Doorgaperspad (2015:208), “in recent years, governments in 
Africa have been under increasing pressure to demonstrate their relevance because 
citizens are demanding better delivery of public services. In response to these 
numerous calls for an enhanced level of efficiency and a general improvement in 
service delivery, governments are designing and implementing a number of new 
and/or amended public policies”. 
Consequently, post-independence Zimbabwe attempted to address some of these 
issues through a number of country-specific initiatives. The policies were crafted to 
address these imbalances and meet the expectations of the majority by creating 
administrative structures with the aim of delivering development as part of the national 
agenda. The following is a description of national economic policies that the 
Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) has crafted and implemented from 1980 to 2015.   
Within one year of independence, the GoZ issued an economic policy statement 
known as Growth with Equity Policy (1981), “which provided the framework for overall 
sectoral policies that the government intended to pursue in the short, medium and long 
terms. This policy asserted government’s desire to develop the country guided by 
socialist and democratic principles in the allocation and distribution of resources and 
social benefits” (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012:214). The major areas of achievements were 
that social services became free and accessible to the majority. The policy was 
abandoned because of unsustainable levels of recurrent expenditure which led to 
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increases in inflation (WB 2013). The Growth with Equity Policy (GWEP) was launched 
in 1981. The “technocrats in the newly-independent state in the early 1980s designed 
economic and social policies with the overall objective of achieving what was termed 
'growth with equity policy through planned change', in order to arrest a situation of 
'growth with widening inequalities'” (Sachikonye 2003:217). Soon after independence 
there was an urgency to rebuild the country. As such, policies became the domain of 
the technocrats. Dogan (1975:5) points “to the crucial role of the ministerial 
bureaucracy and top civil servants in policy formulation.  The final decision on a 
specific policy remains in the realm of the responsible institutions (mainly the 
President, cabinet, ministers and parliament)”.  
The GWEP followed a top-down approach in its formulation stage, given the urgency 
of social and economic issues which needed to be attended to soon after 
independence. Because of this notable practice and belief by citizens, it is important 
that the public should be subjected to wide consultation before implementation of 
policies and the policies should address the public needs (Dogan 1975:5). Since this 
policy was launched just soon after independence, the majority of citizens had the zeal 
to develop their livelihoods which had been devastated by a prolonged liberation war. 
As such they participated in the implementation of this policy within their communities. 
For example, community members would partner government in the construction of 
schools and clinics, through the provision of labour to mould bricks, fetch water, among 
other activities  (Dogan 1975:5). The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ)’s National 
Budget Statement (NBS) (GoZ 1984:27-28) reiterates the importance of community 
participation stating that “government will continue to look towards the increasing 
participation of local authorities, communities and the community at large to support 
existing education/health services as well as with regard to planned expansion of 
these services”. It can be specified that the GWEP improved the citizenry’s lives 
through improved education, health and infrastructure. These results are consistent 
with secondary data where the economic indicators show that there were increased 
budgetary allocations for education, health and infrastructure during the policy’s 
lifespan. A number of schools, clinics and hospitals were constructed during this policy 
period in the rural areas and high density suburbs where the majority of indigenous 
Zimbabweans reside (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development 
(ZIMCORD) (1981:3). This led to improvement in social development such as an 
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improved literacy rate, and a low mortality rate, among other indicators. However, 
growth was not balanced, the productive sectors were lagging behind. The policy did 
not achieve much in one of its major objectives, that is, resettlement of the indigenous 
people who had been displaced during the colonial era.  
The policy budget allocation on resettlement was insignificant. During the colonial era, 
about four million people lived on the limited and generally inferior land in the traditional 
black areas whilst only about 5000 commercial farmers controlled most the generally 
more fertile half of the agricultural land in the country (ZIMCORD 1981:3). Given that 
not much was achieved to redress this anomaly, this explains why the policy created 
negative socio-economic development in the country. 
Two economic transformation and growth plans; namely the Transitional National 
Development Plan (1982/83–1984/85) and the First Five-Year National Development 
Plan (1986-90) were formulated in line with the broad policy objective of GWEP firmly 
rooted in socialist and egalitarian principles.  The policies’ major objectives were 
community development, development of growth points and expansion of rural 
infrastructure (GWEP 1981:3). According to the WB (2013), the policies however, 
achieved annual growth rates of around 3% in 1983, in 1984 the economy recorded 
negative growth rates, whilst in 1985 it was 0%. Inflation rates between 1982 and 1985 
averaged 12%. The country enjoyed normal relationships with International Financial 
Institutions.  Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:220) state that “although these policies were 
noble, sustaining them proved a major challenge, especially in a stagnating economy 
that prevailed in the first decade of independence”. The first decade after 
independence was characterised by command economy policies which were carried 
over from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and war years. New investors 
found their enthusiasm waning in a country in which it was considered to be socially 
unacceptable to be motivated by profit. Existing profits even became a target as 
government imposed strict price controls, regulated the size of dividends that could be 
declared and introduced additional taxes on the dividends themselves, on interest 
earnings and capital gains (Robertson 2015). It was further noticed that “other profit-
limiting policies included ceilings on local borrowings by foreign owned companies, 
statutory wage increases for lower paid workers, ceiling on the rate of interest earnings 
and capital gains. Generous food subsidies were increased as an early move to step 
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up the pace of the promised wealth redistribution process and accommodate these 
and other high expenditures. In addition, company, personal and sales taxes were 
sharply increased as well as the import and excise taxes. Inflation rose rapidly, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates declined, real earnings declined sharply through 
most of the years in the 1980s” (Robertson 2015).  
It was further explained by Robertson (2015) that “the mix of policies described began 
to cause severe economic problems and growing political embarrassment for the 
ruling party. At the centre of the difficulties was rapidly rising unemployment, and after 
a decade of central planning and autocratic leadership, the government realised it 
should start seeking advice. A World Bank invitation to assist the government to redraft 
its economic policies was accepted”. It is against this background that in the second 
decade after independence, the GoZ unveiled “market driven policy measures which 
were adopted as prescriptive solutions to the economic crises of the 1980s. They also 
sought to reverse the expansionary policies of the 1960s and 1970s which had 
resulted in big government expenditure” (Robertson 2015).  
The market driven major economic policy framework for Zimbabwe was introduced as 
A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95), which was an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) prescribed solution.  The policy was dubbed 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The broad objective of the 
Framework for Economic Reform (FER)/(ESAP) was to address many setbacks 
experienced in the economy in the 1980s, through economic liberalisation and 
economic deregulation. In 1983, investment, especially in the productive sectors of the 
economy had been continuously declining (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012:217). Rural 
development and land reform, economic expansion and employment creation which 
were priority areas in development planning had not been achieved to the desired 
extent. The major results of the policy were that the economy grew by a rate between 
3-5%, inflation was high, averaging 56% and unemployment also increased. This 
period was characterised by policy confusion in that prior policies were completely 
opposite to the objectives of FER /ESAP (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012:217). It is argued 
by Shah (2013:11) that some of the many things that the powerful nations through the 
IMF and the WB prescribed through ESAPs was that the developing nations should 
open up their markets to allow more imports, export more of their commodities, remove 
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subsidies, free their markets and reduce the state wage bill.  Zhou and Zvoushe 
(2012:24) indicate that “the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP)/ Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) was adopted across Africa and the rest of the world in 
the 1990s in line with IMF and WB prescriptive solutions to the economic crises of the 
1980s. A Framework for Economic Reform was a prescribed policy meant to reduce 
government expenditure by retrenching 25% of the civil service establishment, 
withdrawing subsidies, commercialisation and privatisation of state owned companies, 
introducing user fees in the health and education sectors, among others”.   
According to Rono (2002:51), the SAPs dismally failed in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). To Rono (2002:52), “SAPs in 
Kenya brought untold suffering to its citizens in form of social unrest, unemployment, 
poor living standards among other social ills”. According to the United Nations 
Commission for Africa (UNECA 2015), the retreat of the states on social areas such 
as health, education and housing was detrimental for many African countries. Sibanda 
and Makwata (2017:13) “identified two mistakes or omissions at implementation which 
negatively affected the FER /ESAP Programme. The first one was the lack of full 
commitment by some people in government suspicious of the IMF. These were the 
same people who should have worked hard to make the programme a success but 
somehow their suspicions ‘sabotaged’ the reforms and acted as self-fulfilling 
prophecies of doom. The second mistake was the failure by the work stream task force 
to bring on-board tariffs to protect the local manufacturing sector from import 
competition”.  Through analysis of literature, it is considered that most of the economic 
indicators were not favourable. The GDP growth rates were on the downward trend, 
inflation was escalating, and the unemployment rate was increasing due to the 
retrenchment of a huge number of civil servants and closure of companies. The policy 
failed because it was just a prescribed solution which was divorced from the needs of 
the general populace and emphasised that Zimbabweans need home grown solutions 
to their problems.  
There are some policies introduced after A Framework for Economic Reform. These 
policies include the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation-
ZIMPREST (1996-2000) and Vision 2020. The ZIMPREST, (1996-2000) came to 
replace FER/ESAP. The policy came into existence after the non –realisation of 
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ESAP’s key objectives of increased real GDP growth and the accompanying erosion 
of social sector achievements of the 1980s. The main objectives of ZIMPREST were 
to control prices of goods and services. The policy achieved an average of 2% growth 
rate between 1996 and 1998. In 2000 the growth rate was below -5%.  Two years after 
it was launched and with very few of its programmes having been implemented, 
ZIMPREST came to an end (Robertson 2015). In the year 2020, Government 
launched the Vision 2020 with the objective (Vision 2020) that, “by the year 2020 there 
would be a proud and happy nation that strives for a highly competitive, sustainable 
and industrialised economy benefiting from its national endowments including its 
natural resources”. This policy was however never implemented. 
The Zimbabwe Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme - MERP (2001-2002) was 
crafted to arrest the economic decline experienced in the 1990s. MERP (2001:5) 
indicated that “the Zimbabwe economy was facing serious economic problems. The 
prime objective was to rebuild mutual trust and confidence among citizens and also 
reduce budget deficit to 3.8% of GDP through mobilisation of all stakeholders including 
government, the private sector, labour, civil society to implement measures that would 
restore macro-economic stability. It also sought to restore normal cooperative relations 
with the international community”. MERP (2001:5) “was a ‘knee-jerk’ reactionary policy 
following the economy which was performing badly. Also, the political situation was 
not stable after the fast track land reform programme in 2000 and the birth of a new 
political party; namely the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which was 
launched in 1999. It was a reactionary policy which sought to win the trust of citizens 
and other stakeholders. Basically, the policy only sought to stabilise both the economy 
and political environments”.  
The MERP failed to realise positive socio-economic benefits. This was demonstrated 
in the 2003 NBS (GoZ 2002:1) which indicated then that “the country was facing 
severe socio-economic difficulties. Their magnitude required urgent corrective action 
to avert further deterioration. Output had declined by 19.3% over the last three years. 
Inflation, which was associated with high growth rates of money supply, accelerated 
to 144.2% by end of October 2002”. The economy was not performing well during the 
MERP tenure. To a larger extent, MERP failed to achieve most of its objectives. 
Sibanda and Makwata (2017:20) state that “MERP failed to revive the economy mainly 
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as a result of non-implementation of recommended policies and loss of macro-
economic balance due to the size of the budget”. This was confirmed by the 2003 NBS 
(GoZ 2002:7) which states that “the commitment we made last year to stabilise our 
arrears at December 2001 levels was, therefore not fulfilled.” Briefly MERP failed to 
achieve its goals due to lack of commitment by the authorities to implement the policy 
objectives. Due to continued economic challenges, the policy was abruptly ended 
following a government directive to introduce a new policy. 
A few intermediary policies were introduced after the MERP. These policies include 
the following: the Ten Point Plan (2002) was a presidential proclamation to inform a 
land reform programme and increase local ownership of the economy. The policy’s 
results were negative GDP growth rates and a period of hyperinflation. The major 
weakness of the policy was that it lacked definite time limits for completion. For 
example, the land reform is still ongoing which increases uncertainty since the farmers 
promised resettling will not be sure if they are going to be resettled again (Zhou and 
Zvoushe 2012:218). The National Economic Revival Programme (2002) was launched 
to stabilise the economy through harmonisation of macro-economic and sectoral 
policies. The policy achieved negative GDP growth rates and the period was 
characterised by hyperinflation (WB 2013). Thereafter another policy was introduced 
called Towards Sustained Economic Growth- Macro-Economic Policy Framework for 
2005-2006 which naturally replaced MERP. The major objective of this policy was to 
sustain the positive economic aspects in the country and prevent further deterioration. 
According to Robertson (2015), “the policy achieved negative growth rates of -4.2% 
and a hyperinflationary period”. The year 2007 brought the National Economic 
Development Priority Programme (NEDPP). The major objectives of the policy were 
to improve food security, savings, investments and foreign currency generation.  Due 
to the worsening economic situation, the policy was quickly aborted and replaced by 
the Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) (2007). The main policy 
objectives of the ZEDS (2007) were to eradicate extreme poverty, combat HIV and to 
promote gender and women empowerment. Robertson (2015) states that “the policy 
achieved negative growth rates, hyperinflation and increased unemployment just like 
its predecessor. The ZEDS was aborted at conception in 2008 as a result of unabated 
economic meltdown”. According to Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:216), generally the 
political will to implement these reform prescriptions and bear the attendant social 
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costs was at a low note”. Subsequently, in the late 1990s, the Former President of 
Zimbabwe Comrade R.G. Mugabe made a presidential proclamation on the Look East 
Policy as a sanctions buster programme. However, this policy was never documented 
(Ojakorotu and Kamidza 2018:19). 
The Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme -STERP I, (February- December 
2009) was initiated on the back of the Global Political Agreement signed on 15 
September 2008. The Policy “was focused on ‘getting Zimbabwe moving again’. It was 
meant to reverse negative growth rates, devaluation of the currency, low productive 
capacity, job losses, food shortages, poverty and massive de-industrialisation” (Ruwo 
2014:1). STERP I adopted the multiple currency system in January 2009 for domestic 
financial transactions. This eased inflationary pressures in the economy (STERP I 
2009:17).  The South African Rand, United States of America Dollar and other 
convertible currencies became legal tenders.  In August 2009, a successor policy 
STERP II was adopted, to support rapid growth, creation of employment, encourage 
investments, support the restoration of economic stability and growth. This was a two-
policy document covering the Five-Year Medium-Term Plan- MTP (2011- 2015) and 
the Budget Framework (2010-12) (STERP II 2009:8). In the third decade after 
independence, polices were generated under turmoil and uncertainty. The period 
experienced a socio-politico-economic meltdown which peaked in 2008 (Zhou and 
Zvoushe 2012: 219). At the beginning of the decade, the Inclusive Government (inter-
party government formed in September 2009) launched the Medium-Term Plan - MTP 
(2011-2015) to deal with developmental issues.  
After the STERP II, the Five Year Medium Term Plan (2011- 2015) was launched to 
address the challenges experienced from 1998 to 2008. The period was characterised 
by: “severe macro-economic instability, the unstable macro-economic environment 
was characterised by hyperinflation, with official annual inflation reaching 231 million 
% and monthly inflation at 1 800% in July 2008; severe shortages of basic utilities 
including electricity, fuel and water as well as most basic food and non-food 
commodities–leading to high levels of poverty; real GDP cumulatively declined by over 
50% during the period 2000-2008; and massive decline in agriculture production, 
among other challenges” (MTP 2011:8).  
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The MTP achieved a single digit inflation, reduced unemployment rate and there was 
no fiscal deficit. The policy achieved macro-economic stability. The MTP’s theme was 
“restoration and transformation of capacities for sustainable economic growth and 
development” (African Development Bank [AfDB] n.d.:13).  The policy was crafted 
during the Government of National Unity (GNU) period. Thus there was acceptance 
by all political parties since they were all involved in the development of this policy. 
Most of the economic indicators were showing positive signs of growth within the 
economy during the MTP period, such as GDP growth, inflation and access to social 
services, among others. However, other economic indicators like lending rates were 
not favourable; hence the reason why businesses which depended on borrowing were 
negatively affected. The MTP was abandoned after the general elections of July 2013. 
It was replaced by the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
Transformation- Zim-Asset (October 2013- December 2018).  
The next policy was the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
Transformation-Zim- Asset (October 2013- December 2018) that was a five-year 
policy which came after the MTP. Its aim was set to achieve “sustainable development 
and social equity anchored on indigenisation, empowerment and employment creation 
underpinned on natural resources exploitation and human capital” (Zim-Asset 2013).  
Zim-Asset was abandoned in November 2017 when the new government in the 
second republic assumed power. 
In view of the above background, the main research question that guided this study is: 
“What are the determinants of economic policies, and what critical success 
factors are required to improve economic policies for socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe?” 
1.3 Research Questions 
According to Creswell (2009, in Nyikadzino 2020:12), “investigators place signposts 
to carry the reader through the plan for a study. The first signpost is the purpose 
statement, which establishes the central direction of a study. From the broad, general 
purpose statement, the researcher narrows the focus to specific questions to be 
answered”. The research questions for this study are: 
 What is the meaning of, and evaluation phases, of the concept ‘public policy’?   
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 What are economic reforms experienced in Africa, the Southern Africa 
Development Community and in Zimbabwe? 
 What are economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
 What are determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
 What are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time Framed 
(SMART) policy objectives to improve economic policies for socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe? 
 What are adequate resources availed to support implementation/action plans to 
improve economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe? 
 What mechanisms are available to monitor, evaluate and supervise 
implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
 What political will is available to support implementation of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe? 
 What are the possible recommendations to improve economic policies for socio-
economic development in Zimbabwe? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Linked to the research questions are the research objectives. The objectives aim to 
provide answers to the research questions. 
 To conceptualise and explain the meaning and evaluation phases of the concept 
‘public policy’; 
 To discuss economic reforms experienced in Africa, the Southern Africa 
Development Community, in Zimbabwe; and economic policies in Zimbabwe; 
 To explain the determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe; 
 To explain the Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time 
Framed (SMART) policy objectives to improve economic policies for socio-
economic development in Zimbabwe; 
 To discuss adequate resources that are availed to support implementation/action 
plans to improve economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe; 
 To discuss mechanisms that are available to monitor, evaluate and supervise 
implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe; 
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 To discuss political will that is available to support implementation of economic 
policies in Zimbabwe; and 
 To provide the possible recommendations to improve economic policies for socio-
economic development in Zimbabwe. 
1.5 Social Science Research Paradigm 
Paradigms “are a way of framing what we know, what we can know, and how we can 
know it. A paradigm is a way of viewing the world (or ‘analytic lens’ akin to a set of 
glasses) and a framework from which to understand the human experience” (Kuhn 
1962, in DeCarlo 2018:144). According to Kuhn (1970), “a paradigm is the underlying 
assumptions and intellectual structure upon which research and development in a field 
of inquiry is based.” A “paradigm refers to a pattern, structure and framework or 
system of scientific and academic ideas, values and assumptions” (Olsen, Lodwick 
and Dunlop 1992:16). In addition, Doyle, Brady and Byrne (2009:176) state that “the 
worldview, theoretical lens and paradigm are all terms used interchangeably in the 
literature”.  Wand and Weber (1993:220) add that, “a paradigm is a worldview that is 
defined by distinct elements including epistemology (how we know what we know), 
ontology (nature of reality), axiology (values) and methodology (the process of 
research). The term ontology refers to a branch of philosophy concerned with 
articulating the nature and structure of the world”.  
The types of paradigms are interpretivist, positivist, feminist, postmodern and social 
science. This study adopts an interpretivist paradigm.  Interpretive “researchers 
believe that the reality to consists of people’s subjective experiences of the external 
world; thus, they may adopt an inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological belief 
that reality is socially constructed” (Thomas n.d.:295). According to Angen (2000:380), 
“interpretive approaches rely heavily on naturalistic methods such as interviews, 
observation and analysis of existing texts”.” It is against this background that 
qualitative data research methods were employed to answer some of the research 
questions which required explanations from the respondents. In addition, a review of 
some secondary data required explanations from respondents to understand the 
historical performance of the selected policies. The interpretivist approach was also 
important to understand the diverse views from the respondents. Naturally, people 
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understand things differently. Also, people’s experiences on economic policies were 
varied, hence it was important to get their mixed views. 
1.6 Research design  
The “research design refers to the overall strategy that a researcher can choose to 
integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby, 
ensuring the effectiveness of addressing the research problem” (Yin, Gwaltney and 
Margaret 1982:2). It is further stated by De Vaus (2001:16), that “research design in 
not related to any particular method of collecting data or any type of data. Any research 
design can, in principle, use either quantitative or qualitative data”. In order to achieve 
the research objectives, two types of research (exploratory and descriptive) were 
considered. 
When a researcher has a limited amount of experience with or knowledge about a 
research issue, exploratory research is useful. It ensures that a more rigorous, more 
conclusive future study will begin with an inadequate understanding of the nature of 
the problem at hand. Usually, exploratory research provides greater understanding of 
a concept or crystallises a problem. Exploratory research is initial research conducted 
to clarify and define the nature of a problem (Manerikar and Manerikar (2014:1). 
Perhaps very little prior research has been conducted on the subject. If this is the case, 
a researcher may wish to do some exploratory work to learn what method to use in 
collecting data, how best to approach research participants, or even what sorts of 
questions are reasonable to ask (Sheppard 2019:60). It is further explained by 
Sheppard (2019:60) that, “conducting exploratory research on a topic is often a 
necessary first step, both to satisfy researcher curiosity about the subject and to better 
understand the phenomenon and the research participants in order to design a larger, 
subsequent study”.  For Devault (2019:2) exploratory research “does not aim for 
specific results or data points. It is more open-ended. It helps the researcher to identify 
problems and usually involves interviews or focus groups with extensive input from 
participants”. In this study, exploratory research was adopted to explore the 
determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe. It assisted the researcher to explore 
the research topic that had not been fully researched, and hence little information was 
available.  
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According to Bhat (2016:2020), “descriptive research is defined as a research method 
that describes the characteristics of the population or phenomenon that is being 
studied. This methodology focuses more on the ‘what’ of the research subject rather 
than the ‘why’ of the research subject. In other words, descriptive research primarily 
focuses on describing the nature of a demographic segment, without focusing on ‘why’ 
a certain phenomenon occurs. Thus, it ‘describes’ the subject of the research, without 
covering ‘why it happens”. In descriptive research, the data can be collected through 
surveys, observation and case studies. In this study, descriptive research was used to 
collect information using questions such as what are economic policies in Zimbabwe?; 
what are determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe?, and what are critical 
success factors for effective implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
1.7 Research methodology and research methods  
Naidoo (2011:47) defines research as “the diligent systematic enquiry into nature and 
society to validate and refine existing knowledge and to generate new knowledge”. 
Research can be broadly divided into two principal categories that are qualitative and 
quantitative (Neuman 2014:167). Qualitative research, according to Guba and Lincoln 
(1994:2) “is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to 
its subject matter.  This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them”.  On the other hand, “quantitative research is used to 
quantify the problem by way of generating numerical data or data that can be 
transformed into useable statistics. It is used to quantify attitudes, opinions, 
behaviours, and other defined variables-and generalise results from a larger sample 
population. Quantitative research uses measurable data to formulate facts and 
uncover patterns in research” (Hammarberg, Kirkman and de Lacey 2015: 498). This 
study is qualitative in nature. 
Research methodology “is a systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science of 
studying how research is to be carried out. Essentially, the procedures by which 
researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena 
are called research methodology. It is also defined as the study of methods by which 
knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research” (Rajasekar, 
Philominathan and Chinnathambi 2013:5). Research methods, according to the 
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University of Newcastle (2019:1), “are the strategies, processes or techniques utilised 
in the collection of data or evidence for analysis in order to uncover new information 
or create better understanding of a topic”. It is, according to Goundar (2019:9), “thus 
interesting to note that research methodology paves the way for research methods to 
be conducted properly. Research methodology is the beginning whereas research 
methods are the end of any scientific or non-scientific research”. 
1.8 Qualitative Research Approach to the methodology 
Qualitative “research can help researchers to access the thoughts and feelings of 
research participants, which can enable development of an understanding of the 
meaning that people ascribe to their experiences” (Sutton and Austin 2015: 226). 
Whereas quantitative research methods can be used to determine how many people 
undertake particular behaviours, qualitative methods can help researchers to 
understand how and why such behaviours take place (Sutton and Austin 2015: 226). 
It is further explained by Hammarberg et al. (2015:498) that “qualitative methods are 
used to answer questions about experience, meaning and perspective, most often 
from the standpoint of the participant. These data are usually not amenable to counting 
or measuring”. Elo, Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen and Kyngäs (2014:5) add 
that “the major advantage of qualitative research is the richness of the collected data 
and such data need to be interpreted and coded in a valid and reliable way”.  
The qualitative research approach was used to unearth contradictory beliefs, 
behaviours and emotions of the implementing agencies. The researcher gained an in-
depth understanding of implementing agencies’ experiences and did not merely obtain 
information which can be generalised to other larger groups. The researcher was 
guided by the theoretical and conceptual frameworks studied under the literature 
review to carry out investigations into the areas of concern. The qualitative approach 
offered great flexibility. Data was collected in contextual form on the basis of 
interviews, observations and case studies and the tools to be used were semi-
structured interview guides, observation guides and checklists, respectively. It was 
significant to obtain and understand opinions, views and perceptions of respondents 
regarding the determinants of national economic policies in Zimbabwe. The qualitative 
study with an interpretive worldview was therefore considered relevant for the study. 
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The interview guide was the tool used to gather qualitative data. Qualitative research 
helped the researcher identify the key issues. It also enabled the study to pick up some 
variables that would otherwise have been overlooked. This method was essential 
since the study was made at a period when time and money were very limited. The 
qualitative method was also useful to improve the quality of the other instruments such 
as the interview and observation guides; that is, to provide clarity of terms, and relevant 
questions to ask. In addition, this method helped the researcher to understand 
people’s viewpoints on concepts under study, the manner to categorise concepts, and 
hence to phrase questions appropriately. Qualitative research involved collecting data 
in its natural settings to explore and understand the national economic policies’ issues.  
Through this approach, the study could assess if the policies in question had achieved 
their intended objectives or not. The researcher also employed this approach to 
deduce recommendations from the respondents.  
1.9 Unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis “answers the question of ‘what’ and ‘who’ is being studied” (Kumar 
2018:70-71) in any research. It is, according to Kumar (2018:71), “the whole unit being 
researched. It includes individuals, groups of individuals, organisations of individuals, 
countries, technologies and objects that are the aim of the investigation”. For this 
study, the unit of analysis is national economic policies and the case under research 
is Zimbabwe.  
1.10 Sampling procedure 
Sampling “refers to the selection of a sub-set of persons or things from a larger 
population, also known as a sampling frame with the intention of representing the 
particular population” (Scott and Morrison 2007:219). There are two types of sampling 
techniques: probability and non-probability. The study utilised the non-probability 
sampling technique. Taherdoost (2016:22-23) elaborates that “non-probability 
sampling is often associated with case study research design and qualitative research. 
With regard to the latter, case studies tend to focus on small samples and are intended 
to examine a real life phenomenon, not to make statistical inferences in relation to the 
wider population”. When “following a qualitative research design, non-probability 
sampling techniques, such as purposive sampling, can provide researchers with 
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strong theoretical reasons for their choice of units (or cases) to be included in their 
sample. Rather than using probabilistic methods (i.e., random selection) to generate 
a sample, non-probability sampling requires researchers to use their subjective 
judgements, drawing on theory (i.e., the academic literature) and practice (i.e., the 
experience of the researcher and the evolutionary nature of the research process)” 
(Lund Research 2012:1). Examples of non-probability sampling include quota 
sampling, snowball sampling, convenience sampling and purposive or judgmental 
sampling.  The study utilised purposive sampling.  
According to Creswell and Plano (2007:125), purposeful sampling is “whereby the 
researcher selects individuals and sites for study because they can purposefully inform 
an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon under study”. The 
major advantages of purposive sampling “involves identifying and selecting individuals 
or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with 
a phenomenon of interest” (Palinkas, Horwitz, Green, Wisdom, Duan and Hoagwood 
2015: 534). In addition, “the importance of availability and willingness to participate, 
and the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, 
and reflective manner” (Palinkas et al. 2015:534) add value to the qualitative research. 
Oppong (2013:203) clarifies “a purposive sample as a non-representative sub-set of 
some larger population and is constructed to serve a very specific need or purpose. 
Purposive sampling (also known as judgment, selective or subjective sampling) is a 
sampling technique in which the researcher relies on his or her own judgment when 
choosing members of population to participate in the study”. According to Oppong 
(2013:203), “purposive sampling occurs when elements selected for the sample are 
chosen by the judgment of the researcher. Researchers often believe that they can 
obtain a representative sample by using sound judgment, which will result in saving 
time and money. Purposive sampling concentrates on people with particular 
characteristics who will better be able to assist with the relevant research. Data 
gathering is crucial in research, as the data is meant to contribute to a better 
understanding of a theoretical framework”. DeCarlo (2018:272) posits that in purposive 
sampling, “a researcher selects participants from their sampling frame because they 
have characteristics that the researcher desires. A researcher begins with specific 
characteristics in mind that s/he wishes to examine and then seeks out research 
participants who cover that full range of characteristics”. Coyne (1997:628) expounds 
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on that when explaining that in “purposeful sampling the researcher selects a 
participant according to the needs of the study. The researcher initially chooses to 
interview informants with a broad general knowledge of the topic or those who have 
undergone the experience and whose experience is considered typical”. 
In this study, the researcher identified individuals who were knowledgeable and had 
vast experience of the policies being investigated. The researcher made a deliberate 
choice of participants due to the qualities the participants possess. The chosen groups 
participated in policy discussions at higher levels in government and political 
structures. They were professionals trusted to respond to the research questions in an 
unbiased manner. The other reason why the researcher employed a purposive 
sampling technique was because it was not possible to specify the entire population 
of everyone who is knowledgeable about policy processes in Zimbabwe - they would 
not all be known, and accessing all would be difficult. In this case, the researcher 
focused on the target groups mentioned below.    
The study was conducted in Harare Metropolitan Province only, due to limited 
resources. All the below mentioned respondents were approached for data collection. 
The researcher gained a deep in-depth understanding of these issues through 
naturalist enquiry, particularly during participation in the following activities. 
 Policy Transition Think Tank (PTTT) retreat which was held at Leopard Rock in 
Manicaland from 11th to 17th March 2018. This Think Tank was established by 
the new President of Zimbabwe, Dr E.D. Mnangagwa in December 2017 to identify 
policy bottlenecks (which hampered development in the first Republic of 
Zimbabwe) and proffer policy advice to the new government of the second 
Republic with a view to break away from the old. The PTTT was a team of thirty-
five experts strategically selected on the basis of their expertise and experience, 
and drawn from all socio-economic sectors, including Zimbabweans working in the 
diaspora. The researcher being a senior civil servant, was assigned as a 
government resource person to the Think Tank. The researcher was also a 
member of the Think Tank’s secretariat.  
 A Seminar on Economic Development which was jointly organised by the World 
Bank, and the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural 
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Resettlement in March 2019. The seminar was held at Wildguese Hotel in Harare. 
A Focus Group Discussion on Policy and Regulatory (FGDPR) issues affecting 
economic development was created where the researcher was a member. There 
were nine members of the focus group, drawn from the World Bank (two), Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (one), European External Action Services (one), 
Office of the President and Cabinet (one), Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation 
and Irrigation Development (two), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
(one), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (one).  
 Interviews were also conducted in early 2020 (before Covid-19) with the following 
office-bearers who are expert in the field of public policy formulation, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation: Minister of State for Provincial 
Affairs (one); Officer responsible for policy formulation, implementation and 
evaluation in ministries (Office of the President and Cabinet) (one); Officers who 
served, or are currently employed, in the Ministry of Local Government and Public 
Works (two); Officers who are currently employed in the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (two); a former National Economic Planning Commission  
Officer (one); and a policy making expert in the Department of Monitoring and 
Evaluation (one). 
 Political Parties Dialogue (PPD), a forum of political parties which fielded 
presidential candidates in July 2018 presidential elections. The forum was 
established by the President Dr E.D. Mnangagwa in March 2019 with a view to 
discuss policy issues surrounding politics and social and economic development.  
Eighteen political parties were participating. The researcher was a member of the 
secretariat to Political Parties Dialogue. For PPD, the political parties are given 
pseudonyms, as stated in Table 1.2 below: 
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Table 1.2: Political Parties Dialogue: participants and information 
Number 
of parties 
Name of the political party Pseudonym 
Party 1 Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) P1 
Party 2 # 1980 freedom Movement Zimbabwe P2 
Party 3 Bethel Christian Party P3 
Party 4 Zimbabwe Partnership for Prosperity  P4 
Party 5 Coalition of Democrats P5 
Party 6 Democratic Opposition Party P6 
Party 7 United African National Council   P7 
Party 8 Independent  P8 
Party 9  Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) P9 
Party 10 National Alliance of Patriotic and Democratic Republicans P10 
Party 11 National Constitutional Assembly P11 
Party 12 New Patriotic Front P12 
Party 13 Rebuild Zimbabwe P13 
Party 14 Republican Party of Zimbabwe P14 
Party 15 United Democracy Movement P15 
Party 16 United Democratic Front P16 
Party 17 The People's Rainbow Coalition P17 
Party 18 People’s Democratic Party  P18 
Source: (Researcher’s own compilation) 
Data was also collected through observation by the researcher. The researcher is 
employed in the Department of Policy Formulation, Analysis and Coordination within 
the Office of the President and Cabinet. The department is responsible for supervising 
all government ministries when formulating policies. It is also responsible for analysing 
existing policies as well as coordinating all government policies.  
As pointed out by Oppong (2013:203), “in qualitative research, it is difficult to fix 
sample size prior to data collection since in purposive sampling the size is usually 
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determined by theoretical saturation. Data saturation is a process whereby new data 
collection provides no new or additional insights to the issue under investigation”.” 
Thus, the researcher collected data until there was no more new information coming 
from the respondents. It “has been suggested that saturation of data may indicate the 
optimal sample size. By definition, saturated data ensure replication in categories, 
which in turn verifies and ensures comprehension and completeness” (in Elo et al. 
2014:5). If “the saturation of data is incomplete, it may cause problems in data analysis 
and prevent items being linked together. Well-saturated data facilitates its 
categorisation and abstraction. It is easier to recognise when saturation is achieved if 
data are at least preliminarily collected and analysed at the same time” (in Elo et al. 
2014:5). 
1.11 Unobtrusive research techniques applied for the purposes of this 
thesis  
Unobtrusive research “refers to methods of collecting data that don’t interfere with the 
subjects under study (because these methods are not obtrusive). Both qualitative and 
quantitative researchers use unobtrusive research methods. Unobtrusive methods 
share the unique quality that they do not require the researcher to interact with the 
people” (Sheppard 2019:314) under study. Esterberg (2002:129) explains that, “social 
workers interested in history are likely to use unobtrusive methods, which are also 
well-suited to comparative research. Historical comparative research is research that 
focuses either on one or more cases over time (the historical part) or on more than 
one nation or society at one point in time (the comparative part)”. While not all 
unobtrusive researchers necessarily conduct historical, comparative, or even some 
combination of historical and comparative work, unobtrusive methods are well-suited 
to such work (Esterberg 2002:129).  
Unobtrusive “research methods offer a strong critique of positivism, namely the 
concept that truths can be determined about the social world by scientific 
measurement. They instead belong to the epistemological theory of interpretivism, 
which is that the social sciences are fundamentally different from natural sciences and 
therefore requires researchers to reject empiricism and grasp the subjective meaning 
of social action” (in Nhlapo 2020:31-32). Unobtrusive “measurement presumably 
reduces the bias that results from the intrusion of the researcher” (in Bangani 
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2019:15). Researchers “who seek evidence of what people actually do, as opposed to 
what they say they do (as in survey and interview research), might wish to consider 
using unobtrusive methods. Researchers often, as a result of their presence, have an 
impact on the participants in their study simply because they measure and observe 
them” (LardBucket 2012:3).  Another advantage of using unobtrusive research is that 
“data analysis is quicker and cheaper than a traditional study because the data are 
already collected. Unobtrusive research is also pretty forgiving. It is far easier to 
correct mistakes made in data collection when conducting unobtrusive research than 
when using any of the other methods” (DeCarlo 2018:402). Unobtrusive research 
satisfies “reliability issues of stability, reproducibility, and accuracy” (Pressbooks 
2020:2). 
The major challenge of unobtrusive research is validity. Sheppard (2019:319) explains 
that “because unobtrusive researchers analyse data that may have been created or 
gathered for purposes entirely different from the researcher’s aim, problems of validity 
sometimes arise in such projects. It may also be the case that data sources measuring 
whatever a researcher wishes to examine simply do not exist. This means that 
unobtrusive researchers may be forced to tweak their original research interests or 
questions to better suit the data that are available to them”. In unobtrusive research, 
“data stems from the lack of control over the data collection process. Also, the 
researcher need to attend to how the original researchers dealt with missing or 
incomplete data” (Pressbooks 2020:3). Therefore, DeCarlo (2018:416) expounds that 
“while the challenges associated with secondary data analysis are important, the 
strengths of secondary data analysis often outweigh these limitations”. As such, this 
study aimed to utilise unobtrusive research techniques with an aim to establish a 
theoretical basis for the thesis. 
1.12 Theoretical framework 
Jann and Wegrich (2007:43-44) state that “from its origins in the 1950s, the field of 
policy analysis has been tightly connected with a perspective that considers the policy 
process as growing through a sequence of discrete stages of phases. The policy cycle 
framework or perspective has served as a basic template that allows people to 
systematise and compare the diverse debates, approaches and models in the field 
and assess the individual contribution of the respective approaches to the discipline”. 
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At the same time, as emphasised by Jann and Wegrich (2017:43-44), “the framework 
has regularly been criticised in terms of its theoretical construction as well as in terms 
of its empirical validity. On the one hand research continues to rely on the stages or 
cycle perspectives or is linked to one of its research questions. On the other hand, the 
very concept of the stages perspective has become discredited by a variety of 
criticisms, including attacks on the theoretical status of the policy cycle as a framework 
or model”. Similarly, according to Nyikadzino (2020:26), “the function of a theoretical 
framework is to inform the rest of the design, to help to assess and refine the goals, to 
develop realistic and relevant research questions, to select appropriate methods, to 
identify potential validity threats to conclusions, and to help justify one’s research. It 
therefore serves as the life blood of the research since it is strongly linked to the 
research problem, research questions, and research methodology. It also informs the 
conceptual framework”.   
1.13 Conceptual framework 
Conceptual frameworks “are used in research for outlining possible options or for 
presenting the preferred approach, namely defining the problem and purpose, 
conducting a literature review, devising a methodology, data collection and final 
analysis. These are very close to empirical inquiry and take different forms according 
to the research question or problem at hand, e.g. exploration, description, 
understanding, deciding and consequential explanation” (Kivunja 2018:47). A 
conceptual framework is “much more than a literature review. It doesn't just summarise 
current published research. It takes into consideration all current theories, findings and 
contexts for the research questions. A conceptual framework must look at multiple 
disciplines to adequately frame the research project. A complete conceptual 
framework helps the researcher to assess the goals of the research and develop 
appropriate research questions and methodology. One of the ways it does that is it 
shows the gaps in the current research” (Kivunja 2018:47).  
Conceptual analysis, according to the Colorado State University (1993:4), “begins with 
identifying research questions and choosing a sample or samples. Once chosen, the 
text must be coded into manageable content categories. The process of coding is 
basically one of selective reduction. By reducing the text to categories consisting of a 
word, set of words or phrases, the researcher can focus on, and code for, specific 
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words or patterns that are indicative of the research question”. A conceptual analysis, 
according to Auriacombe (2012) “needs to indicate which interpretations of concepts, 
theories, phenomena and variables the researcher believes to be most valid and it 
must be supported by evidence. It unpacks the key concepts, theories and phenomena 
used in the preparation of the research study in order to determine the relationships 
between the concepts and the variables that influence the phenomenon under study 
in order to draw conclusions”. In this study conceptual analysis began with identifying 
research questions informed by the problem statement and existing literature on the 
topic under study. Key concepts were extracted from the research questions and 
objectives. These then informed the questions in the interview guide and the 
observation guide. The concepts were categorised to simplify the analysis of results 
for the selected concepts. The rationale of using conceptual analysis is that it signifies 
the aspects of both theoretical and conceptual frameworks. 
1.14 Analytical framework  
Analytical frameworks “provide the basic vocabulary of concepts and terms that may 
be used to construct the kinds of causal explanations expected of a theory. Moreover, 
frameworks help to organise research and provide a general list of areas or variables 
that will be used in any type of analysis. The analytical framework helps to organise 
research by linking the theoretical questions to the empirical analysis, while serving as 
a platform for the construction of theoretical explanations, which represent the flow of 
knowledge in various contexts and conditions” (Coral and Bokelmann 2017:1). It is 
further claimed by Chataigner (2017:1), that “analytical frameworks help researchers 
to approach a problem with logic and in a systematic way, and to set a clear driving 
force behind their lines of enquiries. Developing frameworks suppose breaking down 
the issue at stake into sub-components and creating a mental model, often presented 
visually, that provides a foundation and a guide for data collation and analysis, as well 
as their boundaries”. In the same vein, the Coordinated Assessment and Information 
Management (CAIM) Training Manual (2020:14), states that “analytical frameworks 
are designed to structure an analyst’s thinking, and to help logical thinking in a 
systematic manner. In short, analytical frameworks are models that aim to guide and 
facilitate sense making and understanding”. Coral and Bokelmann (2017:1-2) point out 
that “the difference between a framework and a model is that a model formulates a 
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hypothesis related to a limited set of parameters and variables through simulation, 
experimentation, and prediction, among others, with the objective of exploring these 
assumptions in a systematic way with a limited number of outcomes”. Models 
constitute a more detailed manifestation of a general theoretical explanation, in terms 
of the functional relationships among independent and dependent variables relevant 
to or within a particular setting. In contrast, a framework is a platform in which theories 
and models can be constructed (Coral and Bokelmann 2017:1-2).  
Chataigner (2017:6) argues that “defining a theoretical framework forces researchers 
to be selective, to decide which variables are most important and necessary, which 
relationships are likely to be most meaningful, and, therefore, what information should 
be collected and analysed. Data collected using frameworks is ordered in descriptive 
‘chunks’ which support question-focused analysis and comparisons”. The importance 
of an analytical framework as postulated by Coral and Bokelmann (2017:11) is that “it 
is taken as the starting point of the research, as it facilitates the linkage between the 
theoretical question and the empirical analysis. In addition, it constitutes a flexible 
framework that can represent the flow of knowledge in various contexts and 
conditions”. Chataigner (2017:6) also points out that “analysis conducted using 
frameworks is systematic, comprehensive and transparent and reduces the impact of 
selection and process biases”. In this study, the researcher identified basic vocabulary 
of concepts and terms from the literature reviewed that were important. From these 
concepts, the researcher visualised their relationship, giving an idea of how the study 
may be executed as well as informing the designing of data collection tools.  
1.15 Documentary content analysis 
Content analysis is a type of unobtrusive research, where “information about the 
respondent is gathered through public documents. As such, there is no direct 
interaction between the researcher and respondent that involves the study of human 
communications” (in Nhlapo 2020:32). The documents that content analysts 
investigate includes newspapers, letters, and communiques, and speeches. For 
example, Sheppard and Fennell (2019) utilised a content analysis approach to 
examine public sector tourism policies from around the world over a time span of 
approximately 30 years (Sheppard 2019:321). In the same vein, content analysis was 
employed in this study to critically assess the implementation of national economic 
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policies from 1980 to 2015. Wamboldt (1992:314) explains that “as a research method, 
content analysis represents a systematic and objective means of describing” any 
phenomena under study. Luo (2019:1) states that “content analysis can be both 
quantitative (focused on counting and measuring) and qualitative (focused on 
interpreting and understanding) ”. However, this study utilised the qualitative content 
analysis method to understand the determinants and critical success factors for 
effective implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe. 
1.16 Historical/comparative analysis 
Historical/comparative analysis “is characterised by its emphasis on historically 
contextualised comparisons explicitly aimed at producing causal arguments about the 
macro-sociological phenomena” (Porta 2014:100). It is further stated by Porta 
(2014:100), that the historical/comparative “enquiry is fundamentally concerned with 
explanations of causal configurations that produce major outcomes of interest. In 
comparative historical studies, the causal argument is central to the analysis, thus 
causal propositions are carefully selected and tested rather than introduced ad hoc as 
incidental parts of an overall narrative”. Historical/comparative sequences, according 
to Porta (2014:100), “take seriously the unfolding of process over time. It is distinct 
because its practitioners engage in systematic and contextualised comparisons of 
similar and contrasting cases”. Most historical/comparative work aims for explanations 
for important outcomes within delimited historical contexts, usually focusing on a 
smaller number of cases (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:13). In this study, 
historical/comparative analysis was employed to understand how national economic 
policies have been formulated and performed since 1980. The study looks at the 
relationship between policies and socio-economic development of Zimbabwe since 
1980. This analysis was important to understand how the process has unfolded over 
a long period of time. The study employed document review, interviews and case 
studies to understand the historical experience related to economic policies in 
Zimbabwe. 
1.17 Data collection methods applied for the purposes of this thesis 
The following research methods were utilised to collect relevant information and data 
for the study: 
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1.17.1 Document Review 
As adapted by Makhubu (2020:12), a document review, refers to “the analysis of 
documents that contain information about the phenomenon one wishes to study”. The 
researcher can use data drawn from documents; for example, to contextualise data 
collected during interviews. Information contained in documents can suggest some 
questions that need to be asked and situations that need to be observed as part of the 
research. Document review provides a platform for one method to complement 
another in an interactive way. Also, documents provide supplementary research data. 
Information and insights derived from documents can be valuable additions to a 
knowledge base, whereby documents provide a means of tracking change and 
development (Bowen 2009:27-29). Where various drafts of a particular document are 
accessible, the researcher can compare them to identify the changes. Importantly too, 
documents can be analysed as a way to verify findings or corroborate evidence from 
other sources (Bowen 2009:27-29). Document review was critical in this study. As 
suggested by Nyikadzino (2020:34), a document review is significant as it aims “to 
redress and counter-check possible limitations that arose from biases associated with 
in-depth interviews and purposive sampling”.   
Document review was essential in this study because it provided a record of events 
over a period of time. In this study it revealed any positive change or negative outcome 
that had been brought by national economic policies under study, was deduced by 
comparing the period before and after the programme was launched. Importantly also, 
it provided researcher with an in-depth understanding and assessment of the context. 
For instance, the researcher analysed the alignment of budgets to the policies. Such 
information was then essential in informing the development of tools to be used during 
qualitative data collection. The study reviewed all national economic policies that were 
launched in government since 1980. These are: Growth with Equity (1981); 
Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83 -1984/85);  Zimbabwe: A 
Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95); Second Five-Year National Development 
Plan (1991-1995); Vision 2020 (2000); Ten Point Plan (2002); National Economic 
Revival Programme: Measures to Address the Current Challenges (2003); Zimbabwe: 
Towards Sustained Economic Growth- Macro-Economic Policy Framework (2005-
2006); Short-Term Economic Stabilisation Programme (2008); Short Term Emergency 
Recovery Programme (2009): Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again; Three Year Macro-
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Economic Policy and Budget Framework: STERP II (2010-2012): Reconstruction With 
Equitable Growth and Stability; Zimbabwe Medium Term Plan (2011-2015); and 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset) 
October 2013 – December 2018. Line Ministries’ sectoral policies also provided 
valuable information in this study to check on policy consistencies and synergistic 
relationships.    
Document analysis “is a social research method that is used as a tool for obtaining 
relevant documentary evidence to support and validate facts stated in research, 
especially in the literature review chapter. This exercise involves analytical reading 
and a review of large amounts of written material (Creswell 2013, in Nhlapo 2020:39). 
Document analysis “is often used in combination with other qualitative research 
methods as a means of triangulation-the combination of methodologies in the study of 
the same phenomenon” (Denzin 1970:291). The “qualitative researcher is expected to 
draw upon multiple (at least two) sources of evidence; that is, to seek convergence 
and corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods. Like other 
analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be 
examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop 
empirical knowledge” (in Bowen 2009:27).  Documents of all types, as stated above, 
can help the researcher to obtain insight regarding the topic under study. In this study, 
several documents were reviewed, such as national economic policies launched since 
1980, national budget statements, estimates of expenditures, Auditor General’s 
reports, Government of Zimbabwe publications, official reports, Acts of Parliament, 
reports of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and ZimStat, international and local 
publications, scholarly journal articles, books, newspapers and magazines. In addition, 
the national budget handbooks and the monetary and fiscal policies covering the 
duration under study were analysed. The researcher visited the Government Work 
Programme and Parliamentary Hansard as sources of information. The Ministries’ 
strategic and implementation plans were essential. The study drew some information 
from the line Ministries’ annual reports.  
1.17.2 Literature Review 
A literature review “involves identifying and analysing information resources and/or 
literature that relates to a given research problem” (Robson 2011, in Makhubu 
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2020:10). It is “the critical component of the research process that provides an in-depth 
analysis of recently published research findings in specifically identified areas of 
interest” (Houser 2018:109). The literature review, according to Machi and 
McEvoy (2012:4), “is a written document that presents a logically argued case founded 
on a comprehensive understanding of the current state of knowledge about a topic of 
study. Boote and Beile (2005:3) lament that “a substantive, thorough, sophisticated 
literature review is a precondition for doing substantive, thorough, sophisticated 
research. A researcher cannot perform significant research without first understanding 
the literature in the field”. The purpose of the literature review as emphasised by Bless 
and Smith (2011, in Nhlapo 2020:42), includes the following: “to familiarise the 
researcher with developments in the area of research, to identify gaps in knowledge, 
to identify weaknesses in previous studies, and to study the advantages and 
disadvantages of a research method used by others”. The overall purpose of the 
review of related literature is to provide an overview of the literature about the 
researcher’s chosen topic of enquiry. The overview helps the researcher to determine 
the current state of research on the topic intended to be researched. In this study, the 
literature review was done by compiling information from books, dissertations and 
theses, internet sources, government publications, scholarly journal articles, 
conference papers, newspapers, and magazines. 
1.18 Data-collection techniques 
The study utilised the following data collection techniques: 
1.18.1 Interviews 
Boyce and Neale (2006:3) define interviews “as a qualitative research technique that 
involves having intensive individual interviews with a small number of interviewees to 
explore their perspectives on a certain idea, programme or situation”.  McGrath, 
Palmgren and Liljedahl (2018: 1002) reinforce that “interviews are a method of data 
collection that involves two or more people exchanging information through a series 
of questions and answers. Qualitative interviews are sometimes called intensive or in-
depth interviews. Qualitative interviews use open-ended questions, which are 
questions that a researcher poses but does not provide answer options for qualitative 
interviews afford researchers opportunities to explore, in an in-depth manner, matters 
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that are unique to the experiences of the interviewees, allowing insights into how 
different phenomena of interest are experienced and perceived”. Considering “the 
relationship between participants and researchers and the emphasis on the 
exploration of human phenomena, interviews have traditionally been a data-collection 
method linked with qualitative research” (McGrath et al. 2018:1002). In this study, the 
one-on one in-depth interviews were valuable sources of primary data.  Interviews 
were conducted with members of the PTTT; FGDPR; PPD; Minister of State for 
Provincial Affairs; and office-bearers who are expert in the field of public policy 
formulation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (see Section 1.10). These 
participants were purposively chosen because of their background and experiences in 
policy discourse in Zimbabwe.  
In-depth interviews created an environment conducive to sensitive areas to be 
explored. The interview questions focused on participants’ experiences, feelings and 
convictions about the national economic policy implementation status and the 
determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe. This platform also enabled the 
interviewee to make recommendations to address the challenges currently being 
faced in implementing national economic policies in government.  
However, the interviews had their own shortcomings which the researchers strived to 
overcome. Boyce and Neale (2006:3) state that “in-depth interviews are susceptible 
to interviewer bias and require considerable preparation”. Moreover, some 
interviewees may want to dominate the discussion, whilst some may hesitate to speak 
the truth. To overcome some these challenges, a semi-structured interview guide was 
used during interview sessions to enable the researcher to collect all the data required 
in a focused manner. The issue of confidentiality was over-emphasised   in order for 
the study to get valid and reliable data. The interview guide was designed and pre-
tested before being used during interview sessions. This helped the researcher to 
ensure that all pertinent questions were answered. The tool was also important to 
assist the researcher to stay focused on the research objectives.  
Researchers keep field notes that assist to “document what they observe, and in so 
doing, they form the first draft of data analysis. Field notes may contain many things-
observations of body language or environment, reflections on whether interview 
questions are working well, and connections between ideas that participants share. 
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Qualitative research is open to new ideas that emerge through the data collection 
process” (DeCarlo 2018:366-372). The interview guide used in the study is attached 
under Annexure C. The guide has questions with a limited range of topics that could 
easily be answered individually or in a group setup. Fewer questions enabled the 
interviewer to have more time to pursue leads in-depth before moving on to other 
items. Moreover, a shorter agenda made it possible for participants to express 
themselves freely and in a relaxed atmosphere. The guide was designed so that it 
allowed the flow of discussion and considered the general background of the 
participants. On the other hand, pre-determined questions kept the discussions 
focused. These reduced the risk that the participant could not understand what was 
being asked, which could occur when the questions are framed on the spur of the 
moment.  
During the interview sessions, the researcher concurrently undertook observations of 
key issues that came from the discussions. All responses from the interviews were 
recorded in a notebook. At the end of the day the researcher synthesised the field 
notes. Where there were inconsistencies, the researcher contacted the interviewee for 
clarifications. The major challenge of qualitative interviews is “to rely on respondents’ 
ability to accurately and honestly recall specific details about their lives, 
circumstances, thoughts, opinions, or behaviours. Another challenge is qualitative 
interviewing is time-intensive and can be quite expensive” (The Open University of 
Hong Kong 2020:2). This challenge was overcome by recording field notes.  
1.18.2 Observations 
Observation “is a systematic way of gathering data by watching behaviour, events and 
noting physical events in their natural setting” (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:141). As stated 
by Verma (2015:425), “observations can reveal inter-relationships among multifaceted 
dimensions of group interactions”. Porta (2014:92) explains the use of participant 
observation emphasising that “a growing number of scholars use participant 
observation when studying movements. Through active participation, researchers 
attempt to gain insights into mobilisation processes as they take place and understand 
activism from within”. This was the most useful method utilised by the researcher to 
obtain credible and unbiased data. The researcher was a natural participant in the 
gatherings of participants listed under section 1.10.  The observation method exposed 
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issues not anticipated by the researcher. Also, observation was important for recording 
contextual (background) factors.  
Ritchie and Lewis (2003:141) postulate that observations are susceptible to observer 
bias. Creswell (2009:179) highlights that “observations may be selective and 
subjective, unless the types of actions to be noted are carefully specified in advance 
and it is likely that note keeping may be somewhat random because it is difficult to 
distinguish key activities. Cognitive information such as attitudes, beliefs, motivations 
and perceptions cannot be observed”. Additionally, as emphasised by Creswell 
(2009:179), “in order to circumvent these shortcomings, a structured observation 
guide” can be a useful tool. In addition, creativity in naturalist enquiry was invoked to 
capture relevant comments and behaviours towards the implementation of the national 
economic policies in Zimbabwe. The observation guide was designed, pre-tested and 
used when the researcher was in the field undertaking observations. The tool was 
used as a checklist to ensure that the key variables had been noted. It was used 
concurrently with other instruments when the researcher was conducting primary data 
collection. In addition, the researcher also used it for taking notes.  
1.19 Data analysis 
The researcher collected information and data through various techniques in order to 
address the research questions. The researcher compiled information from responses 
obtained through in-depth interviews and documentary analysis. The information and 
data were compiled through conceptual analysis (see Section 1.13) and documentary 
content analysis (see Section 1.15). 
1.20 Validity and Reliability 
Patino and Ferreira (2018:183) articulate that the “validity of a research study refers 
to how well the results among the study participants represent true findings among 
similar individuals outside the study”.  Sheppard (2019:83) indicates that “to be valid, 
we must be certain that our measures accurately get at the meaning of our concepts. 
While reliability is about consistency, validity is about shared understanding”. Validity 
is the extent to which research findings are trustworthy and meaningful. In this study, 
the researcher pre-tested the data collection tools. This ensured that the concepts 
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were correctly understood by respondents. Thus, there was a common understanding 
of the study concepts between the researcher and the participants.  
Jhangiani and Chiang (2015:30) state that “reliability refers to the consistency of a 
measure. Psychologists consider three types of consistency: over time (test-retest 
reliability), across items (internal consistency), and across different researchers (inter-
rater reliability)”.” In this regard, “reliability refers to whether a research instrument 
gives the same results each time it is used in the same setting with the same type of 
subjects. Reliability essentially means consistent or dependable results. Reliability is 
a part of the assessment of validity” (Jhangiani and Chiang 2015:30). To ensure that 
the research tools were reliable, all the instruments were pre-tested before conducting 
fieldwork.  
With a view for this study to comply with the validity and reliability principles, systematic 
data collection tools were used, these being structured interviews, a structured 
interview guide and semi-structured observation guide. Data triangulation was critical 
in this study to improve the validity of the study findings. Bamberger (2000:14) states 
that “triangulation is the principle of increasing the validity of the data by looking at 
different data sources or by going back to the same subjects at different periods of 
time and asking the same kinds of questions”. Triangulation ensured a deeper 
understanding of the determinants of national economic policies in Zimbabwe. Data 
triangulation was critical in this study to improve the validity of the study findings. 
Bamberger (2000:14) further states that “triangulation is the principle of increasing the 
validity of the data by looking at different data sources or by going back to the same 
subjects at different periods of time and asking the same kinds of questions”. Eisner 
(1991, in Bowen 2009:28) adds that “by triangulating data, the researcher attempts to 
provide a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility”.”  
1.21 Ethical considerations 
Research ethics “requires that researchers should protect the dignity of their subjects 
and publish well the information that is researched” (Akaranga and Makau 2016:1-2). 
In order to obey the aspect of research ethics, a permission letter was obtained from 
the Public Service Commission to collect data from the primary sources outlined under 
section 1.10 (see Annexure A). All respondents were provided with an informed 
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consent form explaining the nature of research (see Annexure B). The respondents 
signed the consent form showing their consent to participate in the study. 
Respondents were informed regarding their voluntarily participate in this study. Where 
they needed clarification, the researcher was available to answer their questions to 
ensure transparency in all that was done. The researcher assured the authorities and 
participants that all information received was going to be treated with confidentiality 
and solely used for the purposes of this study. In addition, the study was not going to 
divulge the identity of respondents. The researcher also obtained an ethical code 
(20PMGPP03) from the College of Business and Economics, University of 
Johannesburg, in order to comply with the ethical considerations mandated by the 
institution.  
1.22 Limitations of the study 
During data collection, the researcher faced the following limitations: 
 Access to classified information.  All Government officials in Zimbabwe are bound 
by the Official Secrecy Act. Due to the existence of this Act, the researcher faced 
difficulties in accessing other important information which could enrich the findings 
of the study.   Cabinet minutes are particularly restricted information, yet these 
were crucial for the study.  
 Lack of government evaluation documents on the performance of policies. There 
is no documentation on a compendium of performances of all government policies. 
Such information could have been obtained in cabinet papers which however, are 
restricted information which is not accessible by the public. To overcome this, the 
researcher had to rely on primary data collection methods. 
 Lack of resources in terms of time, money and manpower to undertake research 
throughout the country. Since government policies affect everyone in the country, 
it could have been enriching to understand the experiences of citizens in the rural 
areas. However, this study was confined to Harare Metropolitan Province only. 
 Bias. Most senior civil servants are afraid to openly critique the government 
policies, especially when participating in interview sessions.  To minimise these 
effects, the researcher had to assure the interviewee that the responses were 
going to be used strictly for academic purposes only.  
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 Information gap. The information under table 1.1 was not available in totality, 
hence data with uniform intervals is not stated. 
1.23 Significance of the study 
Given the rationale and the problem statement under Section 1.2, it is considered that 
policy implementation in Zimbabwe has not been subject to enough scholarly attention 
among policy analysts. General efforts by scholars have been directed at the broad 
policy cycle and gaps remain in policy implementation. In the case of Zimbabwe, the 
government has barely documented information detailing how each of the above 
policies have performed. The information available in the public domain is scanty and 
fragmented. No compendium of information was ever developed by government which 
will make it possible to see the success, failures, lessons learnt of each policy. This 
study therefore seeks to gather information to close policy implementation gaps in 
Zimbabwe. The research aims to identify principal factors that, when followed in 
Zimbabwe, will make a policy achieve its intended goals. There ought to be something 
that has not yet been identified that has led to some Zimbabwean policies being 
abandoned soon after conception or midway through their life span, while others seem 
to have achieved less than expected. The findings are critical for the Government of 
Zimbabwe to advise the stakeholders accordingly on the principal factors that need to 
be done that will ultimately lead to the attainment of the desired goals. The study is 
significant to highlight and recommend areas which might need change management.   
1.24 Terminology Clarification 
The section discusses the major terms used in the study: 
1.24.1 Economic Policy 
An economic policy “is a course of action that is intended to influence or control the 
behaviour of the economy. Economic policies are typically implemented and 
administered by the government. Examples of economic policies include decisions 
made about government spending and taxation, about the redistribution of income 
from rich to poor, and about the supply of money” (CliffsNotes 2020:1). National or 
macro-economic policies aim to fulfil the development goals in country-specific 
contexts. This statement is emphasised by the Economic Development Department 
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(EDD) (Republic of South Africa (RSA) 2016:1) which stresses that in pursuit of its 
developmental agenda, government uses a set of policy tools such as taxation, public 
expenditure, subsidies, credit access and interest rate changes. Macro-economic 
policy seeks to co-ordinate the use of these policy tools so that they deliver sustainable 
human development outcomes. As part of the broad levers of policy, macro-economic 
policy impacts on employment, investment and economic growth, among others. To 
achieve an environment that is conducive for sustainable employment-generating 
growth, macro-economic policy plays a key role. 
1.24.2 Economic Reforms 
Economic reform is defined by Bakoup (2013:9), “as an action by the government 
targeting economic policy instruments designed to effect changes in the behaviours of 
public and/or private economic agents with a view towards either boosting their 
sustainable and non-inflationary demand addressed to the national economy or 
increasing their productive investments to achieve national economic growth and 
employment creation targets”. Economic reform “normally indicates to deregulate or 
at times to decrease the size of government, to eliminate deformities caused by 
management or the presence of administration, rather than current or raised 
regulations or government plans to lessen perversions created by market failure” 
(BYJU’S 2020:1). Rodrik (1996:9) asserts that “reform requires austere policies which 
respect budget constraints. It also precludes compromising with narrow special 
interest groups that have been the beneficiary policies of the past. Policymakers who 
have courageously taken on such interest groups and pursued market-oriented 
policies are the heroes of the economics profession”. Thus, economic reform is when 
government introduces measures that genuinely address the economic challenges for 
the benefit of every citizen to attain high economic growth rates, increased 
employment opportunities and a stable economy. Such policy reforms require political 
will at the highest levels in government structures. 
1.24.3 Public Policy 
Public policy “is a process about selecting strategies and making choices. Public policy 
making includes some steps –setting of agenda, policy formulation, policy adoption 
and policy implementation. It must be also evaluated to see the intended results, to 
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revise existing and future public programmes and projects” (Raipa 2002:1). Hill and 
Hupe (2008:5) define public policies as those policies “developed by governmental 
bodies and officials. In this kind of definition, public policy is about means and ends, 
which have to have a relationship with each other”. Mackay and Shaxton (2005:1-2) 
articulate public policy as “what the government chooses to do, or not to do. It is a 
decision made by government to either act, or not act in order to resolve a problem. 
Public policy is a course of action that guides a range of related actions in a given 
field”.  
1.24.4 Socio-Economic Development 
Seers (1969, in Islam and Ali 2015:928) sees development as when the three evils of 
the society are eliminated, these are: unemployment, poverty and inequality. 
According to Todaro (1977:61), “it would be strange to call a country developed if any 
of these three central problems is present in the economy, even though per capita 
income may double”. In this regard, Todaro (1977:61) defines development “as an 
increase in living standards, improvement in self-esteem needs and freedom from 
oppression as well as greater choice”. Fritz (2010:1-2) adds that “development is a 
planned and comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political  process, in a 
defined geographic area, that is rights-based and ecologically oriented and aims to 
continually improve the well-being of the entire population and all of its individuals, 
whilst economic development is the process of raising the level of prosperity through 
increased production, distribution and consumption of goods and services”. The 
purpose of economic development, according to Fritz (2010:1-2), “is to improve the 
social and material well-being of all individuals and social institutions with the goal of 
achieving the highest possible level of human development. Social development, on 
the other hand, refers to the complexity of social dynamics (the interplay of social 
structures, processes)”. Hicks and Streeten (1979:570) confirm that “social indicators 
attempt to measure the development of health, nutrition, housing, national distribution 
as well as other aspects of cultural and social development. Socio-economic 
development, therefore, requires the integration of economic and social development”. 
Thus economic development is a means to social development. It is the starting point 
in development and not the end in itself. Economic development alone without 
addressing poverty, inequalities, unemployment, greater choices, freedoms etcetera 
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is undesirable. Hence, national economic policies are expected to address the socio-
economic development of the entire population to the point where there is remarkable 
change in the quality of life of citizens. 
1.24.5 Political Will 
Sarajevo (2015:14) defines political will “as the extent of committed support among 
key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem. Within that 
framework, there are four components- sub-conceptual areas- of the proposed 
definition of political will: a sufficient set of decision-makers; with a common 
understanding of a particular problem on the common agenda; is committed to 
supporting; and a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution”. Hence, 
according to Sarajevo (2015:14), “the presence of political will is detected under the 
condition that all four areas are activated; in other words, provided that there is a 
sufficient set of decision makers who share understanding of a problem and who are 
fully committed to providing support, and provided that there is agreement on 
effectiveness of the policy; whilst the absence is detected in the event that one or all 
of the sub conceptual areas are not covered”.  
1.25 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis includes the following chapters: 
Chapter One:  General scientific and methodological orientation to the study 
This chapter looks at the background of all the national economic policies that were 
launched by the Government of Zimbabwe since 1980.  It further moves on to closely 
assess these policies highlighting their areas of success and challenges, and the 
reasons why new policies were being introduced. The chapter also looks at the 
rationale for the study; research problem; research questions and objectives; research 
methodology and methods; unobtrusive research techniques applied for the purpose 
of this thesis; data collection techniques; triangulation; significance and limitations of 
the study; terminology clarification; ethical considerations; and outline of the thesis.    
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Chapter Two:  Economic reforms in Africa, Southern African Development 
Community and Zimbabwe 
The literature review was conducted to gain an in-depth understanding of various 
studies relevant to the economic reforms in Africa, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region and Zimbabwe. The primary goal was to provide a review 
of books, articles, journals, and related resources to compile information relevant to 
this study. With a view to get a deeper understanding of public policies, this chapter 
looks at the conceptual framework, general overview on evolution of public policies, 
phases in public policy, a critical review of economic reforms in Africa, economic 
reforms in the SADC and economic reforms in Zimbabwe. 
Chapter Three:  A review of economic policies in Zimbabwe 
This Chapter discusses all Zimbabwe’s economic policies that were developed from 
the period of 1980 to 2015. The chapter focused on the reason these policies were 
developed, the achievements and challenges of the predecessor policy, vision, goals 
and objectives, targets of the policy under review, strategies to address the goals and 
objectives, budget and funding mechanisms, and monitoring and evaluation plans 
associated with these policies.  
Chapter Four: Determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe 
In the previous chapter, the study found that some policies to a greater extent had 
achieved their objectives whereas some failed. There is an information gap as to why 
some policies perform better than others. Therefore, it is the purpose of this study to 
understand the determinants of a policy in Zimbabwe. In this regard, this chapter 
presents the determinants of economic policies as explained by respondents during 






Chapter Five: Analytical framework on the determinants of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe 
Based on the responses and recommendations received in Chapter Four, this chapter 
provides an analytical framework, highlighting critical success factors to improve 
economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. In line with 
contextual variables, the framework draws information discussing and explaining the 
Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time Framed (SMART) 
policy objectives; adequate resources; mechanisms that are available to monitor, 
evaluate and supervise implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe; and 
political will that is available to support implementation of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe. 
Chapter Six: Synthesis, conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter provides a summarised consolidation of the main findings of the study. 
This final chapter of the thesis offers a synthesis of the key findings of the study drawn 
from responses received in Chapter Four and critical success factors discussed in 
Chapter Five. The chapter aims to draw conclusions on the problem statement 
discussed in Chapter One and to develop policy proposals for the success of economic 
policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. 
The next chapter discusses the concept public policy and its evolution phases; and 
discusses economic reforms in Africa, the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) and Zimbabwe in detail.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY AND ZIMBABWE 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review was conducted to gain an in-depth understanding of various 
studies relevant to the economic reforms in Africa, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region and Zimbabwe. The primary goal was to provide a review 
of books, articles, journals, and related resources to compile information relevant to 
this study. With a view to get a deeper understanding of public policies, this chapter 
looks at the conceptual framework, general overview on evolution of public policies, 
phases in public policy, a critical review of economic reforms in Africa at continental 
and regional contexts as well as in Zimbabwe. The chapter discusses phases in public 
policy exploring the neo-liberal stage; post-independence and the 3G (third 
generation) public policy formulation on the African continent. The chapter explains in 
detail various economic reforms in Africa, highlighting the use of modernisation 
theories; Prebisch-Singer Thesis; growth-equity reforms; Monrovia strategy; structural 
adjustment programmes, and the role of the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD) and African Union (AU) Agenda for socio-economic development in the 
African context. The chapter thereafter explores economic reforms in the regional 
context discussing the Regional Indicative Strategy; Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) Industrial development and free trade area policy. At the end, the 
chapter discusses economic reforms in Zimbabwe emphasising post-independence 
and neo-classical practices in the country specific context. The chapter aims to answer 
the research questions, “What is the meaning of, and evaluation phases of, the 
concept ‘public policy’?  and What are economic reforms experienced in Africa, the 
Southern Africa Development Community and in Zimbabwe? (see Chapter One, 
Section 1.3). 
2.2 Overview on evolution of public policies  
According to Dye (1984:2), “public policy is about what governments do and why they 
do it and the consequences of these policies. Realistically, the general notion of public 
policy is that it must include all actions of government and not what government 
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officials say they are going to do”. Whereas there have been many public policies in 
Zimbabwe since 1980 (ranging in the social, political, cultural, regulatory, fields 
among other sectors), this study focuses on national economic policies commonly 
referred to as economic blue prints or macro-economic policies. Economic policies 
are just one facet of the public policy domain. 
Economic policies “are statements of aims and ideals to be achieved through various 
instruments outlined by the Government to guide the process of economic 
development. In a way, they can be termed as a structural response to correct 
economic imbalances (and inequality). Government, by manipulating economic and 
social variables, influences the process of resource allocation to achieve desired level 
of economic development with social justice and stability” (eGyanKosh n.d.:1). The 
economic policies can be evaluated either as positive or normative economics. 
Positive economics “attempts to describe how the economy and economic policies 
work without resorting to value judgments about which results are best. The 
distinguishing feature of positive economic hypotheses is that they can be tested and 
either confirmed or rejected. For example, the hypothesis that ‘an increase in the 
supply of money leads to an increase in prices’ belongs to the realm of positive 
economics because it can be tested by examining the data on the supply of money 
and the level of prices” (Mifflin 2016:1). Normative economics “involves the use 
of value judgments to assess the performance of the economy and economic policies. 
Consequently, normative economic hypotheses cannot be tested. For example, the 
hypothesis that ‘the inflation rate is too high’ belongs to the realm of normative 
economics because it is based on a value judgment and therefore cannot be tested, 
confirmed, or refuted” (Mifflin 2016:2). This study focuses on both positive and 
normative economics to assess the development Zimbabwe’s economic policies and 
their impact on socio-economic development of the citizens.  
In terms of policy evolution, Sapru (2012:14) states that “the development of the policy 
approach rests on the idea that government could, by making good policies, solve 
problems of the society. It was in America where initiatives towards a more integrated 
approach to the study of public problems and policy really began in the work of Harold 
Lasswell which resulted in the publication of Lerner and Lasswell’s volume on Policy 
Sciences”. Radin (2000:33) has described the institutional and political evolutions of 
the policy sciences. She views the development of policy analysis as a ‘growth 
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industry’ in which a few select government agencies first adopted an explicitly 
innovative analytic approach, others followed, and an industry developed to service 
them. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:213) argue that “equally important is the need to 
appreciate the intimate link between public policies and their ecological contexts. 
Public policies are influenced by the political, economic, or other, factors that will be 
dominating during the time of their development. They have notoriety for benefitting 
third parties”. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:213) add that, “in fact, public policies in terms 
of content and practice usually carry the imprint of their environment. Each 
environment has its own set of socio-politico-economic dynamics which interact to 
either facilitate or disable sound policy making in the polity. Implied here is that public 
policy making is inherently embedded in the politics of its environments”. To buttress 
these statements, Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011:238) states that “most African countries 
have experienced (some still do) a crisis of political turmoil, intolerance and harsh 
dictatorship or have a military regime with highly centralised government processes 
[hence] resulting in a marked degree of social disintegration and economic stress 
throughout the continent”. 
Based on the above authors’ views with respect to interferences by the elite (such as 
economic, political) in policy making processes, one should never rule out the 
influence of politics in all the stages of the policy cycle. In the case of Zimbabwe, to 
some extent the public policies have a bias towards politics. For instance, soon after 
independence government promulgated the ‘growth with equity policy’ to address the 
social imbalances that had been created during the colonial era.  Although this was a 
genuine problem at hand, the policy was a top-down approach focusing on reversing 
the colonial era policies. In addition, the current economic blue print, according to the 
Zim-Asset (2013: 8), “the policy was crafted heavily informed by the Zimbabwe African 
National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 2013 elections manifesto, the August 2013 
President’s inauguration speech and consultative processes involving political 
leadership in the ruling ZANU-PF party, private sector and other stakeholders”.  Whilst 
the aim of the policy was to address socio-economic problems at hand; however, the 
issue of politics should never be undermined in policy discourse.  
47 
2.2.1 Phases in Public Policy 
This section looks at Amoah’s (2008:334) three distinct phases showing a trend that 
public policy processes have followed over some years.  The stages are; namely the 
neo-liberal stage, post-independence policy formulation in Africa, and the 3G public 
policy formation in Africa. The stages seek to demonstrate the neo-liberal domination 
of the public policy formation agenda which was bolstered by the elections of the 
Thatcher Government in 1979 and the Reagan Administration in 1980. 
2.2.1.1 The neo-liberal stage 
According to Amoah (2011:335), “in the early 1930s, developed nations had put in 
place conscious, deliberate and organised processes to dominate public policy 
formation globally with neo-liberal ideas. The classic (modernisation) theories were 
mainly developed between the 1930s and 1960s These development theories were 
developed by Britain, France, Japan and other developed countries”. The policies, as 
further emphasised by Amoah (2011:335), “focused on industrialisation, employment, 
investment and economic growth. No Africans were involved in the whole process; 
hence no African values were captured. In fact, the policies were meant to further the 
interests of those who developed them. However, the policies were also presumed to 
map the development path for Africa”. To further these ideas, a group of 50 
intellectuals emerged as founding members of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS). The 
MPS was formed to push their ideologies through a network of organisations such as 
universities, institutes, foundations, journals and media. The post- World War II 
environment was attributed to the existence of these intellectuals who promoted and 
influenced policy makers with counterpoise socialist ideas across the globe (Amoah 
2011:336).  It is further stated by Amoah (2011:336), that “the MPS is the central node 
in the global network of neo-liberal organisations and their processes, discourses and 
practices which sought to dominate the global knowledge system with their ideas. The 
MPS membership had risen to 100 spread over five continents by 1998”. Strange 
(1988:239) adds that “having initially neglected Africa in its early years, South Africa 
had by the 1990s become the beachhead of the MPS surgical forays into Africa. MPS 
members also participate in other global elite groups such as the World Economic 
Forum (WEF). This has had implications for policy formulation in Africa, whereby policy 
makers especially, have arguably lost completely, at the very least, any pretensions 
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of ideational independence in the face of an ascendant neo-liberalism”. Commenting 
on this global knowledge system, Nkrumah (2004:239) indicates that “in order to halt 
foreign interference in the affairs of developing countries, it is necessary to study, 
understand, expose and actively combat neo-colonialism in whatever guise it may 
appear. For the methods of neo-colonialists are subtle and varied. They operate not 
only in the economic field, but in the political, religious, ideological and cultural 
spheres”. Vyas-Doorgapersad and Kinoti (2015:100) also indicate that “like in many 
other African countries, the case of post-colonial Kenya is not different. The colonial 
British Government at the behest of a Governor laid down government regulations 
including public procurement regulatory processes to legitimise colonial governance 
and exploit economic opportunities”. It is important to note that procurement activities 
were limited, hence fewer regulations were in place. Available literature, albeit scarce, 
shows that the British government system under the responsibility of Crown Agents 
dominated the procurement process throughout the colonial period (Vyas-
Doorgapersad and Kinoti 2015:100). 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the pre- independence policies were biased towards 
enrichment of the minority colonial regime. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP 1980:69) states that “the origins of Southern Rhodesia’s (now 
Zimbabwe) manufacturing industry can be traced to the First World War, but rapid 
growth started with the Second World War. At this time, an influx of overseas military 
personnel had the immediate effect of increasing the European population in the 
country by 20%, thus further widening the domestic demand”. In reaction to this, 
according to the UNDP (1980:69), Southern Rhodesia signed a trade agreement with 
South Africa (which was also dominated by the Europeans) in 1949, under which most 
manufacturers from the country entered South Africa duty free. The objective of such 
a policy was meant to grow the economy and cater for the European population which 
was swelling. In this regard, the roots of the economic policies can be traced back to 
the origins of the colonisers; therefore, confirming the existence of these intellectuals 
who promoted and influenced policy makers with counterpoise socialist ideas across 
the globe.  
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2.2.1.2 Post independence policy formulation in Africa 
Amoah (2011:339) states that “in Africa, the post-independence era was characterised 
by governments searching for autonomy and self-directed national development in all 
spheres of life such as political, economic, technical, diplomatic, managerial, cultural 
and social interests”. Nkrumah (1973: vii) adds that, “autonomy here implies that new 
African nations will respond to their existing challenges on the basis of their concrete 
historic-cultural realities, the national interest and welfare of the citizenry. In other 
words, public policy formation will not be directed from outside”. Consequently, most 
African governments in the first decade after independence developed anti-
colonialism policies such as Nyerere’s Ujamaa policies which were launched in the 
1960s.  In the 1960s policy formulation in Africa was not so thoroughly influenced by 
the neo-liberal ideas. Vyas-Doorgapersad (2015:138) states that “post-apartheid 
South Africa has established various legislative frameworks to eradicate the restrictive 
developmental policies of the past”. In recent years, as highlighted by Basheka and 
Vyas-Doorgapersad (2015:208), “governments in Africa have been under increasing 
pressure to demonstrate their relevance because citizens are demanding better 
delivery of public services. In response to these numerous calls for an enhanced level 
of efficiency and a general improvement in service delivery, governments are 
designing and implementing a number of new and/or amended public policies”. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the post-independence era was experienced in the early 
1980s after Zimbabwe had attained its independence. The post- independence 
government launched a home grown development policy named ‘Growth with Equity 
Policy’ published in 1981. Policy making was redistributive and aimed to improve 
access to public goods and services.   In fact, policy making experiences generally 
resonate with Zhou and Zvoushe’s (2012:214) conclusions that “policy making 
experiences in Africa during the first decades of independence were largely influenced 
by the nationalist agendas of nation-building and economic growth”. Based on the 
unsustainable expansionary and redistributive policies in the 1980s, the Government 
of Zimbabwe (GoZ) then realised the need to focus on creating more wealth which 
ushered in a new phase of economic structural adjustment programmes with the 
objective of stimulating higher rates of economic growth. Although African states 
wanted to develop home grown development policies, the national leaders were 
already programmed by their colonisers to think according to their ideologies.  
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The African nationalists who took power after independence were trained in the 
‘modernisation tradition (Gatsheni, 2020). Their main concern was the development 
of African countries through active government involvement in the economy, protection 
and import substitution for industrialisation in the modernisation fashion”. From this 
statement, it shows that African leaders were indoctrinated with the developed 
countries’ values. So, whatever the leaders would do without the physical presence of 
these ‘super’ countries, their choices would naturally feed into the MPS ideology. 
2.2.1.3 3G public policy formation in Africa 
Amoah (2008:334) describes the period in the 1980s, as the 3G (third generation 
public policy) formation, and states that “from the 1980s to date, Africa tends to be 
heavily influenced by neo-liberal ideas and practices such as privatisation and 
deregulation which the Washington Consensus framework encapsulated”. The 
formation of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the 
Breton Woods conference in 1944 was to prove seminal in the development trajectory 
of African countries. Newly independent African countries emerged in a global and 
economic infrastructure defined and maintained by the global North for survival 
(Amoah 2008:334).  The WB and IMF intended to give less developed countries aid 
to assist them to grow and catch up with the North. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:216) 
indicate that “the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP)/ Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAPs) was adopted across Africa and the rest of the world in the 1990s 
in line with IMF and WB prescriptive solutions to the economic crises of the 1980s. 
Prescribed policies meant to reduce government expenditure by retrenching 25% of 
the civil service establishment, withdrawing subsidies, commercialisation and 
privatisation of state owned companies, introducing user fees in the health and 
education sectors, among others.”  However, “The neo-liberal public polity thinking 
had presented government intervention in any shape or form and under whatever 
conditions in Africa as unacceptable” (Dietz, Havnevik, Kaag and Oestigaard n.d.:26). 
In Zimbabwe, according to Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:217), “ESAP policy measures 
also carried high political and social costs for both society and the political leadership. 
Cutting the size of the civil service and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
withdrawal of subsidies and grants and the introduction of user fees in hospitals carried 
huge socio-politico-economic costs for the public and the national leadership in most 
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African countries. Thus, the political will to implement these reform prescriptions and 
bear the attendant social costs was on a low note”.   
2.3 Economic reforms in Africa  
After independence, African states emerged engulfed with the zeal and hope of 
industrialising to catch up with the North. In the process a number of policies, theories 
and models had been put forward by both North and South economists, politicians, 
development practitioners, civil society organisations and other progressive elites as 
prescriptions for development. These policies were seen as a panacea for countries 
lagging behind in development to advance in the same direction (Heidhues and Obare 
2011:55). The dominant policies in Africa’s development strategies included 
modernisation theories of the 1950s; the inward-looking industrialisation (import 
substitution) model of the 1960s; the growth-with-equity paradigm of the 1970s; the 
neo-classical paradigm of the 1980s; and the sustainable economic development 
model of the 1990s. Finally, after reviewing the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development’s (NEPAD) economic agenda for the 21st century, Africa has put forward 
a model that could reconcile indigenous and endogenous strategies for helping Africa 
to reclaim its own development in this new century. These strategies are discussed 
below. 
2.3.1 Modernisation Theories and African Development 
The modernisation theory of development has its roots in the aftermath of the Second 
World War when the United States of America emerged as a super-power which 
financed the Marshall plan to recuperate war-torn Western Europe. It has often implied 
a one-size-fits-all approach, and the understanding that the paths of others could be 
replicated elsewhere as development strategies (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2019).   Modernisation theory includes the 
following: 
2.3.1.1 Theory of development 
The major assumptions of the modernisation theory of development had been 
summed up in Rostow’s linear five stages of development: namely “traditional society; 
transitional stage (pre-conditions for take-off); take-off; drive to maturity; and high 
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mass consumption” (Rostow 1959:1). Modernisation, according to Reyes (2001:3), “is 
a homogenising process, in this sense that it produces tendencies toward 
convergence among societies”. Levy (1967:2017) maintains that “as time goes on, the 
world will increasingly resemble one another because the more highly modernised 
societies become, the more they resemble one another.  Modernisation is seen as 
evolutionary and linear. Africa then has to move from the traditional stage and create 
conditions for take-off upon which she is to realise development”.  Levy (1967:2017) 
further emphasises that, “if the problem facing Third World countries resides in their 
lack of productive investments, then the solution lies in the provision of aid to these 
countries in the form of capital, technology and expertise.   The Marshall Plan and the 
Alliance for Progress in Latin America are examples of programmes which were 
influenced by Rostow’s political theories”.  However, Omotola and Saliu (2009:87) 
indicates that “between 1970 and 2002 Africa received a total of US$540 billion in 
loans and paid back US$550 billion, yet Africa still owed US$293 billion at the end of 
2002.” This shows that aid is failing Africa and has trapped Africa into a vicious cycle 
of debt and making Africa continuously dependent on the west. In addition, 
modernisation theory claims that it is an irreversible process; once started 
modernisation cannot be stopped.  In other words, once third world countries come 
into contact with the core, they will not be able to resist the impetus toward 
modernisation. However, this is misleading due to the fact that “rapid rate of de-
industrialisation” (Sachikonye 1999:34) now taking place in Zimbabwe, as supported 
by Islam and Ali (2015). The theory failed to take into account natural disasters and 
political factors which many African countries are seized with. Such factors may 
reverse some socio-economic developments that a country might have gained. The 
theory of modernisation was not successful in Africa because it came to Africa as a 
prescription from the developed nations. The theory did not involve the people 
concerned in identifying the problems, planning, policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. The theory overlooked the benefits of Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (IKS), which the theory should have been built on. The theory 
could not therefore be sustainable because the local people were divorced from it 
(Matunhu 2011:67). According to Matunhu (2011:67), this theory actually benefited the 
core countries at the expense of the periphery. The theory created dependency and 
exploitation of the poor by the rich countries. 
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2.3.1.2 Theory of dependency 
Dependency theory “is the result of an extensive search to find a theoretical framework 
to sufficiently analyse and explain both development and underdevelopment within the 
international system. Three main characteristics of dependency theory are salient” 
(Romaniuk 2017:2). First, “the international system is seen as the sum of two sets of 
states: dominant and dependent. Second, dependency theory holds that external 
forces are critical in terms of economic activity of dependent states. Third, 
relationships, based on strongly historical patterns and dynamics (i.e., 
internationalisation of capitalism), between dominant and dependent states are a 
vibrant process, with exchanges taking place between the states playing a 
considerable role in the reinforcement of patterns of inequality” (Romaniuk 2017:2). 
The Prebisch and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s (ECLAC) proposals were the basis for dependency theory at the 
beginning of the 1950s.This is yet another development economic policy which Africa 
embraced with her two hands. Frank (1967, in Matunhu 2011:68), in his analysis of 
the post-colonial state, has argued that, “classical development theories such as 
modernity are misleading in that they fail to articulate the true relationship between the 
developed world and the poor regions of the world.”  As cited by Matunhu (2011:68), 
“modernity distorts the truth about the motive of the developed countries on their 
former colonies. From a dependency perspective repatriation of profits represents a 
systematic expatriation of the surplus values that were created by African labour using 
African resources”. Hence the development of Europe can be viewed as part of the 
same dialectical processes that underdeveloped Africa. In other words, the domination 
of Europe over Africa retarded the economic development of the continent. For five 
running centuries, Europe capitalised on its encounter with Africa (in Matunhu 
2011:68). This situation was expressed by Rodney (1972:149) analysing that “the 
relationship between Europe and Africa is that during colonialism, Europe organised 
herself, accumulated capital gained from her colonies in Africa, shrewdly”. 
The lack of satisfaction “with the modernisation theory in the 1950s precipitated new 
strands of thinking which resulted in the dependency theory. Dependency theory 
advocated an inward looking approach to development and an increased role for the 
state in terms of imposing barriers to trade, making inward investment difficult and 
promoting nationalisation of key industries” (Matunhu 2011:68). However, like in many 
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African states, in Zimbabwe the involvement of government in the economy has 
brought numerous inefficiencies, corruption, among other negative influences. Thus, 
the policies end up not achieving the intended results.  
2.3.1.3 Theory of world systems 
A “central element from which the theory of world systems emerged was the different 
form that capitalism was taking around the world, especially since the decade of the 
1960s. Wallerstein and his followers recognised that there are worldwide conditions 
that operate as determinant forces especially for small and underdeveloped nations, 
and that the nation-state level of analysis is no longer the only useful category for 
studying development conditions, particularly in Third World countries” (Reyes 
2001:8). According to “the world systems theory, the structure is tri-modal and is 
comprised of the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. The assumption is that 
the core developed by exploiting its immediate periphery, which is the semi-periphery, 
who in turn is the middleman prospering by exploiting the periphery” (Reyes 2001:9). 
In other words, according to Matunhu (2011:69), the periphery supplies cheap labour 
and raw materials to the semi-periphery and the core. In Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Africa has managed to pull herself from the periphery by capitalising on the 
Zimbabwean, Mozambican and Zambian (the periphery to South Africa) economies in 
order to develop.  
2.3.1.4 Theory of globalisation 
The theory of globalisation, according to Robertson (1992:5), “emerges from the global 
mechanisms of greater integration with particular emphasis on the sphere of economic 
transactions. In this sense, this perspective is similar to the world-systems 
approach.  However, one of the most important characteristics of the globalisation 
position is its focus and emphasis on cultural aspects and their communication 
worldwide”.  However, Robertson (1992:5) highlights that “rather than the economic, 
financial and political ties, globalisation scholars argue that the main modern elements 
for development interpretation are the cultural links among nations.  In this cultural 
communication, one of the most important factors is the increasing flexibility of 
technology to connect people around the world”.  The “main assumptions which can 
be extracted from the theory of globalisation can be summarised in three principal 
points.  First, cultural factors are the determinant aspect in every society” (Robertson 
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1992:3). Second, “it is not important, under current world conditions to use the nation-
state as the unit of analysis, since global communications and international ties are 
making this category less useful” (Robertson 1992:4). Third, as emphasised by 
Robertson (1992:4), “with more standardisation in technological advances, more and 
more social sectors will be able to connect themselves with other groups around the 
world.  This situation will involve the dominant and non-dominant groups from each 
nation”.  
However, this study observed that it can be contested that we seem to be already in 
the post-globalisation era, with African elites asking the question of whose culture we 
are embracing as global. It is clear that with inferior technology, Africa will continue 
lagging behind in development if the globalisation theory is something to consider. 
This suggests that whilst globalisation will enhance Africa’s link to the core for bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral relationships, it is also suicidal for African economies which are rooted 
in their people’s indigenous knowledge systems.  
2.3.1.5 Arthur Lewis’ industrialisation by invitation model 
The industrialisation by invitation (IBI) model was a modernisation model “that was 
offered to Africa as she emerged from colonialism. Lewis’ economic growth model was 
heavily endorsed by the WB, IMF and United Nations (the First Development Decade 
of the 1960s-1970s), it was accepted as the general theory of development for Third 
World nations, when the tide of independence was surging. Thus, the politically 
independent African countries wholeheartedly attempted to industrialise by instituting 
massive capital formation (industrialisation, urbanisation, technological transformation 
of the agriculture sector)” (Kofi 2002.:3). In the 1960s, according to Kofi (2002: 1), “it 
was assumed that Africa would develop by following the footpaths of the Anglo-Saxon 
development experience system and under the neoliberal, Washington consensus 
ideology. Contrary to Africa’s social values, these ethnocentric models place heavy 
emphasis on free markets, deregulation, privatisation and the limited role the state has 
to play in the development process”. Escobar (1984, in Nustad 2001:480) argues that 
development efforts in Africa in the past years using western models has been just a 
continuation of the colonial project. In a bid to develop using Lewis’s IBI, Nkwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana employed Arthur Lewis in 1963 to help Ghana out of poverty but 
Ghana did not realise development. This can lead one to argue that African 
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development does not need prescribed policies from the developed nations, following 
the failure of Lewis’s IBI model in Ghana.  Doctor Deng has argued that, “Lewis’ 
development model desperately failed in Africa because it sought to apply 
development models that were incompatible with African economic structure, social 
values, and institutions” (Deng 1988:32). This therefore led to the import substitution 
of industrialisation policies being tried in the 1960s in some African and Latin American 
countries. 
2.3.2 Import Substitution (Prebisch-Singer Thesis) 
Prebisch and Singer developed the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy 
which was very predominant in the 1960s.  Mendes, Bertella and Teixeira (2014:120) 
state that “African countries were convinced that they needed to adopt this policy to 
improve their terms of trade. Other African countries followed Ghana’s lead in the 
1960s. Mali and Kenya looked at industrialisation in terms of cost savings from local 
production in place of high cost imports from abroad”. Thus, according to Mendes et 
al. (2014:120), “it became very essential for the African countries (for example, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, and Zambia) to pursue the ISI strategies in the 1960s. 
They strongly argued against primary-product export expansion and instead they 
moved into producing manufactured products at home”. According to “United Nations 
and World Bank estimates, more than four-fifths of the sub-Saharan African countries 
still fell in the low-income category of developing countries (with annual per capita 
incomes of less than US$360 in 1978), and their average rate of growth per capita of 
0.9% over the two decades was the lowest of all the regions of the Third World” (Kofi 
2002:5). It was further revealed by Kofi (2002: 5), that “some indicators illustrated that 
industrial development in Africa was inferior to the industrial progress made by other 
peripheral countries”. In 1960, the developing countries accounted for 6.9% of value 
added in global manufacturing, this share rising to 8.8% in 1975. Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
share in 1960 was only 0.7%, and in 1975, 0.8% (Fransman 1982:1). The development 
policies, according to Kofi (2002:5), “that were designed by the academicians did little 
to generate socially acceptable high rates of economic growth in Africa. Although 
politically independent, control of the import-export trade and the financial sector and 
ownership of major production capacity in the export and industrial sectors remained 
in foreign hands (industries were owned and managed by Europeans or third-country 
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nationals). In short, African countries were economically dependent on the West for 
their: technology and capital goods industries; managerial skills; finance; and 
marketing skills”.  
2.3.3 Growth-Equity Economic Reform Policy for Africa 
In the 1970s, as stated by Chenery, Ahluwania, Bell, Duloy and Jolly (1974:13), 
“international agencies (for example, International Labour Organisation (ILO), World 
Bank), began to question the efficacy and effectiveness of their component strategies. 
As part of that movement ‘redistribution with growth’, ‘the basic needs approach’, ‘the 
basic services approach’, a focus on ‘the informal sector’, and the idea of 
empowerment and grass-roots approaches began to emerge as development 
practice”. This policy, as further emphasised by Chenery et al. (1974:13), “focused on 
agriculture first since it is the backbone of most African states. It also viewed 
grassroots participation as a means of poverty reduction and self-actualisation”. 
However, “a number of African countries failed to implement the Growth-Equity policy 
because of the ensuing deep recession which Africa underwent (despite the fact that 
Gross Domestic Product for Sub-Saharan Africa grew in real terms by 6% during 1965-
73) as a result of the oil crisis of 1973-74, subsequent oil crises of 1979, a global 
economic slowdown and the fact that African governments did not implement a 
consistent set of policy tools to deal with the crisis at its very early stage” (Ndlela 
2011:3). Thus, according to Chenery et al. (1974:15), “natural disasters, famine, ethnic 
conflicts and the economic recession of the early 1980s strongly contributed to the 
end of development planning and the return of neo-classical theorising in the form, for 
example, of supply-side economics in the early part of the 1980s and neo-liberalism 
at the beginning of the 1990s”.  
2.3.4 Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa 
Due to “global economic recession of the early and late 1970s, African countries 
realised that the development performance of most African states had been 
disappointing over the past decade. More importantly, that Africa’s prospects for the 
future were gloomy. Furthermore, the failure of the demands for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) implied that the solution to the African problem, indeed to that 
of most of the Third World, did not lie in a restructured international economic system” 
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(Adedeji 1984:2).  The first economic summit of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) was held in Lagos in April 1980. It was this economic summit that produced the 
Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The chief elements of LPA “centred around its 
endorsement of the African objective of attaining a more self-reliant and more 
economically integrated continent by the year 2000. The LPA was a complete 
departure from past and the substitution of the ISI strategy” (Akinrinade and Barling 
2013:11).  The “five main pillars on which the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan 
of Action (LPA) rested, included the deliberate promotion of an increasing measure of 
national self-reliance; the acceleration of internally located and relatively autonomous 
processes of growth and diversification and achievement of a self-sustained 
development process; the democratisation of the development process; the 
progressive eradication of mass poverty and unemployment and a fair and just 
distribution of income and the benefits of development among the populace; and the 
acceleration of the process of regional economic integration through cooperation” 
(Adedeji 1984:11). After one year of adoption of the LPA by African countries, the WB 
assigned Professor Elliot Berg to prepare an opposing plan entitled ‘Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa’, known as the Berg Report. This research 
focused on attacking the LPA. The paper cited Sub-Saharan Africa’s challenges as 
pricing policies, overvalued exchange rates, and excessive government intervention. 
Influenced by Berg’s report, Africa soon drifted into aid and foreign investments 
dependent policies” (WB 1981:1). The “Berg Report trumped both the LPA and the 
Abuja Treaty. LPA was overshadowed by the institution of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in almost all African countries from the early 1980s onward” 
(Ikome 2004:189). This demonstrates that the developed nations and the world 
financial institutions only support African policies which serve their ideologies; hence 
the advent of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa. 
2.3.5 Structural Adjustment Programmes as an Economic Reform for Africa 
In order to access financial credit from IMF and the WB, African countries were forced 
to undertake Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as another Economic Reform 
for the development of Africa. The SAPs have, as cited by Shah (2013:41), 
“contributed to the greatest peacetime transfer of wealth from the periphery to the 
imperial centre in history”. Shah (2013:42) further argues that “some of the many 
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things that the powerful nations through the IMF and the WB prescribe through SAPs 
is that the developing nations should open up their markets to allow more imports in 
and export more of their commodities, remove subsidies, free their markets and to 
reduce the state wage bill”. However, Shah (2013:53,60) contests that “this is precisely 
what contributes to poverty and dependency in Africa. At first glance it may seem that 
the growth in development of export goods such as coffee, cotton, sugar and bananas, 
would be beneficial to the exporting country since it brings in revenue. In fact, it 
represents a type of exploitation called unequal exchange”. SAPs dismally failed in 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. SAPs in 
Kenya brought untold suffering to its citizens in the form of social unrest, 
unemployment, poor living standards among other social ills. The retreat of the states 
on social areas such as health, education and housing was detrimental for many 
African countries (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 2014:4). The “lessons of 
experience have shown some limitations of the SAPs of the 1980s and have pointed 
to the need to broaden the agenda of the public sector reforms. There is increased 
recognition of the fact that countries with unstable institutions find it difficult to deal 
with face dynamics and costs of globalisation”. Without complementarities between 
domestic strategies for institutional reform and strategies for opening up to global 
market forces, African countries risk exposing themselves to the kinds of protracted 
crises from which some have just begun to recover (ECA 2014:14).  
To a larger extent, prescriptions proffered by the IMF and the WB are failing Africa; 
hence suggesting that African development may not need such prescriptions, resulting 
in Africa developing its home grown economic reform policy named New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
2.3.6 NEPAD as an Economic Reform for Africa 
Africa in a bid to develop using home grown policies, at the 37th session of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) African leaders Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, 
in July 2001, adopted NEPAD. NEPAD’s overall mission was “to address the critical 
challenges of poverty, development and Africa’s marginalisation internationally. Its 
four primary objectives were to: eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth and 
development, foster integration of Africa in the world economy and accelerate the 
empowerment of women” (NEPAD 2001). NEPAD was “different from previous 
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schemes in that it called for African leaders to commit themselves to a hard road of 
democratic reforms, open government and a corruption-free business environment. 
NEPAD is a merger of the Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery Programme 
(MAP) and the Omega Plan for Africa, which used to be called the New African 
Initiative” (Olowoye 2008:2). NEPAD, according to Olowoye (2008:2), as a means of 
ensuring Africa’s sustainable economic development, has not shown tangible results 
so far. NEPAD required US$64 billion a year from both internal and external countries 
and agencies in order to operate as planned. However, only a small fraction of this 
kind of money could be mobilised. Only South Africa paid its share, the rest of the 
African countries were struggling.  
The NEPAD mission was received with lack of contentment due to the ineffective 
economic development and financial growth on the African continent. Adedeji (n.d.:14) 
states that “African governments did not have any well-articulated policies for the 
exploitation, conversions, transformation and marketing of their resources with a view 
to obtaining maximum benefits from them”. Ironically, as emphasised by Adedeji 
(n.d.:15), “countries that had exploited African countries for decades, G8 and 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) were where NEPAD looked for funding. 
Therefore, one wonders if NEPAD was not a refined way for Africa to seek foreign aid 
to maintain any type of development or economic growth. This raises questions if 
Africa can therefore wean itself completely from the West as she purports to desire”. 
Ukiwo (2003:16) highlights that, “NEPAD has also not done well because on the 
international market, Africa did not possess the same leverage as the West”. Ukiwo 
(2003:16) also states that, “like previous top-down policies, NEPAD alienated the 
African people contrary to what the document entailed”. Melber (2003:5) indicates that, 
“if development without people is possible, what and for whom would this development 
be?” Therefore, according to Ukiwo (2003:17), development without the involvement 
of the people concerned is just impossible.  Ake (1996:140-141) also laments that “for 
development to be feasible, the people have to be the agents, means and ends of 
development. NEPAD by depending on received neo-liberal models ignores the fact 
that development cannot be received; it has to be experienced as participation in the 
process of bringing it about”. In this respect, NEPAD faces the same fate as previous 
development strategies that marginalised the people. This, as per the documents of 
the AU Agenda 2063 (AU 2015:1), can lead one to conclude that Africa should look 
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beyond policies for it to develop. Africa needs resources, political stability, good 
governance, involvement of the grassroots people and reformed institutions which are 
free from corruption and tyranny in order to develop. The AU Agenda 2063 (AU 
2015:1), further states that “it can be further argued that whether an African or Western 
model, Africa’s problem seems not to be embedded in the lack of, or availability, of 
policies but resources and good governance are key components to development.  To 
complement the efforts of NEPAD, a new policy dubbed Agenda 2063 was adopted in 
2015 by African Heads of States”.  
2.3.7 African Union Agenda 2063 
Africa “is divided into Regional Economic Communities (RECs) which are key actors 
working in collaboration with the African Union to ensure peace and stability in their 
regions. They are also the building blocks of the African economic community. The 
RECs are namely: the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), East African Community (EAC), Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community for Central African States 
(ECCAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC)” (United Nations Office of the Special 
Advisor on Africa (UN OSAA) 2020). The African Union Agenda 2063 (AU 2015:11), 
is “both a Vision and an Action Plan. It is a call for action to all segments of African 
society to work together to build a prosperous and united Africa based on shared 
values and a common destiny. Agenda 2063 is a logical and natural continuation of 
NEPAD and other initiatives”. After “the adoption of the Agenda 2063 Framework 
Document by the Summit in January 2015 as the basis for Africa’s long-term socio-
economic and integrative transformation, it directed the AU to prepare the First Ten 
Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063 (2014- 2023). This plan, the first in a series 
of five ten year plans over the fifty years’ horizon was adopted by the Summit in June 
2015 as a basis for the preparation of medium-term development plans of member 
states of the Union, the RECs and the AU Organs” (AU 2015:14). Flagship projects 
for the Plan are (Agenda 2063 First Ten Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023:15): 
“Integrated High Speed Train Network: Connecting all African capitals and commercial 
centres through an African High Speed Train to facilitate movement of goods, factor 
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services and people, reduce transport costs and relieve congestion of current and 
future systems; an African Virtual and E-University; formulation of a commodities 
strategy; establishment of an annual African forum; establishment of the Continental 
Free Trade Area by 2017; the African Passport and free movement of people and 
implementation of the Grand Inga Dam Project”.  
Freedom of movement has been a longstanding priority among member states, as 
enshrined in previous agreements such as the 1991 Abuja Treaty (Monks 2016:1). It 
was further advised by the African Development Bank (AfDB 2016:13) that, “easing 
entrance requirements would support economic growth, citing the case of Rwanda, 
which saw GDP and tourism revenues climb after abolishing visas. GDP growth 
increased to 7% in 2014 and tourism revenues rose by 4% to USD305 million. 
Openness helps Africa to plug skills gaps in the labour market, promote 
entrepreneurship, diversify the economy, add value to services, or whether it is to 
attract investment and boost competitiveness”.  
The “African Union is pursuing a path of closer integration through the launch of a 
common passport that will grant visa-free access to all 54 member states. As at July 
2016 during the AU summit in Kigali, Rwanda, 13 African states were open to all 
African citizens without advance visas. The first editions of the electronic passports 
were unveiled at this summit where they were issued to heads of state and senior 
officials. The Union aims to distribute them to all African citizens by 2020” (Murekedzi, 
2016). Some milestones have also been recorded in some African regions like “the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community 
(EAC) where common passports have already been adopted. In 2014, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia launched a Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) Uni-Visa as a pilot project during the 
2014 United Nations World Tourism Organisation. The KAZA Uni-Visa was valid for 
30 days as long as the holder of the visa remained in Zimbabwe or Zambia” (Zambia 
Department of Immigration 2019:1). The Uni-VISA was expected to be bankrolled to 
the SADC region upon successful implementation of the pilot project. However, the 
Uni-VISA regime only lasted for 12 months and collapsed, implying the SADC region 
still lags behind in the implementation of the open VISA policy. 
Implementation of the VISA regime, according to the Africa Development Bank (AfDB 
2016:12), is at varied stages within countries, with many placing severe restrictions on 
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travel. On average, according to AfDB (2016:12), “an African national requires visas 
at departure for 55% of other African countries, can get visas on arrival in only 25% 
and does not need a visa for only 20%. Some countries like the Seychelles and 
Rwanda have already implemented the free VISA policy to all African citizens, whilst 
Egypt requires a VISA for all African citizens before departure. On the other hand, 
70% of African citizens travelling to Zimbabwe should acquire VISAs before 
departure”.  
This study noted that most of the flagship projects are yet to take off. It is important for 
the AU to identify the challenges being faced by member countries lagging behind and 
proffer solutions. Challenges in whatever forms facing one country have multiplier 
effects for the entire continent. In some instances, it is also important to legally bind 
these countries to meet these targets in case the Agenda 2063 remains a dream in 
the pipeline like other predecessor policies.  
2.4 Economic reforms in Southern Africa Development Community 
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) “is the southernmost region of 
the African continent. SADC is an inter-governmental organisation headquartered in 
Gaborone, Botswana.  SADC has its origins in the organisation of Frontline States 
(Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia), which sought the political 
liberation of the region from colonialism and minority white rule in the mid- to late 
1970s” (SADC 2012). The “group expanded in 1980 when Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, and newly independent Zimbabwe joined to form the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the aim of reducing economic 
dependence on apartheid South Africa and promoting their own economic 
development through cooperation and integration” (SADC 2012).   
Most Southern African countries “became independent in the early 1960s. At 
independence, these countries had high hopes for rapid growth and development. 
However, these countries faced poor growth of the productive sectors, a declining level 
and efficiency of investment, waning exports, mounting debt, deteriorating social 
conditions, and an increasing erosion of institutional capacity. These developments 
led to high budget and balance of payments deficits and significant public debt” 
(Heidhues and Obare 2011:58). It was further stated by Heidhues and Obare 
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(2011:58), that “by 1980, output was actually declining. By the end of the 1980s, 
Southern African countries were facing fundamental problems, high rates of population 
growth, low levels of investment and saving, inefficient use of resources, weak 
institutions and human capacity, and a general decline in income and living standards”. 
With “the exception of South Africa, all of the study countries were ranked among the 
poorest of the world. Mozambique considered by many to be among the poorest 
countries in the world had a per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of only US$60 
in 1992. Malawi at $210 was only marginally better. Zimbabwe and Zambia with per 
capita incomes of $570 and $670 respectively, were at the higher end of the 
distribution of low income countries while South Africa with a per capita income of 
$2670 was considered an upper middle income country” (AfDB 2019). The size of their 
population grew rapidly resulting in either stagnating/ deteriorating per capita socio-
economic indicators. This “poor macro-economic performance reflected the 
inadequate performance of the agricultural sector. This was detrimental to the 
economy as the agricultural sector served as the engine for economic growth.  The 
rate of inflation was also very high in all the countries during the period” (Firdmuc 
2003:40). According to Jordaan (2001:6), “some of the key economic challenges that 
Southern Africa faced were becoming competitive by attracting investment, applying 
new technology and producing goods and services that can compete with other 
international role-players and penetrate industrial markets”. The crisis constituted a 
need for economic reform (Gulhati 1990).  In response to these adverse situations, 
political leaders in African states and the major international financial institutions 
recommended different economic reforms, strategies and economic policies to 
remedy these situations. These economic reforms are discussed below. 
2.4.1 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) “was adopted by 
member states in 2003. The RISDP is a roadmap of the policies and strategies that 
the SADC has adopted over a 15-year period to further regional integration.  It outlines 
a number of targets and milestones to be met along the way. Its stated economic goals 
included the creation of a free trade area by 2008, a customs union by 2010, a 
monetary union by 2016, and a single currency by 2018” (IMF 2009: 2-3). The targets 
were set for 2008, followed by targets for 2012 and 2018 (see table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1: Macro-economic Convergence Targets 
 2008 2012 2018 
GDP Growth   
(% Annual)  
7% 7% 7% 
Inflation  
(Annual) 
Single digits 5% 3% 
Fiscal Deficit 
5% GDP 
3% GDP as  
anchor, with a  
range of 1% 
3% of GDP as 
anchor, with a  
range of 1% 
Public Debt 
 
60% of GDP 60% of GDP 60% of GDP 
Current Account 
Deficit   
9% of GDP 9% of GDP 3% of GDP 
Source: (IMF 2009:3) 
IMF (2009:5) states that the “SADC is the largest regional economic grouping in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) which accounts for about half of regional GDP at market 
exchange rates. SADC RISDP states that the region’s GDP as at 2009 stood at USD 
226.1 billion”. It is “also the richest, with real per capita income about two-thirds above 
the continental average, but there are huge variations in income across the SADC 
membership. South Africa, the main contributor to regional GDP, accounts for almost 
two-thirds of total output, although per capita income is higher in Botswana and 
Mauritius” (IMF 2009:6). SADC member countries falls into four classifications; namely 
“middle-income countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mauritius and Swaziland); 
low-income countries (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia); fragile 
countries (Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe) and oil exporters (Angola). 
Fragile refers to low-income countries that are considered weak performers” (see 
SADC 2012). 
Between “2003 and 2009, growth had accelerated steadily across much of the region, 
in line with the improved performance across the rest of the continent. Countries like 
Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania recorded close to 7% growth. Although recovery 
in fragile states has been underway, output has steadily fallen in Zimbabwe” (IMF 
2009). Most countries’ inflation figures were within the single-digit territory, except for 
Zimbabwe which experienced hyperinflation (IMF 2009:10). According to the ZimStat 
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(2016:11), “Zimbabwe recorded 1.6% growth in 2016, which is below the 7% SADC 
target.” According to the Zimbabwe NBS (2017), “there has been a gradual 
improvement in the fiscal positions of most SADC members as they mobilise more 
domestic revenue and, in the case of low-income countries, more grants. However, 
Zimbabwe recorded very high quasi-fiscal outlays, conducted via the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe. These outlays helped to fuel inflation.  The fiscal deficit stood at 3% of 
GDP and rose to 8% in 2016”.  
On average “total government debt in the SADC, in 2009 fell to 27% of GDP from 91% 
in 2000. The improvement has been greatest in low-income countries that benefited 
from debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative” (IMF 2009). However, as highlighted in the Zimbabwe 
NBS (2017), “Zimbabwe did not benefit from these initiatives resulting in its debt 
ballooning. As at 31 October 2016, Zimbabwe’s public debt stood at US$11.2 billion 
or 79% of GDP, of which US$7.5 billion, 53% of GDP, is external debt”. The IMF 
(2009:16) indicates that “the current accounts vary widely among SADC members. 
The middle-income countries’ current account deficits have widened, examples being 
South Africa and Mauritius. In 2011, Zimbabwe’s current account deficit stood at -38.7 
% and the figure for 2016 is -17.8%. The narrowing of Zimbabwe’s deficit has been 
attributed to constraints in accessing external funding by the Government due to 
economic sanctions which were imposed on Zimbabwe by the Western countries”. 
Statistics indicate that Zimbabwe has been missing the SADC targets. The study noted 
that the region is likely to be weighed down by negative externalities from some 
member countries.  According to the SADC (2015: ii), the Regional Indicative 
Development Strategic Plan is currently being revised and extended to 2020. The plan 
continues to be improved and will be finalised considering the SADC Industrial 
Development Policy Framework. 
2.4.2 SADC Industrial Development Policy Framework  
SADC Member States (SADC Industrial Development Policy Framework (SADC IDPF) 
(2003:5), “acknowledge that industrial development is central to diversification of their 
economies; development of productive capacity; and the creation of employment in 
order to reduce poverty and set their economies on a more sustainable growth path. 
A key challenge for SADC as a region is to move off an economic growth path built on 
67 
consumption and commodity exports onto a more sustainable developmental path 
based on industrialisation”. Linked to this, according to the SADC IDPF (2003:5), “is 
the need to build economic infrastructure; enhance the technology base, economies 
of scale and scope, and the competitiveness of industries, leveraging on, among 
others, the regional infrastructure programme”. The SADC IDPF (2003:5) also sought 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency in the manufacturing sector; infrastructure 
(energy, transport and logistics services, and information and communication 
technologies); and services (transport and communication). This is in line with the 
SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) adopted in 2012. 
The SADC IDPF (2003:5) further states that “the RIDMP serves as a key strategic 
framework to guide implementation of efficient, seamless and cost-effective trans-
boundary infrastructure networks in an integrated and coordinated manner, and 
amongst others, serves as a catalyst to industrial development in the region”.  
2.4.3 SADC Free Trade Area Policy 
The SADC Protocol on Trade (2005), as amended, envisages “the establishment of 
a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the SADC Region by 2008.  A free trade area agreement 
stipulated common external tariffs and a common external trade policy that would 
result in the formation of an SADC Customs Union by 2010”. The objectives of the 
SADC FTA were (SADC 2012): “to further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and 
services; ensure efficient production; contribute towards the improvement of the 
climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; and enhance economic 
development, diversification and industrialisation of the region”. Sandrey (2013:2) 
states that in general, the “SADC FTA has made solid progress. Imports into Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) from SADC are largely tariff free. However, as at 2013 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Seychelles had not assented 
to the agreement, due to their own important exceptions”. SADC (2012) indicates that 
“intra-SADC trade had more than doubled, with intra-SADC trade growing from about 
US$13.2 billion in 2000 to about US$34 billion in 2009, representing an increase of 
about 155%. South Africa dominated both overall SADC and intra-SADC trade”. In 
“2010, South African exports constituted 68.1% of SADC exports, but a significantly 
lower 14.8% of intra- SADC exports (and much lower import shares)” (SADC 2012). 
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South Africa’s main markets are the “United States of America (USA) (11.4%), Japan 
(11.3%), Germany (7.8%) and the United Kingdom (UK) (7.7%), while it is also 
increasing exports to China. Within the region, the main markets are Angola, 
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Elsewhere in Africa the country also exports to 
the DRC and Nigeria” (Mbekeani 2013:16). On the other hand, during the same period, 
Zimbabwe’s export contribution to intra-SADC stood at 1.7% against 23.0% imports 
(obtained from Sandrey 2013: 4,7). These figures, according to Mbekeani (2013:12), 
depict that “Zimbabwe has not yet benefited much from the FTA. Zimbabwe’s near-
total collapse in exports reflects a hostile macro-economic and political situation, which 
has damaged productivity”. Sandrey (2013:2) further explains that “the phased 
programme of tariff reductions commenced in 2001 resulting in the minimum 
attainment for FTA with 85% of interregional trade amongst the partner states attaining 
zero duty. The maximum tariff liberalisation was only attained by January 2012, when 
the tariff phase-down process for sensitive goods was completed, except for 
Mozambique which was expected to complete the process in 2015”. In addition, 
according to the Njini (2011:2), “Malawi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania had derogations that 
included allowances for a 25% import duty on sugar and paper products until 2015 in 
order for the industries to take measures to adjust. However, the removal of tariffs on 
sensitive products has the potential to further expand intra-SADC trade volumes”.  
From the literature reviewed it can be established that the SADC is the brainchild of 
the western countries, its policies are meant to directly or indirectly benefit the core. In 
this regard, South Africa (metropolis of the region) remains the biggest beneficiary of 
these policies because it has strong ties with the North. South Africa imports mainly 
raw materials from the region which it uses to manufacture products which are in 
demand in the region, generating more wealth. The wealth generated in South Africa 
may be repatriated to the owners of the industries located in the western countries. It 
has been observed from the literature that South Africa is a central point for 
accumulating wealth from the region for the North. The status of Zimbabwe in this 
regard is discussed in the next section. 
2.5 Economic reforms in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial economy was essentially agricultural and pastoral. Although 
it was largely a subsistence economy, there is evidence of substantial trade and 
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entrepreneurship as far back as the 13th and 14th centuries. Salt and iron were the 
more important products for the internal market, while gold, ivory and copper were 
exported. Iron smelting was done virtually throughout pre-colonial Zimbabwe (UNDP 
1980:8). The colony of Southern Rhodesia, according to the UNDP (1980:9), was 
inaugurated with the hoisting of the British flag at Harare on 12 September 1890. The 
prime motivation was for significant gold discoveries. However, no large gold reserves 
were identified. The white settlers then moved to land grabbing. By 1894 the Land 
Commission had dispossessed indigenous people of over 80% of their cattle. The 
UNDP (1980:12) further stresses that “the white agricultural policy was launched in 
1908. The policy evicted Africans from fertile lands within easy reach of markets and 
segregated them into three reserves from where the pressure of overcrowding and 
poor conditions drove them to accept low wages as tenant labourers on European 
farms”. The British government, according to the UNDP (1980:12), subsequently 
confirmed “the dispossession of African lands by the Company and settlers. The Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 effectively discouraged and limited African Agricultural 
production and marketing activities. The European settlers’ agriculture was therefore 
developed at the expense of African agriculture”. The mining sector occupied a 
dominant position in the economy throughout the period 1890-1939, in spite of the 
growth of agriculture from 1912 onwards.  The key mineral was gold which accounted 
for a major share of the significant growth during the inter-war years.  The 1930s 
witnessed the extension of government control over the economy to further white 
domination. European settlers were given financial and other assistance to promote 
their businesses. By 1938, there were 299 manufacturing establishments with net 
output estimated at £2.0 million. Due to the war, industry was disturbed and capital 
inflows dried up (UNDP 1980:12-13). The government then introduced economic 
policies of self- sufficiency, and Zimbabwe’s “economic experience over the course of 
a century suggests a stylised six-stage history of oscillating inward and outward policy 
and practical orientations, with corresponding economic and development conditions” 
(Bond 1998:164) (Table 2.2). The first national economic policy determination, 
according to Bond (1998:163), began in 1923 with tens of thousands of white settlers 
embarking on ‘self- governing- status’, when the settlers voted against British South 
Africa Company’s continued rule. A tentative Import Substitution Policy was introduced 
in the 1920s.  
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Table 2.2: Phases of inward/ Outward Economic Policies in Zimbabwe: 1920s-
Present  
Period Relevant Policy  Economic Conditions 
1920s    Protection for local manufacturers   Beginning of industrial development  
1930s-40s Relative isolation High growth and inward maturation 
of secondary industry 
1950s Increasing financial and trade 
regulation 
Large inflows of foreign and trade 
regulation investment, but over- 
production problems and 
unsustainable financial and trade 
relations 
1960s-70 Heightened financial trade 
regulations coincident with sanctions 
Initial dramatic recovery followed by 
a crisis of production and civil war 
1980s Gradual loosening of financial/trade 
restrictions and strong export drive 
Enhancement of developmental 
state's human capital functions, yet 
uneven economic record 
1990s Rapid liberalisation of finance and 
trade 
Dramatic volatility and vulnerability in 




Uneven return to a few dirigiste 
policies (exchange controls 
accompanied capital flight, currency 
peg, luxury import tariffs followed by 
regional free trade agreement, 
foreign debt defaults, uncontrolled 
budgetary growth) under conditions 
of desperation 
Deepening crisis across all sectors of 
the economy 
Source: (Bond 1998:164) 
The Import Substitution Policy, according to Bond (1998:166), “expanded in the 1920s. 
In 1926, manufacturing contributed 13% of Rhodesia’s GDP, mainly in the form of the 
railroad yard.  The country’s exports rose to £7 million in 1929, but then crashed by 
50% two years later as the great depression set in. In the 1930s, strong deliberate 
state investment and regulation allowed the country to recover from the depression”. 
These programmes, as further highlighted by Bond (1998:166), focused on “locally-
controlled company development. However, the development was biased towards the 
white citizens only. The result was that real income growth picked up to 16%, 20% and 
21% from 1932-34, followed by growth of 10%, 16% and 10% from 1935-37, and 6%, 
3% and 18% from 1938-41 respectively”.  
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Import-substitution industrialisation policies “were amplified during World War II, as 
the local food processing industry expanded vigorously, accounting for a third of 
manufacturing output by the early 1950s. Another quarter of output was generated by 
the investment goods sectors, particularly construction materials. Low-quality 
consumables (for the black market) grew rapidly, especially clothing and textiles. 
Cheap textiles were also the leading manufactured export of Southern Rhodesia” 
(Bond 1998:167). Indeed, “many small manufacturing enterprises initially aimed at the 
black market, which grew to encompass 28% of the national income during the 1950s, 
of which about 90% derived from wage earnings. On this basis, manufacturing growth 
picked up spectacularly from 1944-48, averaging 24.4% annually” (Barber 1961:141). 
Clarke (1980:15-38) further added that, “foreign direct investment rose from £13.5 
million in 1947 to £50.7 million in 1951, and fixed capital formation was increased by 
an average of £50 million per year from 1946 to 1961”. Stoneman (1988:278) also 
emphasised that, “annual output in manufacturing rose from £5.1 million in 1938 to 
£105.1 million in 1957, doubling as a percentage of GDP. Real GDP growth averaged 
at least 10% annually for the period 1946-57”. Richardson, Chiume-Kanyama, Brock, 
Todd-Garfield and Welensky (1959:28) had initially stated that the buoyant economic 
growth was also as a result of the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1953. The Federation consisted of territories of Northern Rhodesia (now 
Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi), which were being centrally governed by the 
British Colonial Office based in Southern Rhodesia. Most of the Federal Government’s 
expenditure went to Southern Rhodesia. As a result, Southern Rhodesia became the 
most industrialised and the major economic benefits were found to accrue to the 
relatively more industrialised country.  
In 1965, the National Development Plan (NDP) was generally regarded as the basis 
of the Rhodesian Front’s economic policy. The objective of the policy was to propel 
the economy to a stage where growth would be sustained without further dependence 
on external borrowing. In the same year, the international community dramatically 
intensified sanctions of international financial and trade relations when the Rhodesian 
Front won elections and declared a ‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence’ (UDI)  
(Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020:1). After UDI, “the period was characterised by tough 
macro-economic management which included: watertight exchange controls, strategic 
state spending, prescribed assets on financial institutions, increased nationalisation of 
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strategic sites of the economy, directed investment, creative juggling of import/export 
requirements, default on outstanding foreign debt and maximisation of local and 
backward/forward linkages” (Bond and Manyanya 2002:20). These policies resulted 
in high growth figures of nearly double-digit rates each year for a decade. Several 
institutions were created to support industrialisation. These include Industrial 
Development Corporation, Industrial Promotion Corporation of Central Africa Limited, 
Tribal Trust Lands Development Corporation, Agricultural Land Bank, Mining Council, 
Universal Exports, among others.  In 1968, over 600 manufacturing projects came into 
existence (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). The “controls worked, especially when 
combined with buoyant growth conditions in the economy associated with high net 
white immigration (and rising mortgage demand), rapid industrial development through 
diversification (and demand for hire purchase and leasing facilities), and expanded 
primary sector output (with demands for short- and medium-term financing)” (Riddell 
1990: 341). It was further stated by Riddell (1990: 341, 344) that “increased buying 
power within Rhodesia was responsible for a vast amount (61 %) of the manufacturing 
growth which occurred during the years 1964-78, as compared to import substitution 
industrialisation (30%) and export-based growth”.   
2.5.1 Post-Independence Economic Performance 
This section provides a general overview of the economic performance in Zimbabwe 
after independence. The detailed scrutiny of the specific economic policies will be 
done in Chapter three since this is the essence of this study.   
In 1980, “the Southern Rhodesia country was renamed Zimbabwe after the black 
indigenous people gained independence from the white settlers. The Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU-PF) was the political party which won the elections and 
formed the new government. Immediately, the anti-Rhodesia sanctions were lifted” 
(Green and Khadani 1986:1059-1060). The “new government inherited a well-
developed, highly diversified and prosperous agriculture and lucrative mining sector. 
In the immediate post-independence period rapid growth in GDP was achieved, 
amounting to 11% in 1980 and 12% in 1981 in real terms. Economic growth was far 
higher than in most African countries averaging about 4% per annum, including all the 
Sub-Saharan countries” (Sibanda and Makwata 2017:5).   
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In Zimbabwe, post-independence policies performed in various ways. According to 
Sibanda and Makwata 2017:3-4), Zimbabwe’s social and economic policies in the 
post-colonial era, can be grouped into following phases:  
 “The first phase, from independence to 1982 was accompanied by an economic 
boom and characterised by twin phenomena of the adoption of redistributive 
policies and a high level of mutual suspicion between government and capital. 
 A second phase, from 1982 to around 1986, contained two major economic 
recessions, a check on redistributive policies and continuing cool relations 
between government and capital. 
 The third phase, dating from 1986 to 1990 involved the resumption of a degree of 
economic growth and the downplaying of redistribution. 
 The fourth, that of structural adjustment began in 1990 and has been marked by 
a very severe drought and economic contraction, an implicit rejection of 
redistributivism and liberal economic policies.  
 From 1995 many more phases were also observed and in particular, 1995-2000 
marked the beginning of economic decline characterised by economic shocks 
induced by the 1997 unplanned pay outs to Veterans of the Liberation War and 
the cost of engaging in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 A sixth phase can be added and this covers 2000-2008 which was highlighted by 
the chaotic fast-track land redistribution programme and the emergence of vibrant 
opposition politics which sent the ruling party into panic mode and the 
unprecedented hyperinflation period which culminated into the discontinuation of 
the Zimbabwe dollar. 
 Between “2009 and 2012 the country recorded tremendous economic growth of 
5.4%, 9.6%, 10.6% and 4.4% in that order which was a big relief after a decline of 
17.7% in 2008 and that coincided with the Inclusive Government which saw 
ZANU-PF and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations working 
together” (Sibanda and Makwata 2017:3-4).  
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Unfortunately, as highlighted by Sibanda and Makwata (2017:3), “since 2013 to date 
when the Inclusive government was replaced by a wholly ZANU-PF government the 
country has been slowly reversing those gains as highlighted by slow growth rates of 
4.5%, 3.5% and 1.5% for 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively, company closures, rising 
unemployment and rampant street vending as people struggle to survive punctuated 
with the recent wave of demonstrations in 2016 as people vented their frustrations with 
the government. In 2016 the economy contracted by 0.3% according to the 
International Monetary Fund”. The literature reviewed raised a concern such as: why 
economic policies performed differently in various phases. It is thus the aim of this 
study to highlight the determinants and critical success factors for effective 
implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe. This shall be expounded in the 
subsequent chapters of this study.    
2.5.2 Neo-classical Practice in Zimbabwe 
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) “claim that for development to take place, 
the role of the state in economic affairs must be substantially reduced. To promote this 
objective, the IFIs have sponsored programmes of liberal economic reform termed 
Structural Adjustment- throughout Africa” (Gogo 2011:116). The “structural adjustment 
policies are divided into three different types as follows: 
 One type is expenditure reducing deflationary policies primarily designed to 
correct budgetary imbalances. These sets of policies, which are closely tied to the 
IMF, include reduction of public expenditures, credit restraint, wage control and 
the phasing out of subsidies. 
 The second type is expenditure, switching policies that are expected to promote 
export-led growth by diverting productive resources from non-tradable to tradable 
goods. Expenditure switching policies include devaluation of over-valued 
currencies, export promotion, tax reforms and import decontrols.  
 The third type is institutional reforms that are primarily designed to promote 
efficiency and to liberalise trade by removing government controls of prices, 
exchange rates and interest rates and privatisation and/or rehabilitation of state 
owned enterprises” (Gogo 2011:116-117). 
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Mengisteab and Logan (1991:104) opine that the international economic integration 
had a devastating impact on Zimbabwe. It resulted in a national political-economic 
crisis that was severe for a decade. The policies amplified inequalities and dramatically 
reversed the rise in literacy and health indicators.  There was massive de-
industrialisation because of the harsh macro-economic operating environment. The 
standard of living for an average Zimbabwean fell further.  
Through the review of literature, it is highlighted that the “Southern African region is 
characterised by unacceptably high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality. 
In a number of Southern African countries, such as Zimbabwe and Swaziland, poverty 
and inequality are on the increase” (Jaffee 2014:21). ZimStat (2017:19) indicates that 
“as at 2017, in Zimbabwe 70.5 percent of households were poor and having limited 
access to essential services, which is an indicator of disparities being observed. Rural 
individual poverty increased from 84.3 percent in 2011/12 to 86.0 percent in 2017. 
Extreme poverty among the population increased from 22.5 percent in 2011/12 to 29.3 
percent in 2017”. Even “agricultural economies such as Malawi and resource-rich 
countries such as Namibia, South Africa and Angola have been unable to significantly 
reduce wealth gaps and the rates of poverty and unemployment” (Jaffee 2014:13).  
Most “SADC countries managed to achieve some progress in the period immediately 
after independence, usually through expanded social services, to reach the majority 
of the population which had been deliberately neglected under colonial rule.  However, 
there was no systematic transformation of economic structures, and the typical African 
enclave economy persists until today. This enclave economy is typically characterised 
by a relatively small and well-resourced formal sector that  operates  in  isolation  from  
a  large,  growing  and  poverty-stricken informal economy and the communal 
subsistence economy” (Jaffee 2014:15). This situation shows the country is in crisis 
that served as one of the drivers and/ or determinants for socio-economic policies in 
the region. 
According to the World Bank (2015:14), “more than 60% of the population in SADC 
lacks access to an adequate supply of safe water, a third of the SADC population lives 
in abject poverty and about 40% of the labour force is unemployed or underemployed. 
Poverty levels have not only increased but have also become more pronounced in 
urban areas and amongst female-headed households and the youth, in particular”. 
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Sibanda and Makwata (2017:11) add that, “when measured against the Human 
Development Index (HDI) - life expectancy, education and standards of living- seven 
SADC countries fall into the medium category while six are in the low HDI group. 
Although the majority of the countries fall within the medium income category the 
levels of income inequality in the region remain amongst the highest in the world”.  
The “distribution of resources  and  income  is  highly  skewed,  and  in  some  cases  
racially  biased;  for  example,  in  South  Africa  where  white  nationals  constitute 
around 5% of the population and own over 80% of the land.  Social mobility and equal 
opportunity remain alien concepts for far too many people in Southern Africa. The 
region is characterised/defined by persistent gender inequalities in customary 
practices and labour market discrimination to unequal access to social services and 
economic resources such as land” (International Labour Organisation (ILO) n.d.:1-2). 
In a nutshell the economic policies in the SADC did not meet their intended targets. 
The policies have failed to address the real fundamental problems. Sustainable 
economic and human development growth is still lacking in most of the SADC 
countries. It is further highlighted that “realising the devastating effects of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme, the government embarked on policy reversals. These 
included the  introduction of selective price controls, increased tariffs, import licensing 
on some goods, procrastination in meeting regional liberalisation targets, pegging 
exchange rates, suspension of foreign currency accounts, introduction of new export 
incentives and application of new levies on tobacco and consumer goods” (Bond 
2000:183).  It is further stated by Bond (2000:183) that “the precise moment that the 
Zimbabwean economy began its generalised collapse was probably the late morning 
of 14 November 1997, when over a four-hour period, the Zimbabwe dollar lost 74% of 
its value due to withdrawal by foreign currency speculators”.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter explored the evolution of public policies in Africa, the SADC and 
Zimbabwe. It was noticed that like in the international and regional fraternity, in 
Zimbabwe, to some extent the public policies are biased towards political feasibility. 
The chapter thereafter discussed public policy stages such as the neo-liberal stage, 
post-independence policy formulation in Africa, and the 3G public policy formulation in 
Africa in detail. Through the review of literature, it was deduced that the pre-
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independence policies in Zimbabwe were biased towards enrichment of the minority 
colonial regime. After independence, the country launched the ‘equity-based’ 
economic policies to redress the imbalances of the past. It was realised that though 
the Government of Zimbabwe has promulgated a series of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe since 1980, the economic situation has been deteriorating since 
independence due to unfavourable economic indicators. It is considered that the elite 
with connections in politics, economics/wealth and education have dominance over 
the public policy development and implementation process in many countries 
especially in the developing states. Their influence can be traced at any stage right 
through the public policy cycle. Their involvement can come in the form of politics, 
technical expertise, advisory services/think-tanks or financial assistance to assist at 
any stage of the policy cycle. In order to achieve self-reliance, Africa as a continent, 
and Zimbabwe at a national level, need to concentrate on growing member countries’ 
economies, which requires an environment conducive to growth because of political 
stability and good governance to be in place first. What appears to be some of the 
goals of the economic reforms are issues that need to be addressed now (are pre-
conditions) to pave the way for the socio-economic development of the continent as a 
whole. The chapter aimed to achieve the following research objectives, such as “to 
conceptualise and explain the meaning and evaluation phases of the concept ‘public 
policy’; and to discuss economic reforms experienced in Africa, the Southern African 
Development Community and in Zimbabwe” (see Chapter One, Section 1.4). The next 
Chapter focuses on the economic policies in Zimbabwe that have been in existence 




A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICIES IN ZIMBABWE 
3.1 Introduction 
The economic policies that are discussed in this chapter are: Growth with Equity 
(1981); Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83 -1984/85);  Zimbabwe: A 
Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95); Second Five-Year National Development 
Plan (1991-1995); Vision 2020 (2000); Ten Point Plan (2002); National Economic 
Revival Programme: Measures to Address the Current Challenges (2003); Zimbabwe: 
Towards Sustained Economic Growth- Macro-Economic Policy Framework (2005-
2006); Short-Term Economic Stabilisation Programme (2008); Short-Term 
Emergency Recovery Programme: Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again (2009); Three 
Year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget Framework: STERP II (2010-2012): 
Reconstruction With Equitable Growth and Stability; Zimbabwe Medium-Term Plan 
(2011-2015); and Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
(Zim-Asset) October 2013 – December 2018. The chapter aims to achieve the 
research objective “What are economic policies in Zimbabwe?”  (see Chapter One, 
Section 1.4). 
3.2 Growth with Equity Policy (1981) 
Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 and had to undertake tasks to improve the 
socio-economic situations related to poverty, migration, refugees, unemployment, 
illiteracy, to state a few concerns. The new government therefore launched the Growth 
with Equity Policy in 1981. The key goal of the Growth with Equity Policy (GWEP 
1981:1-3), was “to address the imbalance between predominant foreign ownership 
and control of assets on the one hand, and on the other, limited local participation and 
more especially the past colonial dispossession of land and other economic assets 
and the consequential impoverishment of the masses of the people; hence the 
imperative need to re-establish justice and equity in the ownership of land, which 
should be a common heritage of Zimbabweans of all races”. The government had an 
urgent need to address these problems as was espoused in the Zimbabwe 
Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD 1981:1). The ZIMCORD 
included commitments made by Britain (former colonial masters) at Lancaster House 
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Conference to mobilise the support of the international community to assist the 
government and people of an independent Zimbabwe with financial and technical 
resources for land resettlement, rural and agricultural development Zimbabwe, and 
rapid economic development (ZIMCORD 1981:1). Moreover, according to the 
documents of the GWEP (1981:1), “past policy and legislation and other Government 
instruments, especially fiscal and monetary including subsidies and other measures, 
were designed to maintain a sound economy but an inequitable socio-economic order, 
while education and manpower policies were generally designed to ensure the 
existence of cheap unskilled black labour combined with indiscriminate importation of 
skills mainly from overseas”. 
These policies hindered local skills development and full productive employment, 
especially among blacks. Further, horizontal and vertical population movements were 
restricted by an electorate system involving both racial and urban and rural zoning and 
therefore hindered or distorted the national movement of labour and acquisition of 
skills. These policies, devices and practices inevitably led to racial polarisation, 
confrontation, the war of liberation and consequent loss of life, and general destruction 
and disruption of the social and economic infrastructure (GWEP 1981:1). During the 
democratic dispensation after the end of war, the country, dedicated to reconciliation, 
according to the information compiled from the documents of the GWEP (1981:1), had 
to undertake the task of resettlement and rehabilitation, as well as embarking on a 
deliberate programme of restructuring and developing the economic and social fabric 
in order to achieve sustained, balanced and equitable economic growth and 
development. 
The issue of land and rural development was at the centre of the GWEP. About four 
million people lived on the limited and generally inferior land in the traditional black 
areas, whilst only about 5000 commercial farmers controlled most the generally more 
fertile half of the agricultural land in the country. Land redistribution was therefore 
essential to relieve pressure where considerable human overcrowding and 
overgrazing had resulted in depletion of the soil. Government planned to embark on a 
Land Acquisition Policy (ZIMCORD 1981:3). Thus commercial land, according to the 
ZIMCORD (1981:37), “which was underutilised was intended to be purchased by 
government to further redistribute it to Zimbabweans who were made homeless during 
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war. Land in commercial areas that was being farmed productively was not going to 
be diverted from its use and ownership”.  Vigorous measures were also required to 
restore war-damaged infrastructure to a usable condition. Full rehabilitation 
infrastructure was considered as urgent. These included schools, hospitals, water 
supplies, cattle dip tanks, telecommunication equipment, irrigation equipment, rural 
businesses, roads, amongst others. As a stop- gap until the output of new and 
expanded training institutions, there was a need to fill the critical skills required, using 
professional and technical personnel from abroad in many sectors (ZIMCORD1981:2). 
The Government’s primary objective was to achieve equitable economic growth and 
development (ZIMCORD 1981:1). In pursuing this objective, the Government of 
Zimbabwe aimed at achieving the following objectives (GWEP 1981:2), amongst 
others: 
 “Establish progressively a society founded on socialist, democratic and egalitarian 
principles which are inherent in the policies and measures enunciated herein; 
 Achieve a sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy development in 
order to raise incomes and standards of living of all our people and expand 
productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers, especially the 
former; 
 A more equitable distribution of income and income earning opportunities across 
racial groups; 
 Develop and restructure the economy in ways which will produce rural 
development, desired changes in patterns of consumption, technology, exports, 
etc., and in ways consistent with the most desirable use and conservation of our 
natural resources and the environment; 
 End imperialist exploitation, and achieve greater and more equitable degrees of 
ownership of natural resources including land; promote participation in, and 
ownership of, a significant portion of the economy by nationals and the State; and 
 Create and maintain high levels of employment for Zimbabweans in all sectors 
and at all levels of skill and responsibility and redress the historical racial 
imbalance in skilled employment” (GWEP 1981:2). 
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A budget of $3, 898 billion (private and public) gross investments was required for the 
planning period. The budget was broken down as follows (ZIMCORD 1981:10): 
contributions from the public sector ($1,118 billion); foreign capital inflows ($2,302 
billion); and external assistance (grants/or soft loans) ($0.478 billion). The 
assessment, “by the Government of Zimbabwe, of the resource requirements for post-
war recovery and land settlement and rural/agricultural development and technical 
assistance was indeed foreseen at the Lancaster House Conference (1979), 
enormous and well beyond the capacity of Zimbabwe/or a single donor. The GWEP 
indicated the need for formulating and implementing a national development plan. In 
this regard, Government was expected to formulate a three-year transitional plan 
which was expected to be launched in July 1981” (ZIMCORD 1981:2). The positive 
impact of the plan is stated in Table 3.1 highlighting the increase in the education 
expenditure for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. 
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Total Government Revenue and Grants  
(Z$ million) 
$ 675 $ 949 $ 1 365 $ 1 781 $ 1 997 $ 2 212 
Government Expenditure on Education (Z$ 
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Total Government Consumption Expenditure 
(Z$ million) 
$663 $750 $1 007 $1 138 $1 334 $1 559 
Government Expenditure to GDP ratio 31% 29% 32% 36% 41% 32% 
Budget Deficit (Z$ million) $-375 $-335 $-317 $-466 $-630 $-711 
Government Debt (Z$ million) $1 840.2 $2 095 $2478.6 $2 850.3 $3 744 $4 638.6 
GDP Growth (%) 10.8% 13.5% 3.3% 1.3% -2.2% 10.6 % 
Inflation Rate (%) 10.3 % 13.6% 17.4% 14.4 % 12.4 % 15.6% 
Current a/c Deficit to GDP (%) -4.9% -10.9% -11.6% -8.9% -1.8% -1.9% 
General Government (GFCF) (Z$ million) 63.9 99.7 169.9 195.4 234.9 266.5 
Exports (Z$ million) 909 972 968 1 150 1 453 1 596 
Imports (Z$ million) 809 1 018 1 082 1 062 1 201 1 447 
Private Investment (GFCF) $464 $730 869 1 043 950 1 033 
Private Investment to GDP % 13% 16.47% 16.72% 16.53% 14.84% 11.36% 
Total GFCF $ 528 $ 830 $1 039 $1 238 $ 1 185 $ 1 300 
Source: (ZimStat 1986) 
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Table 3.1 indicates that government expenditure on education was constantly 
increasing from 14.9% of GDP in 1980, 26.4% in 1983 to 28.7% in 1985. As a result 
of high budgetary allocations to education, government was able to implement the free 
basic primary education for all policy, which resulted in the establishment of more 
primary and secondary schools.  In the health sector, the main thrust was to effect a 
reasonable balance between the rural and urban population and ensuring equity in 
service delivery and significantly levelling out rural disparities. From table 3.1, it is clear 
that government expenditure increased exponentially from 8.1% in 1980, 9.3% in 1983 
to 10.5% in 1985, thereby supporting the development of the health sector. As 
highlighted by Nyazema (2010:233), there was “progress made in the 1980s 
characterised by adequate financing of the health system and decentralised health 
management and equity of health services between urban and rural areas, which saw 
dramatic increases in child survival rates and life expectancy”. 
Regarding resettlement of indigenous people, very little budget was set aside for this 
exercise. From table 3.1, the average budgetary allocation towards housing and 
community social amenities was averaging 3.9% over the five years, indicating the 
same level of resource commitments during the colonial era. According to ZIMCORD 
(1981), “at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979, Britain made commitments to 
mobilise the support of the international community to assist the independent 
Zimbabwe with financial and technical resources for land settlement and rural and 
agricultural development. However, after independence the promises were not fulfilled 
which made it difficult for the new Government to implement the resettlement 
programme”. 
The general economic conditions during the 1981 to 1985 period were characterised 
by too much dependence on government for survival by the citizens. The economy 
was tightly controlled by the state. The “economy rebounded significantly in the early 
years of independence averaging 10 percent growth during 1980-82. This was 
influenced by favourable domestic and external conditions, including the lifting of 
economic sanctions, stimulation of overall demand in the economy with redistributive 
fiscal policies, and the opening up of external markets, fuelled activity” (AfDB n.d.:3). 
This resulted in the efficient offering of education and health services, together with 
the introduction of redistributive programmes; hence socialism was promoted. The 
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government’s expansionary income policies also promoted security of employment as 
well as raising living standards through the setting of minimum wages. The economy 
experienced very high growth rates in 1980 and 1981, respectively.  Table 3.1 shows 
exports grew from Z$ 909 million in 1980 to Z$1596 million in 1985, thereby decreasing 
the current account deficit from -4.9% to -1.9% of GDP in 1980 and 1985 respectively.      
However, it is important to note that the growth in social sectors was not matched by 
the growth in productive sectors, as reduced demand of Zimbabwean exports due to 
an overvalued currency, a decline in investment and capital formation as well as 
severe shortages of foreign currency combined to bring in a recession towards the 
end of the policy lifespan.  
In summary, the positives from the GWEP were mainly on the social front where 
access to education, access to health and employment creation greatly improved from 
1980 to 1985. This led to an improvement of the general social being of the indigenous 
majority. Therefore, it can be said that on the social front the policy was a significant 
success. However, the productive sector of the economy was subdued. The GWEP 
focused on addressing the colonial imbalances that were perpetuated by the colonial 
policies. The zeal displayed by the GWEP was to promote equal distribution of 
resources and development amongst the whole Zimbabwean populace. It also sought 
to promote participation by everyone in national developmental issues. All of these 
were noble ideas from the newly elected government in an independent country. 
However, the policy heavily depended on external resources and technical assistance 
for implementation. The policy also placed much focus on social development and little 
emphasis was placed on wealth generation using locally available resources. 
Logically, the policy should have come up with strategies to rapidly grow the economy 
in a sustainable manner, then use the wealth generated for social development. This 
would have achieved sustainable long-term results.  
3.3 Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83 -1984/85) 
The Three Year Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) had its roots in the 
GWEP. The Plan was developed to execute the GWEP’s goals and objectives (TNDP 
1983:1). Volume 1 of the Three Year TNDP (1983:1), provided “the overall structure 
of the inherited socio-economic system, the ideological and policy framework of 
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Government and the macro and broad sectoral targets over the plan period. Volume 
II provided outlines of programmes and possible specific projects in the public sector. 
Volume II therefore was the most important instruments for realising the aspirations, 
objectives and targets outlined in Volume I”. In allocating investment and other 
resources among competing demands, government sought the realisation of growth 
with equity and transformation strategy as outlined in Chapter IV of Volume I. This 
required resources to be deployed efficiently while achieving an appropriate balance 
of the imperatives of growth on one hand, and those of equity and transformation on 
the other. In addition, this required attainment of sustainable balanced growth between 
sectors (TNDP 1983:1). Given the general growth assumptions outlined in Chapter IV 
of Volume I, the total cumulative public sector investment programme in the then 
current terms over the planning period was expected to be $3 618 million or 59% of 
cumulative gross capital formation, as Table 3.2 depicts. 
Table 3.2: Public Sector Investment Programme 
 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1982-85 
Gross investment ($) 1 015 1 162 1 441 3618 
Percentage of total 63.0% 58.0% 58.0% 59.0% 
Source: (Three Year TNDP 1982/83-1982-85) 
In order to “impact on the rural economy, a sector of high government priority, nearly 
31% of the public sector investment programme (PSIP) was planned for rural 
development. This encompassed land resettlement, construction of roads, bridges, 
schools, clinics, development of water supplies and agricultural extension services” 
(TNDP 1983:2). Some of the objectives of the Plan are summarised below (TNDP 
1983:2-32): 
 “Agriculture: Through various agencies, Government intended to undertake a 
comprehensive examination and review of pricing with a view to develop a pricing 
policy which effectively and equitably promoted an optimal mix of agricultural 
commodities, sustained development of communal areas, food self-sufficiency, 
regional security and efficient land use and development. 
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 Resettlement and Rural Development: It was planned that 162 000 families would 
be resettled over the Plan period. 
 Industry: The Plan sought to expand and reconstruct the sector to enable it to meet 
the growing and changing patterns of demand for industrial products.   
 Energy: The Government’s major objective was to ensure that the growth and 
development potential of the economy should not be impeded by the insufficiency, 
insecurity or unreliability of supplies of energy and power at realistic prices.  
 Mining: The Plan’s major objective was to prevent the sector from collapsing given 
the depression in the world economy that was taking place at that time.  
 Transport: In order to meet expected transport demands arising from the planned 
growth and development of the economy, it was necessary to integrate and co-
ordinate the operations and planning of all modes of transport. 
 Natural Resources and Tourism: Government recognised that Zimbabwe’s natural 
resources were a heritage, as such the exploitation needed a rational system of 
utilisation and environmental preservation. Government intended to ensure that 
those who formulate, administer and supervise the exploitation of these resources 
were sufficiently trained and understood the fundamental nature of the 
environment. 
 Water Resources and Development: Government intended to provide adequate 
and secure water supplies for people and livestock for human welfare, to raise the 
standards of living of the people. 
 Housing and Construction: The Government’s objective was to provide adequate 
and decent housing conditions with a view to improve social welfare. 
 Education and Culture: The education sector intended to redress the inherited 
educational, qualitative and quantitative imbalances from the colonial era. 
 Health: Government wanted to make the access to adequate health facilities a 
basic right given that a healthy nation was critical for socio-economic 
development” (TNDP 1983:32). 
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The budget requirements for the plan are stated in table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Financing of the Public Sector Investment Programme (US$ million) 
 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Central Government Budget 375 455 592 
ZIMCORD 300 380 377 
Loans  229 297 300 
Grants 71 83 77 
Public Corporations  340 327 472 
Loans  190 139 227 
Revenues 150 188 245 
Total 1 015 1 162 1 441 
Source: (Three Year TNDP 1982/83-1982-85:1) 
The TNDP came up with a long list of government programmes and projects in each 
Ministry. These programmes and projects were aligned to the GWEP. Practically, the 
elongated list could not be implemented within the Plan’s tenure.  
3.4 Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform-the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (1991-95) 
After a decade of considerable social progress but limited per capita income growth, 
the Government of Zimbabwe embarked on a programme of economic policy reform 
aimed at stimulating investment and removing impediments to growth. The 
Programme was known as A Framework for Economic Reform (FER), also commonly 
known as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Thus this study 
may  alternate both terms in the coming sections. Since independence in 1980, 
Zimbabwe made substantial achievements in the areas of education, health, 
population and small-holder agriculture as shown in the table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Achievements Recorded as at 1989 in the Various Sectors 
Sector 1980 1989 
Education Primary 1.2 million 2.2 million 
Secondary 74 000 671 000 
Health % of children fully 
immunised 
25% 86% 
Infant mortality 86 per 1 000 births 61 per 1000 births 
Life expectancy 55 years 59 years 
Population Fertility  2.8% p.a 
Small farmers’ share 
of marketed maize 
Productivity 0 More than 70% 
Source: (FER 1991-95:1) 
The above successes, however, according to the documents of the FER (1991:1), 
“were not matched by economic growth and rising per capita income. Growth in GDP 
during 1980-89 was averaging 2.7% per year, lagging behind population growth. 
Export growth increased by 3.4% per annum in real terms between 1980 and 1989.” 
According to FER (1991:1), “the slow export performance, coupled with debt service 
payments rising to a peak of 34% of exports earnings in 1987, severely constrained 
the growth of imports resulting in severely constrained utilisation of existing capacity 
as well as low investment in new production capability. The unemployment rate stood 
at 26% in 1989”.  
The “central Government’s fiscal deficit was in excess of 10% of GDP during the 
1980s, leading to central Government’s debt reaching 71% of GDP by 1989, 36% of 
which was external debt. Total public sector debt was even larger at 90% of GDP. 
During the Financial Year 1989/90, central Government interest payments comprised 
6.7% of GDP. Inflation averaged around 15% per annum during the 1980s. Nominal 
interest rates averaged 12% and hence the real interest was negative” (FER 1991:2). 
The “principal cause of low growth had been the low level of investment in the 
productive sectors of the economy. Investment had barely been adequate to maintain 
the capital stock. Let alone to increase it and raise productivity” (FER 1991:2). The 
“capital stock was aged, as gross fixed capital formation declined to 155% of GDP in 
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the mid -980s. Private investment was less than 8% of GDP in 1987 compared with 
12% in 1985. The decline in investment was attributed to three basic factors:  the risk 
associated with unsustainable fiscal deficits; uncertainties and high costs associated 
with foreign exchanges allocation system affecting access to investment, intermediate 
goods and spares; and the relatively high cost of doing business in Zimbabwe’s highly 
regulated business environment, as a result of price controls, labour market 
restrictions and investment control procedures” (FER 1991:2). 
The fundamental objective of the Programme was “to improve living conditions, 
especially for the poorest groups. This was meant to increase real incomes and lower 
unemployment, by generating sustained higher economic growth. In order to achieve 
this broad objective, the economy needed to be transformed to make it more 
competitive and productive” (FER 1991:3). The specific objectives of the Programme 
were to achieve (FER 1991:3): “economic growth target of 5% by 1995; industrial 
growth of 5.8% per year; agricultural growth of 3.2% per year; service sector growth 
of 5% per annum; investments to rise to 25% of GDP; increased exports and imports 
as a share of GDP; and per capita to be rising at 2% per annum” (FER 1991:3). These 
targets are stated in table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Economic Indicators: A Framework for Economic Reform (FER) (1991-95) 
Key Indicators 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual 
GDP Growth 
Rate % 
4.3% 7.1% 4.4% -8.4% 4.6% 2.1% 4.8% 5.8% 5.0% 0.2% 
GDP per Capita 
Growth Rate 
1.6 2.91% 1.7 -11.0% 1.9 -1.0% 2.2 7.16% 2.4 -1.64% 
Total Department 
of Defence (in 
US$) 
3056 1 728 3398 2 575 3727 3 161 3996 4 924 4209 7 166 
Department of 
Defence/GDP % 








13.0 18.29% 14.7% 19.59% 16.0% 20.84% 16.2% 18.65% 16.4% 21.88% 
Domestic 
Savings/GDP % 
23.0 -16.89 24.3 -6.1 25.2 -2.9 25.1 -9.8 25.3  
National 
Savings/GDP 








48.6% 28% 48.1% 32% 47.3% 32% 46.1% 28% 45.3% 35% 
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Key Indicators 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 




16.0 23.3% 14.0 42.1% 12.0 27.6% 10.0 22.2% 10.0 22.6% 
Terms of Trade 
(1987) 
0.97  1.05  1.05  1.05  1.05  
Real Export 
Growth Rate % 
4.8 -4.38 5.2 -5.32 5.6 22.7 5.7 9.39 5.8 0.48 
Real Import 
Growth Rate 
8.5 20.13 7.1 3.49 3.7 -9.76 3.7 13.53 3.7 6.17 
Current Account 
Deficit/GDP % 






5.2 -4.62 4.0 -5.16 
Current Account 
Deficit (in US$) 






325.2 -0.318 268.7 -0.369 
Net Reserves (in 
US$) 




 0.494  0.481  0.476  0.473  0.467 
Source: (FER1991; ZimStat 2016) 
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After ten years of independence, the government noted that the economy was not 
growing at a desired pace. In view of this, a new policy was introduced on 18th of July 
1991. The goal of the programme was to transform the economy from being heavily 
regulated to liberalisation. This was expected to rapidly grow the economy. From table 
3.5, the highest GDP growth rate of 7.1% was realised in 1991 whilst the lowest figure 
of -8.4% was recorded in 1992. Generally, the growth rates were below the targeted 
figures. By 1995 the GDP growth rate stood at 0.2%. Inflation figures in table 3.5 
indicate an upward spiral trend. In 1991, the figure stood at 23.5% and rose to 27.65 
in 1993. By 1995, the inflation figure was 22.6%.  
This indicates that during FER, inflation got worse and it eroded people’s purchasing 
power, which also contributed to domestic de-savings. In 1991 domestic savings were 
reduced by -16.9%, whilst in 1994 the figure stood at -9.8%. Likewise, government 
also faced challenges in funding its budget. By the end of the FER in 1995 the deficit 
had worsened to 13% of GDP and government funded this gap through domestic 
borrowing; in the process depriving indigenous businesspeople of resources. On civil 
service reform, 94% of target posts were abolished and the wage bill was reduced 
from 16.5% of GDP in 1990/1 to 10.4% in 1994/95. It allowed individuals and 
companies to operate foreign currency accounts; it ushered in a bureau de change to 
handle currency exchanges and also resulted in the unification of official and interbank 
exchange rates. By 1995 all price and distribution controls had been removed while 
transport deregulations ushered in more players to compete with Zimbabwe United 
Passenger Company (ZUPCO). FER reforms also allowed for remittance of profits and 
dividends to foreign investors. Generally, the performance of the economy under FER 
was largely unimpressive such that significant declines in real incomes were noted. 
As indicated in table 3.5 above, most of the FER targets were not met. 
To effectively implement the Programme, an inter-ministerial Coordination Committee 
was established to follow up implementation and make periodic reviews. A detailed 
Programme implementation matrix with clear timeframes was developed for effective 
monitoring and evaluation by the Committee (FER 1991:23). Table 3.5 above shows 
a summary of the Programme’s key macro-economic indicators, providing the baseline 
information for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Programme. 
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The foreign financing required for five years (1991-1995), was estimated to be about 
US$3.44 billion translating to about US$690 million per annum. This budget was 
wholly coming from foreign financing. Zimbabwe needed a major increase in both 
grants and a blend of concessional and other long-term lending. Short-term lending 
was not very helpful given that the problems were structural and investment related. 
 The FER was a complete departure from the GWEP’s focus. This policy’s centre of 
attention was rapid economic growth, create conditions for a market led economy, 
stimulate investment, employment and exports. Thereby in the process, the policy was 
undoing some of the gains achieved by its predecessor policy. The FER introduced 
user fees in the health and education sector. It also reduced or eliminated government 
subsidies on basic commodities. Furthermore, the policy intended to remove controls 
which had an effect of triggering inflation. The idea of growing the economy was good 
but it was overemphasised at the expense of the social well-being of the general 
populace. There was a need to strike a balance between economic development and 
social development/protection of citizens.  
3.5 Second Five-Year National Development Plan (1991-1995) 
The Second Five-Year National Development Plan (SFYNDP) was a successor of the 
First Five-Year National Development Plan. The SFYNDP was to be implemented 
simultaneously with A Framework for Economic Reform (FER); ithat is, the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). FER was said to be an integral part of the 
SFYNDP. FER was launched to stimulate investment and remove impediments to 
growth and achieve all round economic growth (SFYNDP 1991: i).  Achievements 
recorded under the previous policies involve the following (SFYNDP 1991:1-2): 
 “Increased accessibility of social services in the areas of education and health for 
the indigenous people. This led to the number of primary and secondary schools 
increasing by 146% in 1990, with 1980 as a base year. On the health services 
front, life expectancy rose to 64 years. 
 Creation of new jobs, whereby during 1980-1990, 209 000 new jobs were created 
in agricultural sectors and the public sector. Forty-six percent of the jobs created 
were by expansion of public administration, education and health. 
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 Improved International Economic Cooperation was achieved. With the attainment 
of independence and removal of sanctions, Zimbabwe re-joined the community of 
sovereign nations. This led to increased and improved activity in the international 
relations of the country both politically and economically. At the regional level, the 
country became a member of the SADC, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern 
and Southern Africa States (PTA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and its 
African Development Fund (AfDF) among other institutions. On the global level, 
Zimbabwe joined international financial and economic institutions like the IMF and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or WB), as well 
as the United Nations and its system of sub-organisation, among others” 
(SFYNDP 1991:1-2).  
The SFYNDP (1991: i) states that the formulation of development plans since 1980 
was carried out smoothly. However, implementation faced many hurdles and planned 
targets were not achieved. From 1980-1990, the economy experienced many 
setbacks as well as advances. Since 1983, investment, especially in the productive 
sectors of the economy, continuously declined. Other problems that still existed were 
(SFYNDP 1991:1-2): 
 “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) average growth rate was 3.2% for 1980-1990 
which dropped to 3.0% per annum for 1985-1990. This was against a planned 
target of 4.3% per annum. The growth rate in the productive sectors; namely 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing, averaged only 3.1% per annum for 1980-
1990 and 1.7% per annum during the period 1985-1990. The growth rate was 
attributed to shortages of foreign currency for operations and maintenance. The 
other reasons were low levels of new investments and a technological gap. 
 High and increasing unemployment levels were experienced as the population 
growth rate stood at 2.7%, whilst the economy was growing at a sluggish pace. 
 Declining exports levels were experienced, especially between 1982 and 1986. 
This was caused by unfavourable world market prices for minerals and agricultural 
products.  
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 Declining imports levels due to shortages of foreign currency. This forced industry 
to operate below capacity and hampering the modernisation of machinery and 
equipment. 
 The inflation rate over the 1979-1989 period averaged 11.4% per annum. The 
Zimbabwean Dollar depreciated at almost the same rate. By the end of 1990, 
inflation was running at an alarming rate of 17% per annum. Inflation was also 
fuelled by the huge budget deficit. 
 The budget deficit as a proportion of GDP averaged 9.1% per annum during the 
previous Plan period (1986-90). Public finances remained unbalanced and public 
debt was 70% of GDP at the end of 1990 which was far above the manageable 
level of 40%” (SFYNDP 1991:1-2). 
Faced with these challenges, the Government of Zimbabwe developed the SFYNDP 
to address the problems at hand. The main objectives of the SFYNDP and strategies 
proposed for achieving them therefore are listed as (SFYNDP 1991:3): “improvement 
in living conditions and reduction of poverty; increasing and restructuring of 
investment; expansion and liberalisation of trade; stabilisation of public finances; 
reduction of the rate of inflation; energy and water; transport and communications; 
creation of employment; regional development; rural and urban development; 
conservation of environment; and science and technology” (SFYNDP 1991:3). The 
targets for the Second Five-Year Plan are stated in table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Main Targets of the Second five-year Plan 
Heading Percentage 
Budget Deficit in 1995/96, percentage of GDP 2.4% 
Government Expenditure in 1995/96 percentage of GDP 38.5% 
Government Debt in June 1996, percentage of GDP 59.1% 
Rate of Investment (fixed assets) percentage of GDP 24.4% 
Investment, cumulative 1991-95, $M (1990 prices) 17 153 
Export of Goods & Services, growth rate 1991-95 7.8% 
Import of Goods & Services, growth rate 1991-95 6.7% 
Foreign Debt Service Ratio in 1995 19.5% 
Formal Sector Employment, new jobs in 000’s 1991-95 108.5 
Gross Domestic Product, growth rate 1991-95, in percentage 4.6% 
Per Capita GDP in 1995 (1990 Dollars) 1 673 
Inflation Rate 1994-95 9.0% 
Source: (SFYNDP 1991-1995) 
Further, the manufacturing industry was expected to contribute 6.0% per annum from 
3.2%, mining to move to 5.0% from 1.0%, tourism to record 9.4% and agriculture, 
forestry and fishing to move to 3.5% from 2.0% compared with 1985-1990 figures. 
However, during the first half of the Plan period it was anticipated that the economy 
would be adjusting to FER, resulting in a smaller growth rate. In the second half of the 
Plan period, there would be a take-off in outputs, exports and employment (SFYNDP 
1991:6-7). In order to achieve the agriculture sector’s set targets, government was 
going to develop irrigation facilities and improve technology. In mining, Government 
was expecting to encourage the exploitation of minerals (including small scale mining), 
support local processing and give incentives to attract investment in the sector 
(SFYNDP 1991:6-7).  The total budget of the Plan, according to the documents of the 
SFYNDP (1991:21), “stood at $32 843 million. The Government envisaged three main 
aspects of financing the Plan, these were: government budget; private sector 
investment; and foreign resources”.  The SFYNDP was, however, not addressing the 
immediate needs of the citizens. It had a ‘wish list’ of sectoral programmes and 
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projects to be undertaken. This required a huge budget of US$32 billion, where the 
bulk of it was expected to come from external sources. The full implementation of the 
Plan was difficult given limited government resource outlays against a huge budgetary 
requirement. The Plan was not guided by a long-term national vision.  
3.6 Vision 2020 and Long-Term Development Strategies 
The Zimbabwe Vision 2020 was initiated by the Government of Zimbabwe. The Vision 
was launched in the year 2000 with a life span of 20 years. The Vision was also known 
as the National Long-Term Perspective Studies (NLTPS). It provided a long-term 
planning framework that would guide formulation of both the medium- and short-term 
development plans and other policies (Vision 2020:1). Vision 2020 envisaged going 
beyond economic variables to include social, political, cultural and environmental 
aspects. The vision contained the people’s aspirations that were identified through 
highly consultative processes with representatives of the government, private sector, 
civic society, political parties and labour. In a nutshell, the Zimbabwe vision described 
what its citizens wanted their country to be by the year 2020 (Vision 2020:1-2).  
Vision 2020 (2020: iii) aims that “Zimbabwe should emerge a united, strong, 
democratic, prosperous and egalitarian nation with a high quality of life for all by the 
year 2020.” This proud and happy nation, according to the Vision 2020 [may], “strive 
for a highly competitive, sustainable, and industrialised economy benefiting from its 
national endowments including its natural resources. Zimbabwe shall continue to be 
guided by democratic principles, respect for human rights, with a vibrant and tolerant 
culture while ensuring aesthetic, physical and spiritual welfare for all its citizens” 
(Vision 2020:1-2). The “National Vision for Zimbabwe is based on the aspirations 
identified by the people during the nation-wide consultation process. These aspirations 
were the foundation for the desired future and key to the realisation of Zimbabwe’s 
Vision” (Vision 2020:8).The following is a summary of the aspirations that were 
expected to be realised during the period and beyond (Vision 2020:8): “good 
governance; maintenance of political stability; diversified economy with high growth 
rate; access to social services by all; acceleration of rural development; equal 
opportunities for all; development and utilisation of modern science and technology; 
vibrant and dynamic culture; and sustainable utilisation and management of natural 
resources”. The Vision 2020 targets are stated in table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Vision 2020 Period Targets 




GDP at MP 
1990 p.a. 
28112 37670 50613 69786 93321 ------ 
Annual Average 
Growth 
5.5 8.0 4.0 7.2 8.0 5.0 
Population 
(‘000s) 
13337 15191 17188 19220 21429 ------ 
Annual Average 
Growth 
2.7 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 
GDP/Capita  1938 2480 2945 3631 4355 ------ 
Annual Average 
Growth 
2.8 5.5 1.5 5 5.8 3.3 
Source: (Vision 2020:12) 
Notes: The scenario growth assumptions: A three-year drought cycle and the economy 
becoming more resilient to the effects of droughts, investment ratio of about 30% of 
GDP, Domestic savings of about 25% of GDP, and an incremental capital – output 
ratio of 4.5 or better (Vision 2020: 12). 
In order to attain a sustainable, diversified, broad based oriented economy driven by 
industrialisation, Vision 2020 highlighted the need for strategies to address the 
following (Vision 2020:12-20): “sustainable macro-economic growth; 
regional/provincial development; decentralisation; rural development; urban 
development; employment and poverty; human and natural resources management; 
social development; culture and sport; and democracy”. Vision 2020 was intended to 
be implemented through medium-term and annual plans. The medium-term plans 
would be implemented through the annual budget. The Public Sector Investment 
Programme (PSIP) would remain as a major instrument for implementation of 
development programmes and projects. Given the financial resources that the 
Government had at its disposal, its efforts to implement Vision 2020 was expected to 
be complemented by the private sector, NGOs, Donors and other civic society groups. 
Thus various policy measures and incentives were to be put in place to allow more 
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players to take part in implementing Vision 2020 (Vision 2020: 2). In order to facilitate 
the implementation of Vision 2020, it was considered (Vision 2020:38), that an 
institutional structure be put in place, namely the Vision 2020 Development Council 
(VDC), chaired by His excellence, The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. VDC 
members included cabinet ministers, provincial governors, and members of 
parliament, among other stakeholders. Placing the President of the Zimbabwe as the 
chairperson of the Vision implementation structure showed that the government was 
committed to achieving the aspirations of the Vision. In addition, the implementation 
structure included key stakeholders, which was commendable.   
3.7 Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Programme  
(2000-2001)  
The Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) “was a 
continuation of the commitments and targets of Zimbabwe Programme for Economic 
and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) and was supposed to run concurrently with 
the Millennium Budget announced in October 1999. This policy framework covered 30 
months from July 2000 up to December 2002 and its aim was to ‘fight spiralling 
inflation’ which was cited as a major cause of macro-economic instability” (MERP 
2000:1). The Programme’s goal was “to build confidence in the economy and restore 
vibrant economic growth by removing the fundamental causes of inflation, which was 
a cause of macro-economic instability” (MERP 2000:5). The prime objective was “to 
rebuild mutual trust and confidence among citizens and also reduce the budget deficit 
to 3.8% of GDP through mobilisation of all stakeholders including government, the 
private sector, labour, civil society to implement measures that would restore macro-
economic stability. It further aimed to restore vibrant economic growth by removing 
causes of inflation, achieve sustainable investment capacities, stable real incomes and 
improve living standards. It also sought to restore normal cooperative relations with 
the international community” (MERP 2000:3).  
Some more specific objectives of MERP (2000:40-41), were “to build confidence in the 
economy, consolidate the fiscus, accelerate and complete the public enterprise 
reforms, reduce inflation and interest rates, stabilise the value of the Zimbabwean 
dollar and resolve the foreign currency crisis, engage the support of the international 
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community, strengthen monitoring of the financial sector, stimulate growth of the 
productive sectors, economic empowerment and poverty reduction”.   
The action plans for the MERP included:  consolidating the fiscus by embarking on the 
cash budget to avoid spending overruns, reforming public enterprises to stem losses, 
restructure public debt and enhance revenue collection capacity. Monetary policy was 
aimed at reducing inflation, lowering interest rates and reducing the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe’s (RBZ) lending to government and financial institutions. It also marked the 
beginning of concessional financing of major sectors of the economy such as 
manufacturing, agricultural and mining (MERP 2000:21). Other measures included 
reducing duty on inputs, input schemes to beneficiaries of the fast track land reform 
programme as well as reducing duties and tariffs for the mining sector (MERP 
2000:21).  
The MERP objectives were to be achieved under its principles of (MERP 2000:22): 
“government committing itself to use market forces in the allocation of resources and 
pricing of goods and services with the possibility of limited government intervention in 
some cases; equitably sharing costs of adjustments among the social groups; use of 
balanced and flexible strategies to resolve macro-economic imbalances; and direct 
market interventions would be of limited duration and confined to resolving the market 
distortions. Market institutions would be developed to efficiently allocate resources. 
Government and stakeholders to have the prime responsibility of implementing the 
programme” (MERP 2000:22). However, MERP was unsuccessful in sustaining the 
financial viability due to the size of the budget, as table 3.8 reveals. 
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Table 3.8: Economic Indicators: Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery 








Real GDP Growth Rates 
% 
-8.2  -0.2 -5.9 
Budget Deficit Z$ million -$68 706  -$30 742 -$41 241 
Budget Deficit to GDP -3.4 
Reduction to 
15.5% and 
8% of GDP in 
2001 & 2002 
respectively 
-3.5 -3.6 
Government Debt Z$ 
million 
$230 753.5  $246 043 $292 402 
Government Debt to GDP 57.7  31.4 52.3 
Inflation Rate 55.22%  71.9% 133.2% 





Government Recurrent  
Expenditure  
(Z$ million) 
1.623  1.199 1.137 
Gross Investment as a 
ratio of GDP 
13.57  10.27 5 
Imports to GDP ratio 35.908  32.939 34.73 
Exports to GDP ratio 38.16  34.95 31.83 
General Government 
(GFCF) 
11 749.3  11 156.4 25 421.3 
Private Investment/GDP 
% 
8.47  2.09 1.78 
External Assistance 
(grants/or soft loans) USD 
billions 
0.175 640  0.100 210 0.199 130 
Human Development 
Index 
0.440  0.442 0.435 
Source: (MERP 2001; ZimStat 2016)  
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Table 3.8 indicates most of the macro-economic indicators were not favourable during 
the policy lifespan. Inflation rates rose from 55.22% in 2000 to 133.2% in 2002.  
Government debt increased from Z$230 753.50 in 2000 to Z$292 402, whilst private 
investment to GDP decreased from 8.49% to 1.78% in 2000 and 2002 respectively. 
Over the MERP lifespan, the real GDP was thus declining. Overall, the MERP did not 
achieve its intended objectives. MERP was a ‘knee-jerk’ reactionary policy following 
the economy which was performing badly. Also, the political situation was not stable 
after the fast track land reform programme in 2000 and the birth of a new political 
party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which was launched in 1999. It 
was a reactive policy which sought to win the trust of citizens and other stakeholders. 
Basically, the policy was not developmental but only sought to stabilise both the 
economy and political environment. The government was not committed to implement 
the radical reforms which were needed to achieve the policy objectives.  
3.8 The Ten Point Plan (2002) 
The President of Zimbabwe, during his inauguration address in April 2002, announced 
the policy directions on the Post-Election Economic Development Strategy (National 
Economic Revival Programme (NERP) 2003:30), with the need: 
 “to promote stakeholder unity of purpose and consensus on the country’s home 
grown development strategy based on self-reliance; 
 to address as matter of urgency the supply and stabilisation of the food situation 
and ensure food security to overcome the current and future droughts; 
 to complete the land reform programme and embark on agrarian reform centred 
on wealth creation and the economic empowerment of the peasantry and the new 
indigenous commercial farmers; 
 to develop and promote an agro-based industrialisation programme spearheaded 
by indigenous entrepreneurs; 
 to restructure and re-energise the informal sector as a potential major engine 
growth and contributor to the GDP; 
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 for a concerted and co-ordinated response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in terms of 
organising awareness campaigns, and undertaking preventive measures;  
 to develop an indigenous capitalist base through the democratisation of the 
economic architecture currently dominated by multinational corporations and 
white firms especially in the areas of mining, manufacturing and tourism; 
 to pursue selective state intervention and participation in the strategic areas of the 
economy in order to achieve definite strategic outcomes; 
 to develop new markets in non-traditional sectors and to diversify the production 
of high value exports; and 
 to resuscitate collapsed companies and enterprises closed in the last twelve 
months or so as a measure of job creation and poverty alleviation” (NERP 
2003:30).  
Generally, the policy reversed the gains of the FER/ESAP. Unlike other government 
policies, the Ten-Point Plan was not documented and published. As such, there were 
no policy goals, objectives, targets, budgets, strategies and implementation plans, 
making it difficult for implementing agencies to execute the policy and measure 
success.  
3.9 National Economic Revival Programme: Measures to Address the 
Current Challenges (2003) 
In the budget of 2003, “Government made a commitment to introduce, in conjunction 
with stakeholders, measures to address the viability of producers and the survival of 
exporters, including all earners of foreign exchange. The focus of the National 
Economic Revival Programme (NERP) was to restore conditions necessary for full 
agricultural production, reversal of de-industrialisation and increasing capacity 
utilisation in the manufacturing sector, resuscitation of closed mines and companies” 
(NERP 2003: i). At the time when NERP was formulated, “the country was facing 
severe socio-economic challenges. These were compounded by a hostile external and 
domestic environment, arising from opposition to the Land and Agrarian Reform 
Programme by the country’s detractors. Sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe resulted in 
104 
the drying up of important sources of foreign exchange-donor funding for development 
projects, banks’ lines of credit, foreign direct and portfolio investment. This was 
coupled with worsening export performance, heightened failure to adequately provide 
for fuel, electricity, food, drugs as well as spares, capital and equipment, among 
others. If not urgently addressed, foreign exchange unavailability was foreseen leading 
to national instability and posing a threat to national security” (NERP 2003:1). 
According to NERP (2003:2), “the negative perceptions, of [the] detractors and their 
portrayals of [the] land reforms internationally have dented the country’s image. 
Confidence in the economy is at its lowest ebb as a result, adversely affecting private 
investment and tourism.”  
The challenges manifested “themselves through a contraction in economic activity, 
unemployment and worsening poverty levels, high money supply growth and related 
hyper-inflation, and acute foreign exchange shortages. The economy had cumulatively 
deteriorated by 19.3% over the past three years, the rapid expansion in money supply 
to around 150% by December 2002 due to increased bank lending to the public sector. 
Unsustainably high inflation, which accelerated to 208% in January 2003 was the 
country’s prime macro-economic challenge” (NERP 2003:1). Apart “from crippling 
industrial production, the resultant foreign exchange shortages caused the country’s 
external payment arrears to rise to about US$1.4 billion by January 2003. The build-
up in external payments arrears had further worsened the country’s international credit 
worthiness” (NERP 2003:2). In addition, according to NERP (2003:2), “the foreign 
currency shortages had also adversely affected the economy’s capacity to supply 
adequate basic goods and services. Consequently, most companies were operating 
below capacity and others had closed down. The distortions in the foreign exchange 
and goods markets undermined trade relations with neighbouring countries, which 
were threatening to ban the importation of Zimbabwean products”.  
All these economic challenges made it difficult for the nation to meet the objectives of 
the ‘Ten Point Plan’, which had set the tone for a sectoral driven economic revival 
growth strategy (NERP 2003:1). Critical measures urgently being put in place and 
indicated in this Policy Statement, were (NERP 2003:6-22): “agriculture and rural 
development; manufacturing; mining; tourism; entertainment industry; foreign 
exchange generation; pricing policy; financing; effective use of public resources; public 
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enterprises commercialisation; and energy”. To oversee the implementation and 
monitoring of Government policy measures, Government planned to institute the 
following (NERP 2003:28): 
 “Cabinet Action Committees were to be refocused to effectively implement 
sectoral policy measures; 
 Sub-committees of officials, which may also include private sector 
representatives, would assist Action Committees; 
 The Presidency and Cabinet would oversee the implementation of policy 
measures; 
 The Review Panel, chaired by the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet, 
would render necessary support to the Presidency and Cabinet; 
 A Taskforce, chaired by the Senior Secretary for Administration in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet would monitor the implementation of agreed policies and 
measures on a day-to-day basis; and 
 The Task Force would also interface with other stakeholders, through the TNF and 
NECF to ensure collective ownership and responsibility in the implementation of 
agreed measures to revive the economy” (NERP 2003:28).  
The NERP had an implementation matrix which was clear on measures to be 
implemented, the responsible agencies and time frames. The focus of the NERP was 
on “the restoration of macro-economic stability, particularly reducing the unsustainably 
high inflation from a three-digit to a two-digit figure and increasing aggregate supply 
across all sectors of the economy, especially agriculture.  During this period, year-on-
year inflation declined from 622.8% in January 2004 to 251% by September, 2004. 
Fiscal consolidation and discipline resulted in a new Budget for 2003, with a marginal 
deficit of 0.3% of GDP, compared to a targeted deficit of 11.5%. The restoration of 
discipline resulted in the elimination of speculative activities, which had contributed to 
spiralling inflation” (Sibanda and Makwata 2017:20). As emphasised by Sibanda and 
Makwata (2017:20), “for the first ten months of 2004, total inflows into the official 
market amounted to more than US$1 373 million. However, inflows for the whole of 
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2003 amounted to a mere US$302 million. The improvements in foreign exchange 
inflows resulted in increased capacity utilisation from 40% in 2003 to 60% in 2004. 
Non-resident Zimbabweans remitted US$40 million into the country by September 
2004; this also positively contributed to foreign currency inflows. Due to Government 
support, agricultural output increased, with maize production increasing from 508 000 
tonnes to 930 000 tonnes during the same period”. However, TNF did not have powers 
to make decisions. It could only recommend to Cabinet for approval. It was important 
for the NERP to recognise the need to give this forum legal powers to implement the 
policy and genuinely address the critical matters affecting the country in an inclusive 
and holistic manner. The policy had an implementation plan to execute the measures. 
Under TNF, Government, Business and Labour had clear obligations to achieve the 
measures. However, the policy did not have goals, objectives, targets and budgets 
with which to scientifically measure its success or failure.  
3.10 Zimbabwe: Towards Sustained Economic Growth- Macro-Economic 
Policy Framework (2005-2006) 
This National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) was underpinned by the 
objectives of the ‘Ten Point Plan’ whose focus was agriculture-led economic revival. 
The ‘Ten Point Plan’ was enunciated by His Excellency the President in 2002 (Macro-
Economic Policy Framework (MEPF 2004:1). Despite some notable developments 
mentioned above, the country was still facing a couple of challenges in the various 
sectors, which included the unstable macro-economic environment, characterised by 
high inflation, capacity utilisation, infrastructure and public service delivery, foreign 
currency generation, compromised corporate planning, corruption, poor management 
and corporate governance, and job losses. In the mining sector, output remained low, 
amid diversions of the mineral to the informal market, thereby depriving the country 
the much needed foreign currency.  
The tourism sector performed poorly due to negative portrayals of the country arising 
from opposition to the land reform (MEPF 2004:5-12). Given the problems that the 
economy was faced with, the government developed the MEPF 2005-2006 which was 
meant to focus on strategies to address the critical challenges. The strategies were 
categorised into seven sections and an implementation matrix was developed to 
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facilitate follow up on implementation of the policy (MEPF 2004:13). The summary of 
the MEPF’s targets is stated in table 3.9. 
Table 3.9: Macro-Economic Policy Framework (MEPF) Targets 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
GDP 









SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT 
Gross National Savings (% of GDP) 














CPI Inflation Annual Average 











































Source: (MEPF 2004: 106) 
The MEPF strategies focused on seven sections; namely (MEPF 2004:14-24): 
“agriculture development, industrialisation of the economy, infrastructure 
development, social services delivery, poverty reduction, critical success factors and 
programme implementation arrangements”. Government was cognisant that “the 
successful outcome of the sectoral strategies under this MEPF was dependent upon 
some critical policy interventions. In pursuit of realising the policy objectives, critical 
success factors were identified as the realisation of sustained macro-economic 
stability; foreign exchange generation and mobilisation; improved public service 
delivery; domestic and foreign investment promotion; improved corporate governance 
and improved public service conditions” (MEPF 2004:67). The measures to address 
the critical success factors considered were (MEPF 2004:68-84): “inflation reduction 
and stabilisation programme; foreign exchange generation; investment promotion; 
restructuring of public enterprises; pricing and income policies; strengthening 
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institutional capacity; improving the image of the country; and anti-corruption and 
corporate governance”. 
The policy’s budget was not developed. However, the sectoral objectives were 
expected to be synchronised with the objectives of the national budgets to ensure that 
adequate resources were allocated. In addition, some infrastructure projects were 
going to be funded through Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements (MEPF 
2004:88). A detailed implementation matrix was developed with clear time framed 
activities, responsible implementing agent and expected results (MEPF 2004:107). 
The Office of the President and Cabinet was expected to spearhead the timely 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the framework through the following 
mechanisms (MEPF 2004:86): “High Level Management and Coordination 
Committee, chaired by the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet and assisted 
by the Programme Steering Committee, chaired by the Deputy Chief Secretary; 
Review Panel, Chaired by the Chief Secretary; and Heads of Ministries Meetings, also 
chaired by the Chief Secretary” (MEPF 2004:86). The policy came up with a list of 
sectoral programmes/projects that needed urgent attention. However, the list was too 
long to be accomplished within a short space of two years. There was a need to 
prioritise areas that needed urgent attention such as building investor confidence, 
combating corruption and respecting the rule of law. By addressing these issues, 
capital would naturally flow into the country to address challenges in various sectors. 
3.11 Short-Term Economic Stabilisation Programme (2008) 
The Short-Term Economic Stabilisation Programme (STESP) was expected to cover 
the twelve-month period from July 2008 to June 2009. It was an intermediary 
programme intended to be implemented whilst the nation was in the process of 
finalising the Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (STESP 2008:6). The 
programme emphasised effective implementation of home grown policy measures to 
counter the impact of sanctions as well as to create the desired trust and confidence 
among stakeholders. The programme was meant to benefit from experiences and 
lessons drawn from the implementation of the National Economic Development 
Priority Programme (NEDPP) (STESP 2008:6). The programme was expected to 
benefit from the country’s abundant and diverse natural resource endowment as well 
getting support from cooperating partners (STESP 2008:5). The programme was 
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developed by a Technical Committee of the National Security Council, chaired by the 
Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet. The programme, as per the documents 
of the STESP (2008:7), was subjected to consultations from stakeholders through the 
National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF). The programme brought together 
social partners; namely business and labour, together with other key players in the 
economy to build the required consensus for effective policy formulation and 
implementation. 
The critical success factors were identified as follows (STESP 2008:8-9): “stabilise and 
reduce inflation; raise capacity utilisation through supporting domestic production; 
manage the country’s natural resources better and effectively generate more foreign 
exchange; better coordinate the country’s home grown socio-economic policies; 
consolidate the country’s investment management climate with a view to attract more 
new investments; inject vibrancy in the country’s parastatals and local authorities; shift 
local, regional and international focus away from Zimbabwe’s politics through swift 
political reforms that promote unity and internal cohesion; and see the removal of the 
illegal sanctions imposed on the country by some Western Governments” (STESP 
2008:8-9). The STESP was expected to focus on the following key areas (STESP 
2008:10): “pricing and inflation stabilisation; currency reforms; addressing improved 
availability of basic commodities; food security and enhancing productivity in 
agriculture; foreign exchange mobilisation; infrastructure rehabilitation; public 
enterprises and local authorities service delivery; skills retention; empowerment and 
indigenisation; enhancing social service delivery in the health and education sectors; 
social safety nets; and strengthening institutional frameworks for policy formulation 
and implementation”.  
The programme, according to the documents of the STESP (2008:51), indicated that 
“Government had experienced a serious deficiency in implementation of agreed 
measures in the past, as such the Programme was expected to be underpinned by an 
institutional framework and mechanisms for monitoring with a view to guarantee 
timeous implementation of Government programmes with coordination from the Office 
of the President and Cabinet”. The STESP (2008:51) further states that “the Chief 
Secretary to the President and Cabinet was expected to coordinate the sector 
coordinating teams. These teams would work with provincial monitoring teams, 
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comprising senior officials from Government to ensure quick decision making and 
timeous implementation of Government policies and programmes.” The STESP was 
reacting to the worsening macro-economic conditions in the country. Whilst the policy 
was meant to be short- term, some of the programmes and projects identified needed 
a medium- to long-term period to be resolved. These include structural bottlenecks, 
infrastructure (e.g. road, water, energy, irrigation) development, and industry capacity 
utilisation, amongst others. The policy did not clearly state its goals, objectives, 
targets, implementation plan and how the policy would be funded.  
3.12 Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (2009): Getting 
Zimbabwe Moving Again 
The Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) “was conceived a few 
days after the 15th of September 2008. When the inclusive Government was 
inaugurated on the 16th of February 2009, Government immediately formulated 
STERP as an important foundation stone in ‘Building the Zimbabwe We Want’ and 
‘Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again’” (STERP 2009:8-9). STERP sought to address 
many challenges that were being faced in the economy. At “the epicentre of the 
economic crisis have been unprecedented levels of hyper-inflation, sustained periods 
of negative GDP growth rates, massive devaluation of the currency, low productive 
capacity, loss of jobs, food shortages, poverty, massive de-industrialisation and 
general despondency” (STERP 2009:7-8). In view of this, government was bound by 
“the Global Political Agreement (GPA) Article 3 1(a) to give priority to the restoration 
of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe. As part of its obligation to address the 
economic crisis, Government came up with STERP which was expected to cover the 
period March to December 2009” (STERP 2009:12). STERP was “an emergency 
short-term stabilisation programme whose key goals were to stabilise the macro- and 
micro-economy to recover high levels of savings, investment and growth, and lay the 
basis of a more transformative mid-term to long-term economic programme that will 
turn Zimbabwe into a progressive developmental State” (STERP 2009:12). The key 
priority areas to be achieved under STERP were (STERP 2009:13-14): 
 “Political and Governance Issues: it includes- the Constitution and constitution 
making processes; the media and media reforms; and legislation reforms intended 
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at strengthening governance and accountability; promoting governance and the 
rule of law; and promoting equality and fairness, including gender equality. 
 Social protection: it includes- food and humanitarian assistance; provision of 
education; provision of health; and strategically targeted vulnerable sectors. 
 Stabilisation: it includes- implementation of a growth oriented recovery 
programme; restoring the value of the local currency and guaranteeing its stability; 
increasing capacity utilisation in all sectors of the economy and hence, creation of 
jobs; ensuring adequate availability of essential commodities such as food, fuel 
and electricity; rehabilitation of collapsed social, health and education sectors; and 
ensuring adequate water supply and safe sanitation” (STERP 2009:13-14). 
STERP sought to consolidate several policy shifts reflected in the Budget Statement 
of 29 January 2009 by focusing on the following short term emergency policy areas 
(STERP 2009:25): 
 “Social Protection Programmes: The provision of adequate and quality basic social 
services was a key area of this Programme. Access to health care, education, 
humanitarian assistance and other services including housing, clean water, 
electricity amongst other services, would ensure human development and the 
active participation of the people in the country’s development. Therefore, the 
social protection objective was to focus on rebuilding human social capital” 
(STERP 2009:26). Social protection “measures meant to mitigate poverty and 
suffering by resuscitating public service delivery, and strengthening humanitarian 
assistance, particularly focusing on specially targeted vulnerable groups, including 
women, children, disabled, the elderly and child-headed families” (STERP 
2009:32).  
 “Support for the Revival of Productive Sectors: The economy has been under 
severe stress, with annual real GDP growth suffering a decline averaging -5.9% 
since 2000. Cumulatively, output declined by more than 40% during that period. 
Since 2006, virtually all sectors recorded declines in output, with agriculture, 
manufacturing and mining estimated to have declined by 7.3%, 73.3% and 53.9% 
respectively in 2008” (STERP 2009:34). As a result, “the essence of STERP was 
to ensure that there was increased capacity utilisation in every sector of the 
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economy. This would ensure more jobs, disposable incomes, savings and greater 
vibrancy in the economy” (STERP 2009:34).  
 “Creation of a Climate Conducive to Investment in the Country: STERP recognised 
the need to stimulate investment. Therefore, the intended objective was to 
increase investment capacity from 4% to over 25% of GDP. Increased investment 
was meant to underpin sustainable economic growth and development” (STERP 
2009:61). STERP was also “committed to adhering to the country’s bilateral and 
international obligations. In this regard, the Government would uphold its 
commitments to investors, which include ensuring the protection and honouring of 
foreign investments covered by Bilateral Investments Protection and Promotion 
Agreements (BIPPAs). Besides BIPPAs, STERP indicated the importance of 
ensuring observance of the rule of law, the country’s constitution and other laws 
of the country” (STERP 2009:75). 
 “Macro-Economic Reforms: The precondition for the success of STERP was the 
implementation and execution of a sound macro-economic stabilisation 
programme” (STERP 2009:87).   
 “Labour Market and National Employment Policy: The inclusive Government 
sought to finalise the National Employment Policy Framework which was expected 
to rationalise the labour administration system to create a unitary decentralised 
system, re-organise technical and vocational education and training to make it 
more demand driven and responsive to the needs of the economy” (STERP 
2009:100). 
 “Utilities, Amenities and Infrastructure: Public enterprises that had the mandate to 
provide utilities and amenities were identified as a big drain on the fiscus. As such 
STERP sought to evaluate all public enterprises, with a view of rationalising their 
functions as well as other time-framed reforms. STERP also intended to provide 
adequate services in water, energy, transport (railways & air), social amenities, 
roads, state buildings, telecommunications” (STERP 2009:103). 
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STERP required US$8 billion to be implemented. Resources were planned to be 
obtained from domestic and external financial sources. STERP also welcomed private 
sector investment to assist the implementation of the plans (STERP 2009:125). 
STERP (2009:122) indicated that “experience from previous policy pronouncements 
have demonstrated a serious deficiency in the implementation of agreed policy 
measures and Government programmes. As per the agreement between the political 
parties, the Office of the Prime Minister shall, through the Council of Ministers, ensure 
the overall effective implementation of Government policies and plans as approved by 
Cabinet”. The STERP sought to address conditions for civil servants with a view to re-
open public institutions that had closed down due to incapacitation problems.  
In the productive sectors, short-term measures were also introduced to support the 
viability of both primary and secondary industries. Generally, the short-term measures 
were practical and necessary to get Zimbabwe moving again.  The policy had a clear 
implementation structure and budget. However, the implementation plan and policy 
targets (quantified) were not clearly outlined. The budgetary requirements were too 
huge given the short-term lifespan of the policy.  
3.13 Three Year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget Framework: STERP II 
(2010-2012): Reconstruction with Equitable Growth and Stability 
In 2009, the inclusive government developed two critical policy documents to succeed 
STERP. These documents were “the Three Year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget 
Framework and the Medium-Term Development Plan. The Three Year Macro-
Economic Policy and Budget Framework were expected to lay out macro-economic 
policy instruments that would anchor the rolling budget for the years 2010-2012, whilst 
the Medium-Term Plan would deal with broad developmental and growth oriented 
policies. The Framework was therefore meant to bridge the gap between STERP and 
the Medium-Term Plan” (STERP II 2009:8). The implementation of STERP (STERP II 
2009:17), “had some positive achievements, particularly on the economic front, in 
areas such as inflation reduction, resuscitation of business activity and subsequent 
improved supply response, removal of price distortions, improved management of 
public resources, recovery of basic public services provision, normalisation of financial 
services, re-engagement with the international community, as well as confidence 
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building. Therefore, the Three Year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget Framework 
were meant to consolidate the positive STERP gains”.  
In summary, the objectives of the Three Year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget 
Framework were (STERP II 2009:10): “sustaining macro-economic stabilisation and 
consolidating STERP; supporting rapid growth and employment creation; ensuring 
food security; restoring basic services; encouraging public and private investment; 
promoting regional integration; restoring basic freedoms; and restoring of international 
relations”. The macro-economic targets for the Framework over the period 2011-2012 
were drawn from an integrated account of the four main sectors of the economy. That 
is, the real sector’s national accounts, fiscal sector’s government budget accounts, the 
external sector’s balance of payments and the financial sector’s monetary survey 
(STERP II 2009:98). Critical success factors for achieving the STERP II objectives 
were (STERP II 2009:10): “political will at all levels of Government; commitment by all 
stakeholders to implement agreed policies; public ownership and effective 
participation in the implementation of the framework agenda; adequate funding of 
programmes and projects. All priorities of Government would be linked to the Budget 
processes; and systematic monitoring and evaluation” (STERP II 2009:10).  
Following a number of success stories from STERP, the Three Year Macro-Economic 
Policy and Budget Framework sought to reprioritise urgent issues and re-strategise 
interventions drawing from challenges, lessons and unfinished agendas under 
STERP. Since the thrust of the Framework was to sustain the macro-economic 
stabilisation gains under STERP, the following strategies were put in place (STERP II 
2009:106): 
 “Fiscal Consolidation–The cash budgeting principle was intended to continue as it 
was an important tool to contain inflation. This will be underpinned by Results 
Based Budgeting to ensure greater efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and 
accountability in the public sector. 
 Inflation– The Framework targeted inflation within the single digit levels for the 
period 2010 – 2012. 
 Multiple Currencies –The principle of the use of multiple currencies was going to 
be maintained over the Framework period. This would allow for the restoration of 
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high production levels across the key productive sectors to levels commensurate 
with supply responses and macro-economic fundamentals, necessary for 
sustaining recourse to domestic currency” (STERP II 2009:106). 
In support of measures on enhancing management of public resources, government 
introduced the new Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (2016) that shifted 
financial management from appropriation accounting and reporting to the value for 
money approach. The Act sought to improve accountability in the audit process (PFMA 
2016). The restoring capacity utilisation included the following (STERP II 2009:141-
358): “agriculture and food security; mining; industrial development strategy; business 
practices and prices; research, science and technology; tourism; construction and 
housing; small and medium enterprises; investment in basic infrastructure; public 
enterprises; restoring basic social services; rural development; environment; social 
protection programme; human resources and the labour market; accountability; 
defence and security; rights and interests; and constitution making process”. 
The Framework required US$20-30 billion to be fully implemented. Funding was 
expected to come mainly from domestic resources with foreign resources expected to 
complement the domestic input. Government also welcomed PPPs as part of the 
sources for funding the Framework (STERP II 2009:360). An effective Monitoring and 
Evaluation system, according to the STERP II (2009:380), was put in place. The 
Offices of the President and Cabinet, including that of the Prime Minister, were 
intended to be capacitated to facilitate the coordination of the systems and processes 
of government policy formulation and implementation. The policy had clear objectives, 
targets, implementation structure and plan and a budget. However, the sectoral 
programmes and projects to be executed were too many, resulting in a bloated budget 
which was not sustainable. Whilst it is understood that all sections of the economy 
needed urgent attention due to the economic melt-down realised between 2000 and 
2008, it was important for the policy to prioritise its immediate national focus.  
3.14 Zimbabwe Medium-Term Plan (2011-2015) 
The MTP was launched in July 2011 to guide all Government plans and programmes 
beyond short-term stabilisation.  The Medium-Term Plan (MTP) responded to the 
mandate set out in Article III of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) to support the 
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restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe (MTP 2011:1). The policy 
was created to build on the foundations which had been laid by the Short-Term 
Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) (February-December 2009) and the 
three- year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget Framework (STERP II). The MTP was 
put in place to guide all other Government policy documents. The MTP was meant to 
set out clearly the national priorities and investment programmes for the 2011-2015 
period (MTP 2011:1).  
During the STERP period, according to MTP (2011:13), the economy of Zimbabwe 
was broadly in a recovery phase and capacity utilisation had gained space though it 
was uneven across sectors of the economy. Real GDP rose to 8.1% in 2010 from the 
6.3% that was recorded in 2009. Inflation had stabilised at the average annual rate of 
4%. Despite some of these achievements, the economy was still facing some 
challenges. Some of the challenges that the MTP sought to address were (MTP 
2011:8): “low aggregate demand; low wages; low capacity utilisation; low productivity; 
high unemployment; high inequality in income distribution; inequality in gender; low 
savings and investment rate; insecurity; persisting corruption and weak governance; 
poor infrastructure; and slow progress in achieving structural changes in the economy 
away from reliance on agriculture and export of primary products”. 
The vision of MTP was “to enhance a democratic developmental state anchored by a 
growing and transforming, socially just economy” (MTP 2011:16). The priorities of 
MTP were (MTP 2011:16): “infrastructure development; employment creation; human 
centred development; entrepreneurship development; macro-economic stability; 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT); science and technology 
development; good governance; investment promotion; resource utilisation and 
poverty reduction; and gender mainstreaming”. The MTP came up with specific 
objectives, policy targets and strategies for each of the priorities given above. The 
macro-economic targets intended to achieve the following (MTP 2011:26): ”an 
average growth rate of 7.1% during the Plan period; single deficit annual inflation; 
interest rate regime that promotes savings and fosters investment; Current Account 
Deficit of not more than 5% of GDP by 2015; average employment creation rate of 6% 
per annum; sustained Poverty Reduction in line with Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs, now known as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)) targets; Foreign 
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Exchange Reserves of at least three months import cover by 2015; double digit 
savings and investment ratios of around 20% of GDP by 2015; budget deficit to 
converge to SADC benchmark of less than 5% of GDP by 2015; and reduce sovereign 
debt to at least 60% of GDP by 2015”. The targets are stated in table 3.10. 
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723.0 678.4 590.9 347.2 338.8  
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US$ 




0.467  0.478 0.505 0.516 0.525 0.529  
Source: (MTP 2011)  
The statistics in table 3.10 indicate that the MTP achieved most of its objectives 
despite the fact that it was aborted in 2013. The GDP average growth rate increased 
from 12.58% in 2012 to 14.78% in 2012. The inflation rate was maintained at single 
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digits as was MTP’s target.  However, the MTP did not achieve its targets in the areas 
of accumulating gross investments, reducing unemployment and increasing revenues. 
The road towards a successful democratic developmental state was going to be 
inspired by growth models of emerging economies such as China, South Korea and 
Malaysia. In view of this, Zimbabwe sought to learn from both African and Asian 
countries on how to lay the basis for its own development model though cognisance 
of its own peculiarities (MTP 2011:17). The MTP model sought “to consolidate and 
develop the basic requirements while laying the foundation for the next democratic 
state, which was to become an efficiency driven economy characterised by higher 
education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial 
market sophistication and technological readiness” (MTP 2011:19). As per the 
documents of the MTP (2011:234), “approximately US$9.2 billion total investment was 
required in order to meet the MTP growth and development targets. This was expected 
to be harvested from the country’s natural resources and growth dividend. Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), though critical was considered as a bonus. In addition, private 
sector credit lines and PPPs were viewed as critical funding mechanisms during the 
Plan period”.  
The MTP was “supported by a results and implementation matrix that was subjected 
to annual reviews. The Ministry of Macro-Economic Planning and Investment 
Promotion was identified as the leading coordinating Ministry in the implementation of 
this Plan. A Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) mechanism was intended to provide 
information on whether the MTP programmes, policies or development strategies were 
being implemented as planned” (MTP 2011:4). It was further highlighted by MTP 
(2011:4), that “tracking and monitoring the implementation of the Plan was intended 
to provide timely feedback on whether the Plan’s objectives were being achieved or if 
there was a need for remedial action to redirect efforts to address the critical 
development challenges”. The MTP had a collection of policy frameworks for socio-
economic development. However, it also had an over ambitious list of programmes 
and projects which could not be implemented within the policy’s tenure. The policy 
budget was also too huge to be mobilised given that the country was slowly coming 
out of a depression. It failed to mobilise local resources and lacked the donor support 
on which the blueprint was underpinned; hence it failed to meet some of its targets 
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between 2011 and 2012. This policy was hastily abandoned when ZANU-PF won the 
2013 elections paving the way for the Zim-Asset Programme. 
3.15 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
(Zim-Asset) October 2013-December 2018 
After the “landslide victory by the ZANU-PF Party on the 31st July 2013 harmonised 
elections, the Party was given the mandate to govern the country for a five (5) year 
term. To guide national development for these five years, Government crafted a new 
economic blueprint known as Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
Transformation (Zim-Asset)” (Zim-Asset 2013: ix). The Vision of the Plan is “Towards 
an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy” (Zim-Asset 2013: ix). The execution 
of this Plan was to be guided by the following Mission: “To provide an enabling 
environment for sustainable economic empowerment and social transformation to the 
people of Zimbabwe” (Zim-Asset 2013: ix). The implementation of Zim-Asset (2013: 
ix), was planned to be underpinned and guided by the Results Based Management 
(RBM) system and aligned to all the national budgetary cycles.  
Zimbabwe had “experienced a deteriorating economic and social environment since 
2000 that was caused by illegal economic sanctions imposed by the Western 
countries. This resulted in a deep economic and social crisis characterised by a 
hyperinflationary environment, industrial capacity utilisation of below 10% and an 
overall cumulative GDP decline of 50% by 2008” (Zim-Asset 2013: ix). Zim-Asset 
acknowledged that Government’s measures “in 2009 resulted in some modicum of 
economic stabilisation, with 5% real GDP growth being recorded in 2009, 11.4% in 
2010, and reaching a peak of 11.9% in 2011. However, the recovery remained fragile 
as growth declined from 11.9% in 2011 to 10.6% in 2012 and 3.4% in 2013. Despite 
the economy having shown some degree of stabilisation, with inflation modestly below 
5%, it still experienced a myriad of challenges, which if not addressed, would reverse 
the marginal gains recorded in the past” (Zim-Asset 2013:4). These challenges are 
discussed below (Zim-Asset 2013:5-7): 
 “Manufacturing sector: remained in crisis with capacity utilisation declining from 
an average of 57% in 2011, 44% in 2012 to 39% in the 3rd quarter of 2013. This 
was attributed to structural and infrastructural bottlenecks such as erratic power 
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supply, obsolete machinery and dilapidated infrastructure as well as high cost of 
capital. 
 Fiscal space: remained severely constrained due to poor performance of revenue 
inflows against the background of rising recurrent expenditures and a shrinking 
tax base. In addition, as at December 2012 the debt stock stood at US$10 billion 
making it difficult for the country to access international capital and investment 
inflows.  
 Agricultural sector: faced challenges including lack of agricultural financing and 
lack of affordable inputs.  
 Mining sector: was constrained by energy, depressed international mineral prices, 
shortage of utilities and transport infrastructure challenges. 
 Tourism: faced challenges such as perceived country risk, poor connectivity of 
local destinations. 
 Social sector: faced sporadic outbreaks of epidemics such as typhoid and 
dysentery, increased maternal mortality, shortage of funds to procure essential 
drugs and equipment and to rehabilitate dilapidated infrastructure. The education 
sector faced challenges of a curriculum that did not match the developmental 
needs of the country. 
 Utilities and infrastructure: experienced dilapidated and obsolete generation 
equipment and infrastructure, inadequate funding and capitalisation and other 
structural bottlenecks.  
 Transport sector: continued to face challenges due to resource constraints, 
obsolete equipment, corruption, mismanagement, vandalism and absence of a 
robust corporate governance policy” (Zim-Asset 2013:5-7).  
The Growth Targets for Zim-Asset are stated in table 3.11. 
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Table 3.11: Zim-Asset Targets 

















-1.3 9.0 5.1 7.0 8.0 12.5 
Mining & 
Quarrying 
6.5 11.4 9.2 6.5 12.0 12.6 
Manufacturing 
 
1.5 3.2 6.5 7.5 8.4 9.5 
Electricity and 
Water 
4.2 4.5 7.0 9.8 11.0 16.0 
Construction 
 
10.0 11.0 13.5 12.0 13.0 15.0 
Finance and 
Insurance 
2.6 6.4 6.2 6.2 8.1 10.3 
Real Estate 
 




3.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 7.1 9.3 
Transport and 
communication 
3.4 4.4 5.5 5.3 5.4 8.0 
Public 
Administration 
5.2 4.2 4.5 3.5 2.4 2.5 
Education 5.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.4 
Health 4.3 3.4 4.3 6.2 2.0 4.0 
Domestic 
Services 
1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 
GDP at Market 
prices 
3.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 7.9 9.9 
Source: (Zim-Asset 2013:11) 
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These growth projections were anchored on the successful implementation of Zim 
Asset. The implementation of Zim-Asset relied on the following Key Success Factors 
(KSFs) (Zim-Asset 2013:13): “political commitment and leadership from the highest 
level; strong collaborative partnerships among Government agencies, the private 
sector, citizens and other stakeholders; human capital development programmes to 
enhance the acquisition of requisite skills; scientific research and development; 
continued use of the multi-currency regime to consolidate macroeconomic 
stabilisation; and introduction of special economic zones”. Additional KSFs are (Zim-
Asset 2013:13): “creation of special funding vehicles such as acceleration of the 
implementation of PPPs; establishment of Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF); 
institutionalisation of RBM across the public sector; value addition and beneficiation in 
productive sectors such as mining, agriculture and manufacturing; deliberate 
implementation of supportive policies in key productive economic sectors in order to 
quickly grow the economy; and alignment of legislation, policies and guidelines by all 
Government ministries and departments in line with the Constitution Amendment (No. 
20) Act 2013”. 
To foster team-spirit and collegiality “in the operations of Government, Ministries and 
Government Agencies, four core clusters were put in place related to the Cabinet 
Committee system in an effort to engender team spirit. The clusters were called upon 
to eliminate compartmentalisation and the silo mentality by creating strong synergistic 
relationships that fully exploit the benefits of both horizontal and vertical linkages as a 
way of institutionalising harmonised approaches to Government programming” (Zim-
Asset 2013:23). Each cluster identified key priority projects. In “order to realise tangible 
results, results matrices were developed for each cluster highlighting major Key Result 
Areas (KRAs), Outcomes, Outputs, Strategies, and Lead Institutions that would be 
spearheading the implementation of the Plan” (Zim-Asset 2013:5-23). The four key 
clusters were (Zim-Asset 2013:23): “food security and nutrition; social services and 
poverty eradication; infrastructure and utilities; and value addition and beneficiation.” 
In addition to the four main clusters mentioned above, Zim-Asset also had two 
enabling clusters, such as (Zim-Asset 2013:88-91): “fiscal reform measures sub-
cluster; and public administration, governance and performance management sub-
cluster”. It was further emphasised that Zim-Asset (2013:91), the enabling clusters 
sought to address cross cutting issues affecting all four main clusters.  
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Government envisaged mobilising funding from domestic resources in abundance in 
the country. Government also sought to collaborate with the development partners 
that traditionally had been rendering technical and financial assistance to different 
sectors of the economy. Additionally, government intended to pursue investment 
vehicles such as PPPs, particularly in the proposed special economic zones (Zim-
Asset 2013:x). It was further stated in the documents of Zim-Asset (2013:24), that “an 
implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Plan was put in place clearly identifying 
each Cluster’s priority projects, outcomes, outputs, strategies and lead institutions. 
The Office of the President and Cabinet was identified as the Lead Government 
Agency that was expected to provide the necessary leadership and guidance in the 
formulation, implementation, monitoring & evaluation of the Plan. The Plan’s 
Monitoring & Evaluation system was expected to regularly input into the Cabinet 
decision making process in order to achieve tangible results on the ground”. Zim-Asset 
(2013:24) was a top-down policy heavily biased towards the ruling party (ZANU-PF) 
2013 election manifesto and the President’s inauguration speech. The consultative 
process involved political leadership in ZANU-PF, the private sector and other 
stakeholders. There were uneven contributions from all political parties. As such, the 
policy may be deemed exclusionary.  
3.16 Summary 
A close analysis of all the economic policies that were developed in Zimbabwe since 
1980 reveal that the country has been struggling to stabilise the economy for 
sustainable development to take place. The challenges that the country wanted to 
address from the 1980s still exist in the current Zimbabwe. Clearly, this shows that 
policies have been failing to address the real challenges prevailing in the country. It is 
true that there have been sporadic episodes when the country realised meaningful 
development as indicated in some policies. These periods were short-lived followed 
by reversals of all such gains. The impact of politics on state performance must never 
be underestimated. A close analysis at these policies since 1980 indicates a strong 
influence by the political and economic elite on socio-economic development of the 
country. It is clear that politics determines the social and economic factors that 
determine the interaction between rulers and citizens, whereas the political role of the 
state should exist to serve private agents and citizens. In the development of national 
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economic policies, the political role has not been exercised to benefit all the citizens 
as some policies sought to propel the interests of the ruling party only. Unfortunately, 
if citizens feel like the political role of government is being abused, they will stop 
supporting the national economic policies, stop paying taxes, disobey the rules, and 
no longer recognise the government’s legitimacy.   
Given the analysis of all these policies, there are underlying reasons why policies are 
not performing as expected.  It is the thrust of this study to understand the 
determinants of economic policies on socio-economic development. The chapter 
aimed to achieve the research objective, “to discuss the economic policies in 
Zimbabwe” (see Chapter One, section 1.4). The next chapter discusses the 
determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe based on findings gathered from 




DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC POLICIES IN ZIMBABWE 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the study found that some policies had achieved their 
objectives to a greater extent whereas some failed. There is an information gap as to 
why some policies perform better than others. Therefore, it is the purpose of this 
chapter to understand the determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe. In this 
regard, this chapter presents the determinants of policy as explained by respondents 
during primary data collection (see Chapter One, Section 1.10). The chapter discusses 
the determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe highlighting the use of good 
governance and democracy; accountability; transparency; fiscal discipline; political 
stability; responsive public institutions; political will; consultations; shared vision, 
inclusive goals and objectives; political clarity; and the impact of corruption and 
economic sanctions on a country’s economy. Secondary data was used to buttress 
findings from primary sources. The chapter aims to answer the research question 
“What are determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe?” (see Chapter One, 
Section 1.3). 
4.2 The determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe 
The researcher gained an in-depth understanding of these issues through naturalist 
enquiry, particularly during participation in the following activities: Policy Transition 
Think Tank (PTTT); A Focus Group Discussion on Policy and Regulatory (FGDPR); 
and Political Parties Dialogue (PPD) (see Chapter One, Section 1.10 and 1.18.1). Data 
was also collected through observation by the researcher (See Chapter One, Section 
1.18.2). In order to compile responses, the following were considered: the responses 
obtained from the organisations (PTTT, PPD and FGDPR) are stated in an aggregated 
manner, stating an organisation’s name and year; for example, PTTT (2018) and 
FGDPR (2019). For PPD, the political parties are given pseudonyms (see Chapter 
One, Section 1.10). The political parties with pseudonyms are presented as P1 (PPD, 
2019). Some participants voiced their opinions adding value to the study; hence were 
given pseudonyms. For instance, participant 1 is presented as R1 followed by the 
affiliation and year the interview was carried out; for example, R1 (PTTT, 2018), R1 
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(PPD, 2019) and R1 (FGDPR, 2019). Throughout the study, the findings on the 
determinants of policies in Zimbabwe were generally the same from all the data 
collection methods employed; hence reaching saturation “means that no additional 
data are being found” (Saunders, Sim, Kingstone, Baker, Waterfield, Bartlam, 
Burroughs and Jinks 2018:3). This section first looks at the determinants of national 
economic policies in Zimbabwe emphasising the role of state. It is important for the 
study to understand the general role of state as this has a huge bearing on national 
economic policy development and implementation. The data collected in this study 
was analysed thematically in the section below, highlighting the determinants of 
national economic policies. 
Zimbabwe has three distinct but interdependent roles. These are political, 
administrative and economic roles. First, “they make and enforce general social rules 
and maintain social unity by sustaining institutions that allow conflicting social interests 
to be expressed and managed. These political activities involve the identification and 
aggregation of interests, the negotiation of compromises between competing social 
demands, and the maintenance of support for the state as a collective system” (Brett 
2006:7). Second, “states also produce public goods by creating an administrative 
apparatus that supplies private agents with essential services, but also competes with 
them for the resources that it needs. Third, they provide the regulatory framework that 
governs the terms on which private and public enterprises relate to each other, 
generate livelihoods and provide the taxes required to finance the state apparatus” 
(Brett 2006:7).  It was further added by Brett (2006:7) that, “political scientists generally 
focus on these political and administrative problems, and economists on those related 
to the production of goods and services, but state capacity actually depends on the 
government’s ability to maintain a symbiotic relationship between its political, 
administrative and economic roles”. The success and failure of economic policies 
depends on how the government executes its three roles. For a policy to attain tangible 
results in Zimbabwe, there are fundamental issues that need to be met. These have 
been placed into different categories as presented below. 
4.2.1 Good Governance and Democracy 
The “word ‘governance’ originated from the Latin word ‘gubernare’, and from the Greek 
word ‘kubernaein’, meaning to direct” (Kraai 2018:1).  The United Nations Economic 
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and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP n.d.) indicates that, “the 
concept of ‘governance’ is not new. It is as old as human civilisation. Simply put 
‘governance’ means: the process of decision making and the process by which 
decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several 
contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national 
governance and local governance”. Fukuyama (2013:3) explains governance “as a 
government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of 
whether that government is democratic or not”. Williams (2009:22) describes 
governance as “a collaborative and symbolic association between the state and other 
stakeholders such as civil society, business and non-governmental organisations”. 
Governance, according to Matheson (2004:37), “includes the methods utilised in 
decision making, the supremacy of institutions and the manner in which public 
representatives are held answerable”.   
Vyas Doorgapersad and Ababio (2010:412) point out that good governance includes 
“ten principles as requisites of ethical local governance. These principles are 
participatory, rule of law, equality, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, 
effective and efficient, oversight, vision and professionalism”. Vyas-Doorgapersad and 
Aktan (2017:7) further add that “good governance has several major characteristics. 
It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, ethical, meritocratic, 
responsive, effective and efficient, quality-oriented, equitable and inclusive, 
decentralised and follows the rule of law, etc.”. Good governance “assures that 
corruption is minimised, the views of minorities are taken into account, and that the 
voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision making. It is also 
responsive to the present and future needs of society. According to Kraai (2018:1), 
“the principles often overlap and are complex to exercise as it assesses the application 
of authority. Furthermore, these principles can also inculcate values in public 
institutions”.   
The Constitution of Zimbabwe (CoZ) Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 Section (9) 
articulates good governance as:  
(1) “The State must adopt and implement policies and legislation to develop 
efficiency, competence, accountability, transparency, personal integrity and 
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financial probity in all institutions and agencies of government at every level 
and in every public institution, and in particular – 
(a) Appointments to public offices must be made primarily on the basis of merit; 
(b) Measures must be taken to expose, combat and eradicate all forms of 
corruption and abuse of power by those holding political and public offices. 
(2) The State must ensure that all institutions and agencies of government at every 
level, in particular Commissions and other bodies established by or under this 
Constitution, are provided with adequate resources and facilities to enable them 
to carry out their functions conscientiously, fairly, honestly and efficiently” (CoZ 
2013).  
Rousseau (1913:59) advocated that “the word democracy comes from two Greek 
words: demos = people and kratos = rule. Therefore, the democracy means ‘rule by 
the people’, sometimes called ‘popular sovereignty’ and can refer to direct, 
participatory and representative forms of rule by the people. Today the word has a 
positive meaning throughout most of the world; so much so that to connect themselves 
with this positive image, even some political systems with little or no rule by the people 
are called democratic”. Rousseau (1913:59) further gave the following analysis using 
“a simple model of the key elements of democracy as it exists today: citizen 
involvement in decision making; a system of representation; the rule of law; an 
electoral system-majority rule; some degree of equality among citizens; some degree 
of liberty; or freedom granted to or retained by citizens; and education”. 
A quotation from the Zimbabwe Auditor General Report says “most of the challenges 
that continue to plague the Zimbabwean public sector entities are of a corporate 
governance nature” (Auditor General 2014: ii). The Zimbabwe Auditor General’s (AG) 
annual reports point to weak areas of governance in all public institutions and further 
lay out recommendations thereto. The researcher observed that these 
recommendations are barely implemented. Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and 
Development-ZIMCODD (2012:12) also stated that “unfortunately, the AG’s 
recommendations are not implemented due to a lack of political will”. The PTTT (2018) 
during its Retreat in Vumba from 11th to 17th March 2018, pinpointed “governance, 
political corruption, captured criminal and justice systems as the main issues that 
needed to be addressed in Zimbabwe for real and sustainable development to be 
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realised”. The PTTT (2018) separated governance into two categories, political and 
economic. The PPD (2019) during its session held on 1 March 2019, also indicated 
that “governance was an important issue that needed to be addressed in Zimbabwe”.   
 Political Governance  
Under political governance, the PTTT (2018) identified the major bottlenecks as: 
“conflation of party and government; politicisation of civil service leading to 
partisanship; electoral management; human rights; underdeveloped 
pluralism/suppression; abuse of state monopoly on coercive power; patronage; role of 
traditional leaders; central and government relationship; limited scope for people in 
governance to influence processes and institutions and outcomes; and rule of 
law/constitutionalism”. The PPD (2019) identified political governance issues that 
need attention as: “electoral reforms; legitimacy; constitutionalism; rule of law; security 
sector reform; devolution; enforcement of human rights; removal of sanctions; value 
based system installation e.g. ubuntu; national healing; eradication of violence; and 
conflation of party and government”.  
The following sections demonstrate the state of political governance in Zimbabwe.  
Sachikonye (2011:59) suggests that, “in Zimbabwe violence has been a decisive 
instrument in the attainment of independence and violence has remained the cancer 
that corrodes the country`s political culture and blocks Zimbabwe`s democratic 
advance”. In support, Ndulo and Lulo (2010:189) indicate that “since 2000, state 
sponsored intimidation, arbitrary arrests, torture, attack on the political opposition, 
independent media, and human rights organisations have escalated. The government 
has used its supporters as well as state agents; namely, so-called war veterans, youth 
militia, police and the army to wage a targeted campaign of oppression in a bid to 
retain control. Parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2000 and 2002, 
respectively were marred by politically motivated violence”. In congruence, Kasambala 
(2008:1) explains that “police partisanship has contributed heavily to Zimbabwe's 
disastrous human rights situation. Serving police officers told Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) that between April and July 2008, police across Zimbabwe were issued with 
specific instructions not to investigate or arrest ZANU-PF supporters and their allies 
implicated in political violence. HRW also found that of at least 163 politically motivated 
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extrajudicial killings -almost entirely of MDC supporters- since the March 29, 2008 
general elections, police have only made two arrests, neither of which led to 
prosecutions”.  
This violates the tenets of good governance, such as citizen involvement in decision 
making, majority rule (fair electoral systems), equality, rule of law, liberty; freedom 
granted to or retained by citizens, exhibited by law enforcement agencies. With similar 
views, Chikerema and Chakunda (2014:1) state that “as for Zimbabwe, democratic 
decay and violence have been the defining feature of the political environment. A 
culture of impunity characterised by electoral fraud has engulfed Zimbabwe`s political 
landscape and this has defined the political culture of the system of governance. 
Violence and political instability have negatively affected Zimbabwe`s political 
economy”. However, according to Chikerema and Chakunda (2014:1), “popular 
beliefs, symbols and values structure both people’s attitudes to the political process 
and crucially, their view of the regime in which they live, most particularly whether or 
not they regard their regime as rightful or legitimate. Legitimacy is thus the key to 
political stability and it is nothing less than the source of the regime’s survival and 
successes”. In his 2017 inauguration speech, the newly elected President of 
Zimbabwe, Dr, E.D. Mnangagwa, acknowledged the deep polarisation that existed in 
the country and pledged to resolve the matter. He said, “I appreciate the fact that over 
the years, our domestic politics had become poisoned, rancorous and polarising. My 
goal is to preside over a polity and run an administration that recognises strength in 
our diversity as a people, hoping that this position and well-meant stance will be 
reciprocated and radiated to cover all our groups, organisation and communities” (The 
Chronicle 25 November 2017). 
The ongoing political culture negatively affected the democratic election processes in 
the country, whereby citizens were not free to elect leaders of their choice. 
Furthermore, this created a deeply wounded and divided nation with little or no 
confidence/trust in those in the position of authority. The state agencies and 
institutions have been greatly compromised and worked against their constitutional 
mandates. It is also important to note that several provisions of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe (CoZ) Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 have been violated in the process, 
some of these being: 
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 “Chapter 4 which is a declaration of rights such as: the duty to respect fundamental 
human rights and freedoms; right to life; right to personal liberty; rights to personal 
security; freedom from torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment; freedom of assembly and participation; political rights (where every 
Zimbabwean citizen has a right to free, fair and regular elections for any elective 
public office established in terms of the constitution or any other law, to make 
political choices freely); amongst others; 
 Chapter 11 on general provisions of the security services. The security services 
of Zimbabwe consist of the defence forces, police service, the intelligence service, 
prisons and correctional services and other security services established by the 
Act of Parliament. Section 208 (2) outlines that neither the security services nor 
any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions: (a) act in a partisan 
manner, (b) further the interests of any political party or cause, (c) prejudice the 
lawful interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the fundamental rights 
or freedom of any person. Section 208 (3) states that members of the security 
services must not be active members or office bearers of any political party” (CoZ 
2013).  
The use of state agencies to achieve political goals violates the constitutional 
provisions outlined above. This is the worst state of political governance decay in any 
country, with those entrusted to protect and uphold citizens’ rights becoming the 
perpetrators of the same. In such a scenario, citizens are left exposed to any form of 
danger that might befall them. It creates a vulnerable and hopeless nation. In a bid to 
protect and restore the citizens of Zimbabwe’s rights, the international community, 
mainly the western nations such as the United States of America, Europe, Australia 
and Canada, imposed sanctions on the leadership of Zimbabwe and companies which 
were deemed to be perpetrating and funding human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The 
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001 “was enacted 
by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled to provide for a transition to democracy and to promote 
economic recovery in Zimbabwe” (ZIDERA 2001:1). The policy statement states that 
“it is the policy of the United States to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle 
to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic 
132 
growth, and restore the rule of law” (ZIDERA 2001:1). Section 6 of this Act articulates 
the individuals to be affected. It states that, “it is the sense of Congress that the 
President should begin immediate consultation with the governments of European 
Union member states, Canada, and other appropriate foreign countries on ways in 
which to identify and share information regarding individuals responsible for the 
deliberate breakdown of the rule of law, politically motivated violence, and intimidation 
in Zimbabwe”. In addition, the Act aims to “identify assets of those individuals held 
outside Zimbabwe; implement travel and economic sanctions against those individuals 
and their associates and families; and provide for the eventual removal or amendment 
of those sanctions” (ZIDERA 2001:1).  
ZIDERA sets conditions that must be met for it to be uplifted. It is therefore imperative 
for the Government of Zimbabwe to convince the international community that all the 
requirements of this Act have been fully implemented. In his 2017 inauguration speech 
the new President of Zimbabwe, Dr E.D. Mnangagwa admitted that politics in 
Zimbabwe was toxic. In this regard, he pledged that “as we chart our way forward, we 
must accept that our challenges as a nation emanate in part from the manner in which 
we have managed our politics, both nationally and internationally, leading to 
circumstances in which our country has undeservedly been perceived or classified as 
a pariah State. My Government will work towards ensuring that the pillars of the State 
assuring democracy in our land are strengthened and respected” (The Chronicle 25 
November 2017). The study has observed that after the governance issues which 
were raised by the newly sworn-in President, Dr E.D. Mnangagwa, PTT (2018) and 
PPD (2019) conform to the aspirations of ZIDERA. This points to the fact that these 
issues are real and hurting/ blocking the citizens from attaining political democracy 
and hence need full attention. In this state of decaying political democracy, citizens’ 
participation and involvement in developmental issues are hampered. 
 Economic Governance 
PTTT (2018) stated the following as matters that needed to be addressed: “separation 
of powers (executive, judiciary and parliament); governmental institutional 
effectiveness;  lack of political will for the implementation of blue prints/white papers 
on economic and social transformation; corporate governance (role of ministers / 
permanent secretaries / chief executive officers (CEOs), board meetings and 
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allowances, abuse of parastatal resources, limitation of terms for CEOs of government 
controlled entities); pluralism; corruption; wrong prioritisation; unnecessary creation of 
dependence syndrome; mangling of the mandates of central fiscal management 
institutions; misappropriation of state financial resources (tender scandals); partisan 
implementation of social safety net programmes; collateralisation of land; and delivery 
models for development programmes–state/parastatals/state controlled 
enterprises/private sector”. The PPD (2019) stated the following as matters that 
needed to be addressed: “corruption; accountability; transparency; land issue, 
inclusivity in allocation (after the land audit); economic policies distortions and review; 
identity of income streams; clear cut currency policies; and partisan allocation of 
resources”. 
The political and economic governance issues highlighted above are intertwined. As 
such these are going to be simultaneously discussed below under broad 
themes/categories. 
4.2.1.1 Conflation of party and government 
The PTTT (2018) highlighted that “there exists a very thin line between government 
and ruling party businesses, to the extent that most of the Party business is sponsored 
by government funds”. The PPD (2019) in its March session also highlighted that 
“conflation between the Ruling Party and Government needs to be addressed.” 
Secondary sources also buttress this point. Thinking Beyond (2019:1) indicated that 
“the compelling evidence, therefore, that there is a Party/State Conflation that has left 
the people, with little or no hope of recovery in the foreseeable future”. Chitiyo, Vines 
and Vandome (2016:44) also highlight that “ZANU-PF and its members have profited 
from control over the state, and many fear losing privileged power and patronage 
networks. But those driving the agenda must confront these vested interests and 
patronage networks if they are going to achieve the objectives of development”. 
Chitiyo et al. (2016:14) further state that “the ZANU-PF government is politically 
motivated to implement economic reform. If the state runs out of money, the governing 
party will be faced with an existential threat”.  
R7 (PTTT 2018) said that, “I think there is need to stop the government from 
implementing macro-economic policies for it does not serve as a government but 
interests of the ruling party”. In concurrence, R9 (PDD 2019) lamented that “there 
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was a very thin line between government and ruling party business”.  R1 (FGDPR 
2019) highlighted that “government and party business were overlapping”. Through 
observations the researcher noted that all government business is first discussed and 
approved at the ruling party politburo meetings (highest decision making body of 
ZANU-PF before being rubber stamped at cabinet level.  
This is stated in The Chronicle (11 September 2018) indicating that the party’s 
Secretary for Information and Publicity, Cde Simon Khaya Moyo revealed that several 
former ministers who did not make it into the 20-member Cabinet announced by 
President Mnangagwa last week, were yesterday redeployed to work at the ZANU-PF 
headquarters as full time employees, as the ruling party seeks to reinvigorate itself. 
He further said that the party and Government will now have to work as a thoroughly 
oiled machine, bearing in mind that Government is a product of the party. The party is 
always supreme to government. Thus, the former ministers redeployed as ZANU-PF 
would ensure that there was harmony in operations, while ensuring that party policies 
were implemented by government. In its meeting, the PTTT (2018) recommended that 
“it was imperative for government to maintain separation between national obligations 
and loyalties and those to political parties”.   
It was affirmed by Chikerema and Chakunda (2014:61), that “Zimbabwe politics is 
centred principally around state power, hence fierce contestations over state power as 
an end in itself. The capture of state power is perceived as an end in itself rather than 
a means to an end. Political power is seen as a guarantee or license for economic 
power through accumulation aimed not at sustainable national development but at 
self-aggrandisement by the elite. The combination of both political and economic 
power is surely meant to ensure the hegemony and self-reproduction of the ruling elite 
and dominant party in politics both within and outside the state sphere”. Kasambala 
(2008:1) explains that “over the last decade, Zimbabwe's ruling party, the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has progressively and 
systematically compromised the independence and impartiality of Zimbabwe's 
judiciary and public prosecutors, and instilled one-sided partisanship into the police. 
Since 2000 it has purged the judiciary, packed the courts with ZANU-PF supporters 
and handed out ‘gifts’ of land and goods to ensure the judges' loyalty. ZANU- PF has 
provided instructions to prosecutors to keep opposition members in jail for as long as 
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possible. It has transformed Zimbabwe's police force into an openly partisan and 
unaccountable arm of ZANU-PF”.  
To confirm this, Magaisa (2020:1) revealed that “government’s top officials benefited 
from the US$ 1.35 billion Reserve Bank Mechanisation fund in 2008 and failed to pay 
back the loans. The loans were then assumed by Zimbabwe Asset Management 
Company (ZAMCO)–a Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe debt assumption vehicle for non-
performing loans which were to be extinguished through government funds”. 
Patronage politics therefore allows unprecedented levels of corruption, unstable 
economic policies and state decay. State capture guarantees the retention of political 
power. However, it destroys all the democratic systems of a country. Those in 
positions of authority will not be accountable to anyone as they are above the law (they 
have captured the executive, judiciary and parliamentary systems) or sacred cows. 
Separation of powers will enable public institutions to be accessible and responsive to 
all. It is the only way that guarantees sincere and sustainable national development. 
4.2.1.2 Politicisation of civil service and patronage 
The PTTT (2018) noted that “in government there was politicisation of civil service 
leading to partisanship and patronage”.  R9 (PPD 2019) bemoaned “partisan allocation 
of resources”. Politicisation of the civil service is evidently explained by McGregor 
(2002:9), who states that “from February 2001, War Veterans stormed local authorities 
in districts where political opposition had strong support- primarily but not exclusively 
in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces. They locked district council and other local 
government offices, closed some schools and demanded the dismissal of numerous 
officials, councillors, teachers and workers”. In additions, “officials were suspended 
from their jobs and subjected to a procedure of ‘vetting’ by war veterans in which they 
were accused of a wide range of offences from dancing on the photograph of the 
President, to campaigning for the opposition party, to maladministration and 
corruption” (McGregor 2002:9). The “process received little comment from the Former 
President Mugabe, war veterans, or party leaders yet its consequences were far 
reaching. The war veterans’ interventions politicised all areas of public sector work 
and have seriously undermined the scope of professionalism within the public service. 
The ruling party has used the veterans’ disruptions to newly conflate party and state 
structures at district and provincial level and set up new channels of authority” (African 
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Affairs 2002). It was added by Ncamphalala and Vyas-Doorgapersad (2019:208) that 
Africans “have experienced and still experience a crisis of political turmoil, intolerance 
and harsh dictatorship; some countries have political turmoil, intolerance and harsh 
dictatorship”.  
The researcher has observed that recruitment of senior government officials at 
principal director, permanent secretary, ambassadorial and ministerial levels upwards 
is through political appointment, by the President of the country. Members of the 
executive such as the vice presidents, are also appointed in the same manner. This 
also applies to Chairpersons of all independent commissions, such as the Judiciary 
Services Commission, Public Service Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Media Commission and Gender Commission and 
many others. Senior posts in state enterprises, parastatals, public institutions and their 
boards of directors are also recruited using the same procedure. The pre-condition to 
qualify for such appointments is one’s political inclination and loyalty to the appointing 
authorities. One can only keep one’s job at the mercy of the appointing authorities.  
This approach described above is, however, contrary to paragraph 200 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013, section 3 (a) which states 
that no member of the Civil Service may, in the exercise of their functions act in a 
partisan manner; or (b) further the interests of any political party or cause. Section 4 
states that members of the Civil Service must be office-bearers of any political party. 
In addition, the Public Service Act 2001 (Chapter 16:4) expounds that, “when 
considering candidates for appointment to or promotion within the Public Service, the 
Commission shall: (a) have regard for the merit principle; that is, the principle that 
preference should be given to the person who, in the Commission's opinion, is the 
most efficient and suitable for appointment to the office, post or grade concerned; and 
(b) ensure that there is no discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, place of origin, 
political opinions, colour, creed, gender or physical disability”.  
PTTT (2018) recommended that it is necessary “to have an apolitical, value driven, 
responsive and incorruptible public administration that is fit for purpose in terms of its 
structure, size, competences, orientation and culture.” However, the current 
recruitment practice/system is exclusionary in nature, as it only seeks to further the 
interests of one political party. It promotes nepotism and patronage.  It discourages 
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civil servants to openly critique government systems, policies, projects and 
programmes as one would be labelled as a member of the opposition and thus fighting 
the government that one is serving. The current recruitment and promotion system 
excludes talented citizens from participating in national development programmes, 
including the implementation of economic policies. It is clearly detrimental to any form 
of national progress.  
4.2.1.3 Clear separation of powers 
Mojapelo (2013:37) describes the separation of powers as, “the division of explicit 
roles, obligations and tasks to individual institutions, with defined competence and 
authority”. The “meaning of the terms legislative, executive and judicial authority in the 
statutory arrangement is of significance. The intention of the separation of powers is 
founded in the constitutional theory of John Locke and Charles de Montesquieu” 
(Venter and Landsberg 2013:53). The “French philosopher Montesquieu based his 
rationale on the British Constitution, which observed three pillars of state authority, 
namely: executive, legislative and judicial functions” (Venter and Landsberg 2013:53). 
These functions should be conferred on the three distinct government organs with 
different office-bearers.   
According to Thornhill (2012:39), “legislative authority in all spheres of government 
has several generic functions; namely: legislative, control, financial, reconciliation and 
representation functions”. Thornhill (2012:149) posits that “legislatures have the final 
say regarding legislation and budgetary proposals deferred to them”. Thornhill, Ile and 
van Dijk (2015:63) acknowledge that “executive authority gives effect to the decisions 
made by legislatures”. The “judicial authority is where the regulations and rules of the 
state are understood, defended and prescribed” (Thornhill 2012:18). The meaning of 
the separation of powers at the sphere of national government underscores that one 
of the three arms of government is responsible for the enactment of laws. Landsberg 
and Graham (2017:62) indicate that “the principle of the separation of powers is that 
permissible political authority may not be assigned to individuals or a single institution 
in a state. Admittedly, the nature of a state and its powers are essentially co-dependent 
and interrelated, therefore, absolute division is impractical”.  
The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) acknowledges that “there should be division of 
powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with applicable checks and 
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balances to guarantee answerability, transparency and honesty”. Chapter 5 of the 
Constitution (2013) outlines that executive authority is derived from the people and 
must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. Executive authority is vested 
in the President who exercises it through the Cabinet as determined by the 
Constitution. Section 164 determines the independence of the Judiciary. Section 116 
explains that legislative authority is derived from the people. It also states that all 
agencies of government are accountable to Parliament. Section 235 prohibits the 
interference by anyone with the independence of commissioners in their operations. 
The researcher observed a blurred division of power between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, as demonstrated in section 4.2.2 below. The researcher also 
observed blurred role clarifications and systems of collaboration at the centre of 
government; that is, the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), Public Service 
Commission (PSC), and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The OPC, 
according to Brett (2006:6), has been “seen to be stepping into the mandates of other 
institutions, thereby creating a partocratic government.  There have been issues of 
state capture. Competing elites capture state power to build clientelistic support 
networks and use that power to extract the resources they need to maintain their 
support and build capitalist enterprises”.  Brett (2006:6) further emphasised that “free 
elections, merit-based bureaucracy and competitive markets are impossible in such 
environments because on the one hand, public service remains personalised by way 
of clientelism and nepotism; on the other, access to the public institutions of the state 
is seen as the main means of personal enrichment-even if the fruits of such labour are 
thereafter to be redistributed or even reinvested by well-connected elites”.  Brett 
(2006:6) further argued that “there is no reason to expect these destructive processes 
to end because they serve the interests of the political and economic elites who control 
state power. In view of this, there is every chance that the elites will use the reforms 
currently ushered in by the so-called transitions to democracy in order to secure both 
renewed legitimacy and access to the new assets which the apparent liberalisation of 
the continent’s economies makes available”. 
PTTT (2018) recommended government “to adhere to the characteristics and 
functions of Public Administration systems as provided for in chapter 9 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013 (p.81)”. Paragraph 1, section 
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(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that a high standard of professional ethics 
must be promoted and maintained and section (2) indicates that all appointments to 
office must be made primarily on the basis of merit (CoZ 2013).  The PTTT (2018) 
emphasised “the need to de-politicise and respect the public service and eliminate 
patronage and ensure all appointments are based on merit”. The PPD (2019) 
cautioned “the nation to adhere to all the constitutional provisions”. R18 (PTTT 2018) 
said “for economic policies to achieve their set targets there is a need to separate the 
role of policy drafter, implementer and supervisor”. In support of this, R17 (PTTT 
2018) said “Government must stick to policy formulation while inviting the private 
players to do implementation. This will instil investor confidence thereby improving 
Foreign Direct Investment that is critical for resource mobilisation”.  
Lack of separation of powers deters investors as they fear that their assets will not 
be secure as they do not trust the judicial system to objectively handle dispute cases 
if they arise. Thus lack of separation of power leads to duplication of roles, 
discourages investment and development. R2 (FGDPR, 2019) noted that “the lack 
of clear separation of powers was negatively affecting policy formulation, 
implementation and coordination”.  
The researcher observed that clear separation of power amongst the three arms of 
government was clearly stated in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. However, there were 
clear cases when it was questionable if these constitutional provisions were being 
respected. For instance, senior public office bearers refuse to attend parliamentary 
portfolio committees for the question and answer sessions. Under normal 
circumstances, it is expected that the judiciary should come in to prosecute such 
senior officers. Importantly also, the executive should penalise such behaviour by 
senior civil servants. However, none of the above occurs. Whereas the idea of 
separation of power is to ensure checks and balances amongst the three arms of 
government, this is still questionable in Zimbabwe. Such cases attest that practically 
there is no independence of one arm of government from the other. Consequently, 
within the governance and democratic issues, three critical items should be addressed 
in Zimbabwe, these being accountability, transparency and fiscal indiscipline. 
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4.2.2 Accountability 
Vyas-Doorgaspersad (2017:36) specifies accountability to be when “public officials 
elected and appointed have an obligation to explain their decisions and actions to the 
citizens”. According to Lindberg (2009:3), accountability implies that “when decision 
making power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an agent (e.g. 
government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agents to account 
for their decisions and if necessary for imposing sanctions, ultimately by removing the 
agent from power”. Accountability “ensures actions and decisions taken by public 
officials are subject to oversight so as to guarantee that government initiatives meet 
their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to 
be benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance” (Tatarcan 2016:199). 
A Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013, section 194 (1f) requires 
public administration to be accountable to Parliament and to the people. However, 
these provisions have not been adhered to. During a presentation, Permanent 
Secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet, Mhlanga (2019), indicated that 
“for the developing world, fussy lines of accountability, non-existence of performance 
targets and scant feedback of actual work performance compound socio-economic 
problems.”  In the case of Zimbabwe, the channels of accountability are blurred and 
manipulated due to state capture. State power has been centralised in the hands of 
the President, who happens to be at the helm of both government and ruling party 
structures. He is responsible for approving the performance targets for senior civil 
servants. In this case, the civil servants are only answerable to the president and the 
rest of the nation is left in the dark. The public is provided with scant information on 
the performance of public institutions. Sachikonye (2003:101) explains that “since the 
advent of national independence, political developments in Zimbabwe have largely 
been played in what may be termed ‘a neo-patrimonial political system’ in which 
autocracy is a distinctive feature of the style of rule of President Mugabe”.  Sachikonye 
(2003:101) further adds that “a leader who rules by dint of personal prestige and 
personal power while ordinary folk are treated as extensions of the big man’s 
household with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. Authority 
is entirely personalised and shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather than any codified 
system of laws”. 
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 Centralisation of power enabled the president to perpetuate systematic patronage and 
thus keep a grip on political power as long as he wished.  The public institutions 
became undemocratic, thereby undermining the issues of transparency and 
accountability, or checks and balances in the state, and independence of key 
institutions such as the judiciary, parliament and independent commissions; for 
example, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, among others. The absence of 
transparency and accountability became a fertile ground for embarking on grand 
corruption by senior public office bearers thereby syphoning huge public resources for 
personal gain. The researcher observed that sometimes the government incurred 
expenditure which was outside the approval of parliament. The public is also not 
informed about the activities which were funded outside the approved national 
budgets. 
Due to lack of accountability and transparency in government operations, it became 
almost impossible to know about budgets which would have been set aside for national 
economic policies, thereby curtailing their implementation efforts. In support of this, 
R6 (PTTT, 2018) said “economic policies, programmes and projects are often not 
linked to the budget. This makes it difficult for accountability of resources and results 
to be done by office bearers”. Public finance management remains important in 
determining efficiency and effectiveness in the mobilisation and utilisation of public 
resources in Zimbabwe. ZIMCODD (2018:1) states that “comparatively, over the 
years, the expenditure and non-expenditure irregularities have increased across 
ministries, an indication that the Auditor General’s report is not being fully utilised”. 
 Common issues arising from the  Auditor General’s report (2017) include “abuse of 
financial systems and fiscal rules, failure to reconcile financial transactions, poor book 
keeping, poor maintenance of accounting records, violation of treasury instructions, 
poor budgetary control, and poor asset management”. The Auditor General’s report 
(2017), further highlights “untimely posting of financial transactions, failure to recover 
amounts owed to government departments, wasteful and overstated expenditure, 
violation of procurement procedures, poor service delivery, diversion of resources from 
both funds and appropriation accounts, failure to recover debts owed to government 
departments and untimely payments to suppliers of goods and services”. Most “of 
these errors have been recurrent over the years. This has serious implications on the 
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social and economic rights of citizens especially the right to education, health, food 
and water, right to life and rights of special interest groups including the rights of 
women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities as enshrined under part 2 
of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment” (No. 20) Act 2013 (ZIMCODD 2018:1).  
The study noted that accountability for public funds is lacking by the authorities. R7 
(PDD, 2019) mentioned the “mismanagement of funds and corruption as the major 
reasons affecting the implementation of national economic policies ”. The Auditor 
General’s report (2014: v) indicates that “a number of Ministries and departments 
incurred total expenditure of $21 746 501 that was not supported by source documents 
making it difficult to ascertain whether the expenditure was properly incurred to 
constitute a proper charge on public funds. The Auditor General was unable to validate 
whether the expenditure was a proper charge against the votes of these Ministries”. 
Despite such clear evidence of misuse of public funds, no punishment of government 
officials was done. R9 (FGDPR, 2019) indicated that “accountability levels were low in 
government and I recommend that control measures must be put in place to ensure 
that policies are properly implemented”. In support of this, R34 (PTTT, 2018) said 
“leadership at the top should be held accountable for results. To arrest the problem 
of non-implementation of policies, those charged with the implementation should 
face consequences for failing to deliver”. 
The researcher has observed that there is manipulation of accountability structures in 
government based on political affiliations.  Members of Parliament for the ruling party 
often abscond from parliamentary sessions when they are invited to answer questions 
from the parliamentarians. A practical example of how senior civil servants are failing 
to be accountable to citizens was demonstrated in an article in the Herald dated 30 
May 2019. The article reads “last week, the Speaker and Deputy Senate President 
Mike Nyambuya criticised Cabinet ministers and their deputies for failing to attend 
sittings to respond to questions from backbenchers. Parliament will take disciplinary 
action against ministers who missed yesterday’s Question and Answer Session in the 
National Assembly without seeking leave of absence. I ask the clerks to take note of 
those ministers who are absent without leave of absence and will charge them 
accordingly” (The Herald, 30 May 2019). This was announced by the Speaker of the 
National Assembly, Advocate Jacob Mudenda, before commencement of business on 
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29 May 2019. The Herald (30 May 2019) further stated that, “the non-attendance of 
ministers and their Deputies has been a cause of concern in Parliament for so many 
years. Advocate Mudenda has since said there was a need to invoke provisions of 
Parliament’s Standing Orders to deal with the problem through the introduction of 
punitive measures”. 
The Parliament of Zimbabwe is mandated by the Constitution of Zimbabwe to provide 
an oversight role to the executive. However, the executive when summoned to attend 
parliamentary sessions, abscond willy-nilly, without any consequences. Members of 
Parliament from the ruling party (some are ministers and deputy ministers) abscond 
from parliamentary business knowing that they are protected due to the patronage 
system in appointing officers in government. Most importantly, whatever they do is first 
approved by the politburo of the ruling party. As such, they are only proxies of the 
party, so they will not be able to provide answers to the questions they are expected 
to take. On the other hand, members of parliament from opposition parties normally 
do not attend parliamentary business as a way of protesting against the government 
which they consider to be illegitimate. Also, they feel that their contributions in the 
House of Assemble are normally disregarded. 
In another case, the Auditor General’s report (2014: ii), states that “a number of public 
entities were paying board fees and management salaries and benefits which were 
not authorised. For example, the Environmental Management Authority (EMA), whose 
Board passed a resolution to increase its own fees without the parent Ministry’s 
approval; the Health Service Board approved fuel allocations to its Board members 
without Treasury’s concurrence; Zimbabwe National Road Administration (ZINARA) 
awarded its Chief Executive Officer a monthly salary and a representation allowance 
increase which were above the contract stipulated rates”. The Auditor General’s report 
(2014: ii), further states that “ZARNet paid its Chief Executive Officer a monthly 
housing allowance whilst paying month rentals for his residence; Zimbabwe Mining 
Development Corporation (ZMDC) gave non-executive directors a total of 2,940 litres 
of fuel and holiday allowances of US$ 27,450 each without the parent Ministry’s 
approval; and the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) paid board fees that were above 
those approved by the parent Ministry, by US$ 26 868”. The above information is 
available in the public domain.     
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The PPD (2019) emphasised that “with a view to ensure accountability, there could 
be need to create a Government of National Unity, Political Party Council or to 
establish a question and answer session between the executive and the citizens. This 
would require the amendment of the Constitution or other legal framework for 
empowerment”. R2 (PDD 2019) said “for economic policies to achieve their objectives 
there should be: a clear set aside budget for the implementation of the programmes 
and projects; clearly defined reporting and coordination structures, with the 
implementing agencies accountable to the Presidency and Parliament; and punitive 
action must be taken against those who will not adhere to the agreed budget, 
timelines and principles”. In concurrence, the PTTT (2018) explained that “public 
office bearers must be accountable to the nation for every action they have done or 
for failing to execute their objections”. R2 (FGDPR 2019) emphasised “the need for 
civil servants to be accountable in policy formulation and implementation”.  
The researcher observed that accountability for results was weak in public institutions 
at all levels. Although the Results Based Management (RBM) that is being 
implemented by government is expected to hold officers accountable, this is barely 
being done. At the beginning of every year, each office is expected to come up with 
an individual work plan which is linked to the organisational/ministry’s goals. The 
heads of organisations and Ministries also sign annual performance contracts linked 
to the organisational/ministry’s goals. However, evaluation of such work plans and 
performance contracts are not objectively being done. In addition, access to 
information regarding alignment of the Ministry’s annual plans or strategic plans and 
officials’ performance is limited and deemed confidential. As such, the public is not 
always informed regarding public institutions’ performances. 
It is clear that the issue of accountability needs to be strengthened in public institutions 
if the policies are to achieve their set targets. The responses from primary data indicate 
that policies were failing to meet their targets because those entrusted to implement 
them were not accountable to anyone. The solution lies with the citizens’ collective 
responsibility in ensuring that principles of the Public Finance Management Act (2016) 
as provided for under section 298 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe are adhered to. 
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4.2.3 Transparency  
Bauhr and Grimes (2012:4) define transparency as, “the increased flow of timely and 
reliable economic, social and political information, which is accessible to all relevant 
stakeholders”. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP n.d.:1) expounds transparency to mean that “decisions taken and 
their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It implies 
that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected 
by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is 
provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media”.  
The Constitution of Zimbabwe (CoZ) (2013) sections 194 and section 298 (and others) 
provide measures to ensure transparency of public funds by responsible authorities. 
ZIMCODD (2018: ii) indicates that “institutions entrusted to safeguard and keep 
custody of national resources abuse them instead. This makes citizens feel cheated 
when the country’s national resources are not used in the most economic, efficient 
and effective way as provided for in our Constitution”. Officials abscond form the 
national system put in place to ensure transparency. For instance, the Auditor General 
(2014: iv) indicated that “some Ministries and Departments failed to follow 
procurement regulations resulting in procurement of goods and services out of tender 
totalling US$2 644 485 in violation of procurement regulations.  Some Ministries 
transferred a total amount of US$12 084 785 from Fund accounts under their 
administration to meet expenditure of parent Ministries without the authority of 
Treasury as required by the constitutions of the Funds. In most cases the objectives 
for which the Funds were established were not achieved”. The report further states 
that “due to weak internal controls, some Fund Accounts lost at least a total amount 
of US $179 144 to fraudulent activities perpetrated by employees. There were 
differences between expenditure amounts reflected by the Public Finance 
Management System (PFMS) and that of the Sub-Paymaster General Accounts for 
seven Ministries totalling US$ 70 932 805. The Ministries did not produce 
reconciliation statements showing the sources of differences. As a result, the Auditor 
General was unable to rely on the total expenditure figures disclosed in the 
Appropriation Accounts of those Ministries” (Auditor General 2014: iv).  
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Given some of the Auditor General’s findings, it is clear that the government is losing 
huge sums of some due to lack of transparency. The researcher observed that the 
Finance and Accounts departments in various ministries are highly centralised. The 
respective annual Finance Acts provide information on the allocation of financial 
resources for each Ministry/Department. However, it is not possible for government 
officers to know how resources allocated to their operations by Treasury are being 
managed. Likewise, the general populace does not have access to information on 
detailed government expenditure records. 
With a view to achieve national objectives, the Auditor General (2014: iv) 
recommended that “there is a need to strengthen internal control systems of public 
entities to safeguard public resources and channel the same to priority areas of 
development and service delivery. The systems should be developed to enable 
institutions that have surplus resources to channel the same to areas of need and 
optimise on the resources that are available”. Likewise, in the policy making cycle, all 
the stages must pass the transparency test. This creates confidence and trust in the 
policy itself. Starting from the formulation stage of a policy, it should be clear whose 
agenda is being pursued. All concerned parties must be satisfied with the policy 
formulation process. Broad and extensive consultations should be done to allow 
people to openly critique areas of concern. The final product should be owned by all. 
 R7 (FGDPR 2019) said “when developing policies, goals and objectives, there is a 
need to be transparent; i.e being honest to the intended beneficiaries”. PTTT (2018) 
also expressed that “lack of policy transparency and consistency has negatively 
affected the long-term nature of investments”. R11 (PPD 2019) bemoaned “lack of 
transparency in government business. At the implementing stage, there should be 
clearly defined implementation systems and structures. The roles of all the 
implementing agencies must be clearly explained. The lines of responsibilities must 
be clearly known and respected. The Policy budget should be developed by all 
concerned parties”. R16 (PTTT 2018) indicated that “it is imperative for accountability 
and decentralisation of the budgeting process down to the grassroots level”. It must 
be clear how the budget will be managed, allocated and used. Everyone should be 
accountable for all the funds allocated to him/her.  
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The researcher observed that transparency in public institutions was weak. This has 
been exacerbated by the officials’ Secrecy Act which prohibits civil servants to openly 
give information to the stakeholders, public or other fellow public officials. Information 
is released on a ‘need-to-know’ basis and there are complex bureaucratic procedures 
to be followed to get it. As such, it is not easy for one to get information on government 
business performances. To improve on transparency, the RBM system must be 
enforced. It compels information on government business to be well prepared and 
readily available for public scrutiny. It emphasises that human resource deployment 
be based on merit. This ensures the proper manpower to be at the right place to 
execute the policy. RBM promotes free flow of information through the use of 
Management Information Systems.  The monitoring and evaluation stage under RBM 
is objectively done in a transparent and professional manner.  Also, the Results Based 
Budget (RBB) needs to be put in place to support the policy. The budget needs to be 
open for scrutiny by stakeholders and the public, thereby promoting fiscal discipline. 
4.2.4 Fiscal Discipline 
Fiscal management, as conceptualised by Goel and Burton (1996:6) is a 
“systematised and specialised branch of knowledge of the rational techniques, 
principles and practices of raising, allocating and utilising financial resources for the 
achievement of set national goals”. In Zimbabwe, fiscus refers to all funds that are paid 
into and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF). These are public funds meant 
to be used for the nation’s development through funding government policies, projects 
and programmes. The elements that constitute public financial management comprise 
the legislative and regulatory framework; institutional and administrative framework; 
and process framework.  
4.2.4.1 Legislative and regulatory frameworks  
Fiscal management is provided for in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (No 20) 2013, 
Public Debt Management Act 2015 (chapter 22:21), Joint Venture Act 2015 (chapter 
22:22), Public Entities Corporate Governance Act 2018 (chapter 10:31), Public 
Finance Management Act 2016 (Chapter 22:19), and Public Procurement and 
Disposal of Asset Act 2017 [Chapter 22:23] and Regulations.  
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The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) Chapter 17 covers public financial management 
issues which include the establishment and management of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund (CRF), Management of Public Debt, and appointment and role of the 
Auditor General.   In Section 302, the Constitution (2013) states that all revenues of 
Zimbabwe, from whatever source arising, shall be paid into and from one Consolidated 
Revenue Fund (CRF). The Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) is the main working 
fund of the Government; it is a Constitutional Fund that consists of the bulk of receipts 
and payments. The exceptions to this requirement are: moneys payable by or under 
an Act of Parliament into some other fund established for a specific purpose; and 
moneys that may, by or under an Act of Parliament, be retained by the authority that 
received them for the purpose of defraying the expenses of that authority (CoZ 2013). 
Section 303(1) of the Constitution (2013) further provides that, “no moneys shall be 
withdrawn from the CRF except: to meet expenditure that is charged upon that Fund 
by the Constitution or by an Act of Parliament; or where the issue of those moneys 
has been authorised by an Appropriation or other Act. Government spending is 
authorised by appropriations approved by the Legislature”. 
Section 305 of the Constitution (2013) requires the minister responsible for Finance to 
cause preparation of estimates of revenue and expenditure for Zimbabwe to be 
prepared and laid before Parliament for approval each year. The Public Finance 
Management Act (2016) defines the roles of all key stakeholders in the management 
of public resources. It separates financial management from the External Audit. It 
further widens the definition of ‘public entity’ to include local authorities and 
government-controlled entities. The Act provides for the issuance of regulations to fully 
operationalise the Act. The Act’s main objective is to strengthen governance over, and 
accountability for, public resources by; clarifying roles and responsibilities of players 
involved in the public resources management chain, providing for implementation of 
generally accepted accounting standards, legislating for adequate corporate 
governance arrangements, facilitating effective decision making and legislative 
oversight by availing timely and accurate information (GoZ 2016).  
The Public Debt Management Act (2015) provides for restrictions on borrowings, 
guarantees and other commitments such as loans. It specifies the persons who may 
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enter into transactions that bind or may bind a public entity to any future financial 
commitment. It also specifies the consequences of unauthorised transactions.  
The Joint Venture Act (2015) allows government to regulate Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). The critical aspects of the Act are meant to set rules for 
participation of the private sector in the development and financing of infrastructure 
and development projects. Whenever an entity seeks assistance of any nature, 
treasury concurrence should be sought through the parent ministry.  The Public 
Procurement and Disposal of Asset Act (2017) [Chapter 22:23] defines procurement 
as the acquisition by any means of goods, construction work or services (consultancy 
and non–consultancy). Procurement is regarded a strategic tool in public service 
delivery. The Act created a Public Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe 
(PRAZ). Before the promulgation of this Act, all procurement in public institutions was 
being done centrally by the State Procurement Board. The Public Procurement and 
Disposal of Asset Act decentralises the procurement process in all public institutions, 
whereby each public institution must have a Procurement Management Unit (GoZ 
2017).  
4.2.4.2 Institutional and administrative frameworks   
There are institutional arrangements mandated to effectively manage public funds, 
which include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Parliament, the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Auditor General’s Office. 
The Ministry of Finance is the nerve-centre of the fiscal management system in 
Zimbabwe. It plays critical roles in national fiscal and economic planning. It has a legal 
constitutional mandate to manage the finances of the central government and other 
ministries’ expenditure (Zhou 2012:156). Section 305 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
(2013) requires the minister responsible for Finance to cause to be prepared and laid 
before Parliament for approval each year, estimates of revenue and expenditure for 
Zimbabwe.  The Budget Cycle is premised on a Results Based Budget (RBB) 
framework, and all line ministries have entered into an Integrated Performance 
Agreement with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. RBB creates 
linkages between the necessary inputs for the production of outputs, the 
implementation of the ministry/departmental strategic development plan and 
anticipated outcomes and impacts (CoZ 2013). The Auditor General is appointed 
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under Section 309 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) to examine, audit and report 
on the public accounts of Zimbabwe. The Auditor-General is not subject to the 
direction and control of any person or authority other than Parliament. The above 
constitutional provisions bring all government finances firmly under the control of 
Parliament.  
Parliament is a place where Government spending is authorised by appropriations and 
approved by the legislature. It is a parliamentary obligation to approve public 
expenditures. There exists a Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts (PAC). The 
PAC’s mandate is to examine the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums 
granted by Parliament to meet public expenditure and such other accounts laid before 
the House of Assembly as the Committee may think fit. The Committee undertakes a 
critical examination of the public accounts presented to ensure that Parliamentary 
grants for each financial year have been applied to the purpose for which they were 
intended. It also considers matters reflected in the public accounts, such as 
unnecessary, wasteful or excess expenditure, which have been brought to the notice 
of Parliament by the Auditor-General (Section 299 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment No. 20 of 2013).  
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) is regulated by Section 317 of the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe (2013) explaining that the Central Bank regulates the monetary system, 
protects the currency of Zimbabwe in the interest of balanced and sustainable 
economic growth, and formulates and implements monetary policy. An Act of 
Parliament may provide for the structure and organisation of the RBZ and can confer 
or impose additional functions. 
4.2.4.3 Process frameworks  
There are procedures/ instructions to be followed in the management of public 
finances with a view to ensure transparency, accountability and clear reporting 
structures. These include the Public Finance Management Systems, Treasury 
instructions and manuals, amongst others. 
The Public Finance Management System was introduced in Zimbabwe “in government 
ministries in 1999. These are a networked computer based system in which 
government ministries carry out their accounting and financial transactions. They 
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enable treasury to have access to all line ministries’ management information and be 
able to control, monitor and supervise management of public funds. The system is 
managed centrally at the Treasury through Central Computing Services which is 
responsible for the government’s computer requirements” (Zhou and Zvoushe 
2012:159). The Treasury Instructions and Public Finance Management Regulations 
“require line Ministries to ensure compliance and adherence to accounting and internal 
control provisions” (Statutory Instrument 144 of 2019:8). The Internal Audit Manual 
and Audit Committees are meant to improve controls, enhance risk management, 
governance and promote ethical behaviour and guide Internal Auditors (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development 2017:15).  
According to Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:152), “sound fiscal management is the bedrock 
of socio-economic development. The development efforts of a government are directly 
linked with the availability and efficient utilisation of its resources”. With all the Public 
Finance Management legislative, institutional arrangements and clear procedures in 
place, evidence reveals that the economic crisis that has dogged Zimbabwe over the 
years is largely attributed to fiscal mismanagement.  
The NBS (2018:3) acknowledges that, “the gravity of fiscal indiscipline is reflected in 
failure to adhere to approved budgets, with significant expenditure being incurred 
arbitrarily outside budgeted votes, and failure to follow laid down systems, at times 
involving quasi-fiscal expenditures. This resulted in persistent fiscal imbalances and 
consequently, a breakdown of budgetary systems, laid out processes, and a major 
fiscal and monetary disconnect”. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe also indicated that 
government’s budget deficit has been growing to unsustainable levels, mainly being 
driven by consumption expenditure against low levels of revenue inflows. In 2010, 
2012, 2014 and 2018 the statistics on budget deficit to GDP were 2.8%, 1.3%, 2.5% 
and 11.1%, respectively (Trading Economics 2019).  The NBS (2003:25) further states 
the figures for capital expenditure as “11.7% of the total budget and about 4.9% of 
GDP, compared to 8.1% and 3.3% in 2002, respectively”. The meagre resources 
allocated to capital expenditure make it difficult to execute macro-economic policies. 
In addition, there is often a mismatch between what is budgeted to execute economic 
policies and what is actually funded.  
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R12 (PTTT 2018) explained that “the high and unsustainable fiscal deficit is an account 
of a lack of fiscal discipline where government expenditures have always exceeded 
the revenues generated. These are on account of unbudgeted expenditures which 
were reflective of lack of political will to adhere to approved budgets, ghost workers 
increasing the Government wage bill, unforeseen circumstances such as droughts and 
flooding have given rise to unexpected expenditures, and corruption on the part of 
procurement agencies and institutions as well as extravagant expenditures added to 
the costs borne by Government”. This has resulted in a huge national debt overhang. 
The ZANU-PF election manifesto (2013:48) acknowledges that “a major threat to 
winning all the goals of the people over the next five years is the crippling debt burden 
now estimated at some US$10 billion whose unjust origins date to a US$700 million 
debt incurred by Ian Smith’s illegal Rhodesian regime ironically from some Western 
countries”. After independence, the new government kept on borrowing (locally and 
internationally) to close its budget deficits. However, the loans have not been serviced 
over a long period of time. R4 (PTTT 2018) indicates that “the unresolved debt, 
constituting the high debt stock itself and the arrears situation presented a number of 
challenges to the economy. First and foremost, the arrears situation placed the country 
in a high investment risk category with the result that investors tended to shy away 
from the country thereby depriving the nation of the much needed foreign direct 
investment. High indebtedness restricted access to further borrowing by the country 
as well as investment by International Financial Institutions such as the International 
Finance Corporation which assists the private sector”.  
Financial indiscipline was witnessed “during the first half of 1997, where the war 
veterans organised themselves and demonstrated expressing their grievances that 
the government was not giving them attention they deserve. As the intensity of the 
strikes grew, the government was forced to pay the war veterans, unbudgeted for, a 
once-off gratuity of Zimbabwean Dollar (ZWD) 50 000 by December 31, 1997 and a 
monthly pension of US Dollar (USD) 2000 beginning January 1998” (Kanyenze 
2004:3). Such kind of fiscal indiscipline had inflationary pressures on the economy and 
marked the beginning of a crumbling country. Kanyenze (2004:3) further stated that 
“in 1998, government funded the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war which was 
not budgeted for. It is argued that USD 3 million per day and a total of ZWD 6 billion 
was being spent on this war. Some view the intervention in the DRC war was a move 
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by certain individuals to enrich themselves through the illegal diamond industry that 
was booming in the Congo. Many economists view this move as the beginning of the 
downfall of the Zimbabwean economy due to increased unbudgeted government 
spending”. 
It is noted that over the years, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has been 
engaged in rapid money supply. The NBS (2003:5) indicates that M3 money supply 
growth rose to 113% by August 2002. Underpinning this is the level of budget deficit 
and its financing through the RBZ overdraft. In January 2007, the M3 money supply 
increased from 1 638.4% to 51 768.8% in November 2007 (Gono 2008). RBZ “was 
engaged in quasi fiscal expenditures to fund unbudgeted government consumption, 
particularly the civil service wage bill. On 27 June 2007, it was announced that Central 
Bank Governor, Gideon Gono had been ordered by President Robert Mugabe to print 
an additional ZWD$1 trillion to cater for civil servants’ and soldiers’ salaries that were 
hiked by 600% and 900% respectively” (Lee 2009:2). The NBS (2009:26) indicates 
that, “RBZ has been engaged in excessive quasi-fiscal activities…[.] These 
expenditures by RBZ were substitutes for international loans as Zimbabwe was facing 
isolation from the international community, thus failing to access lines of credit”. 
However, very little money was channelled towards economic development through 
economic policy implementation. As such seigniorage fuelled up inflation to five 
hundred billion percent, resultantly leading to a collapsed currency and economy in 
2008.” (NBS 2009:26).  
ZIMCODD (2018: ii) states that “there is growing concern over the rising government 
expenditure which amounted to US$6.3 billion against the planned US$4.1 billion as 
of September 2018. This implies a US$2.2 billion expenditure over-run resulting from 
over expenditure on capital and net lending, employment costs and interest on debt 
repayments. It is ironic that the country experienced such levels of expenditure over- 
run concurrently”. In most cases, the expenditure breakdown is neither approved by 
parliament nor accessible to the public. These expenditure over-runs are contrary to 
the provisions of the CoZ (2013) section 298 (f) which states that “public borrowing 
and all transactions involving the national debt must be carried out transparently and 
in the best interests of Zimbabwe”. Fiscal discipline was imposed in 2009 at the onset 
of the Government of National Unity. The NBS (2009:12) explains that the natural law 
154 
of cash budgeting includes “the use of a multi-currency system”. This brought to halt 
the RBZ’s quasi-fiscal activities and abandonment of the local currency. This in turn, 
resulted in the reduction in government expenditure leading to a stable macro-
economy creating an environment conducive to economic development. Significant 
amounts of resources were channelled towards capital expenditure. The environment 
boosted investor and citizens’ confidence, thereby increasing domestic savings and 
investments. During this period, “GDP growth rates averaged 10.5% per annum and 
inflation was below 0%” (NBS 2009:12). Fiscal discipline greatly contributed to the 
success of the Medium-Term Plan, reinforced by political stability.  
4.2.5 Political Stability 
Hussain (2014:1) gave the standard definition of political instability as “the propensity 
of a government collapse either because of conflicts or rampant competition between 
various political parties. Also, the occurrence of a government change increases the 
likelihood of subsequent changes. Political instability tends to be persistent. Economic 
growth and political stability are deeply interconnected. The uncertainty associated 
with an unstable political environment may reduce investment and the pace of 
economic development”. On the other hand, as emphasised by Hussain (2014:1), 
“poor economic performance may lead to government collapse and political unrest. 
Political instability also refers to the lack of real competition for the governing elite. The 
‘politically unstable’ system enforces stringent barriers to personal freedoms. Similarly, 
other freedoms such as freedom of press, freedom of religion, access to the internet, 
and political dissent are also truncated. This breeds abuse of power and corruption”. 
 Larbi (1999, in Vyas Doorgapersad 2011:238), postulates that “economic crises often 
go hand in hand with political instability; in countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, the orientation of the political leadership was not particularly pro-
market or pro-private sector. To name a few, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, Ethiopia and 
Uganda are in dire straits, resulting in a marked degree of social disintegration and 
economic stress throughout the continent. In this scenario of authoritarian ideology, 
public administration merely administers commandments and decrees”. 
Government officials are obliged to deliver services without any political interference. 
However, a senior official in ZANU-PF (former cabinet minister), Dr O Mpofu (2018) 
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confirmed that “government business was being directed by the ruling party.” Mpofu 
(2018) was quoted in Pindula News (2018) saying that “we will be working closely with 
institutions of development and ensure that they conform to agreed positions by the 
party; I am talking about Government institutions. As is always said, the party is 
supreme”. These assertions point to exclusionary government policies. R9 (PDD 
2019) said “the political differences should not limit anyone to contribute to policy 
development as policies benefits or disadvantage all citizens”. As long as citizens 
feel that the policies are marginalised in nature, this creates fertile ground for 
political instability. 
Political disorder is created by corrupt states with weak economies. Brett (2006:7) 
argues that “politics in Africa has generally operated on authoritarian and corrupt 
principles that have produced destructive short-term results. Authoritarian regimes 
cannot maintain viable and interdependent political, administrative and economic 
processes”. Their need to satisfy contradictory demands forces them into socially 
destructive decisions which often lead to a growing loss of control, whether over 
supporters who have lost their assets, officials who do not work because they no 
longer get paid, bankrupted firms that can no longer deliver taxes or provide jobs” 
(Brett 2006:7). The Zimbabwean Government normally responds to such political 
threats by adopting populist policies designed to buy political support from key 
constituencies whose support would have dwindled. For example, the Millennium 
Economic Recovery Programme (MERP 2000:3) was launched with the prime 
objective to rebuild mutual trust and confidence that had been lost in the past decade 
among citizens due to poor economic performance. It also sought to restore normal 
cooperative relations with the international community. However, in Zimbabwe such 
policies actually worsened the situation resulting in political and economic catastrophe.  
The researcher observed that the ultimate solution in Zimbabwe must begin with 
political settlement. Chikerema and Chokuda (2014:63) argue that “Zimbabwe has 
done relatively well in the conduct of regular general elections, but questions have 
been raised on the quality of elections whose environment has been defined by 
institutionalised intimidation, fear, violence, lawlessness/selfishness, patronage, 
manipulated state institutions, thugocracy, rigging, selective application of law and the 
inability to accept/ concede defeat of polls”. The SADC Parliamentary Forum Election 
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Observation Report SADC (2018) noted that “…again as was the case with the 2000 
Parliamentary Elections, most of the international observers from outside Africa, 
especially from Europe condemned the election as seriously flawed while Regional 
and African Missions’ opinions were mixed. Soon after the election, the MDC filed a 
petition challenging Mugabe’s victory, citing flaws in electoral laws, electoral 
irregularities and pre-election violence”. In response “to the alleged irregularities 
during the 2002 Presidential Elections the United States, the European Union (EU), 
and other European countries-imposed travel restrictions against senior Zimbabwean 
officials and embargoed the sale of arms to Zimbabwe. The US and the EU also froze 
the financial assets of selected ruling party officials. In addition, the Commonwealth of 
Nations suspended Zimbabwe from council meetings for one year after its election 
observation team found the 2002 Presidential Election neither free nor fair” (SADC  
2018).  
It is observed that elections in Zimbabwe have always yielded contested results since 
the formation of the main opposition party, MDC.  The issues of elections being rigged, 
whether perceived or real, curtail all developmental efforts in the country. This study 
urges the country to conduct elections which yield undisputed results. Failure to do 
this leads to perpetual civil unrest which deters investors and thereby plunges the 
nation into a further economic abyss. As shown in the literature above, the major 
funding institutions withdrew their support in protest of the manner in which elections 
were conducted in Zimbabwe. This also invited sanctions on the leadership of 
Zimbabwe, straining relations with Zimbabwe’s host government and major investors, 
thereby hampering the implementation of national economic policies. It is important to 
note that when the nation is at peace, united, filled with trust and has confidence in 
government, it is easier to achieve economic development. PTTT (2018) emphasised 
that “it is important to enhance the credibility of the elections, it is imperative to 
undertake minimum electoral reforms and ensure the independence of the Zimbabwe 
Election Commission (ZEC) by removing any appearance of executive interference. 
In addition, it is important to put in place an election dispute resolution mechanism that 
is credible”. R10 (PPD 2019) indicated that “the issues of government legitimacy were 
critical to foster development”. 
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Political conflicts in the country have weakened bureaucratic and economic efficiency 
and alienated foreign relations. The political crisis adversely affects the country’s 
image internationally. This is particularly evident in the tourism sector and investors 
who are very sensitive to political stability. During the period 2007 to 2009, many 
countries issued a number of travel warnings against Zimbabwe, thereby negatively 
affecting the tourism sector, foreign direct inflows and the entire country’s economic 
growth. Most of the population was reduced to destitution, intensifying elite competition 
and political repression. The formal economy has been replaced by the informal 
economy. Kanyenze (2017:1) states that “the share of informal employment in total 
employment increased from 80.0% in 2004 to 94.5% in 2014. In the case of 2008, 
government virtually ceased to govern as the economy had collapsed. Most factories 
closed, bureaucracy hardly functioned, taxes were not collected, and the currency was 
virtually worthless”.  
In 2009, the ruling party and main opposition party joined hands to form a Government 
of National Unity. This brought political victory to the country and produced a shift from 
a vicious to a virtuous circle in Zimbabwe. A new national economic policy was 
developed, called the Medium-Term Plan. The political stability resulted in economic 
growth, attracted investment and donor support, among other economic and social 
achievements. This demonstrates how important political stability is to the attainment 
of any policy objectives. 
4.2.6 Responsive Public Institutions 
The “2015 World Public Sector Report (WPSR), titled Responsive and Accountable 
Public Governance, presents the need for public governance to become more 
responsive and accountable in order for the State to lead the implementation of a 
collective vision of sustainable development” (United Nations 2015: vii). In terms of the 
economic environment, “responsiveness has two aspects. First, it gives importance to 
the government or the public agency, which is the supply side of the process while the 
other aspect gives primacy to the citizens, who demand services from the government. 
Both are directed toward the effective provision of public services to the citizens” 
(eGyanKosh n.d.:2). 
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The study found that current public institutions are lacking in many aspects. Kavran 
(1989, in WB 2012:5), posits in his Zimbabwe Public Service Review Commission 
Report (1989) that, inter alia, “a bureaucracy characterised by lack of performance 
management culture; arrogance and poor attitudes to work; high staff turnover; and a 
bloated, centralised and secretive bureaucracy that was non-transparent; suffered 
poor communication of decisions and was inaccessible to the public. The emerging 
arrogance of civil servants compromised professional standards. Corruption and 
underhand dealing in service delivery also emerged”. Dari and Hamauswa (2016:3) 
explain some of the landmark corruption cases which occurred in high government 
offices. They exemplified that “the major outstanding cases in Zimbabwe include the 
Willowgate scandal pitting Maurice Nyagumbo as early as 1985, followed by the Enos 
Chikore scandal at Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and later at the National Oil 
Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM)”, to state a few. Another high-level case of 
corruption was exposed where “several senior government officials have reportedly 
been summoned by Zimbabwe's Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on mines and 
energy over the missing $15 billion diamond revenue. However, some officials failed 
to attend the meetings” (see Xinhua news 2018). This information is available in the 
public domain. 
Kavran (1989, in WB 2012:5), further postulates that the “public service suffered from 
over-complicated rules and procedures, overlap and duplication of functions - facets 
not conducive to promoting a liberalised economy. These characteristics lead to 
delays in service delivery and in responding promptly to public needs.” In congruence 
with the above Commission’s findings, R9 (PDD 2019) indicated that “government 
officers were inaccessible. In most cases, senior officers will be out of office. It appears 
civil servants are waiting for their president to occupy office and currently have a 
negative attitude towards the sitting government”. Vyas Doorgapersad and Ababio 
(2010:412) explain that “the image of a government depends upon the conduct of 
public functionaries and the perceptions of its citizenry regarding the acceptable 
standards of services offered by the functionaries”. 
With a view to improving efficiency in public service delivery, the study noted that the 
Government of Zimbabwe has adopted the Results Based Management (RBM) 
system since 2005. This is a New Public Management (NPM) system to improve 
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service delivery in public institutions. The system intends to coordinate the policy 
formulation process at national level, with a view to align all government policies 
towards national goals. It is also meant to empower the lower levels in civil service to 
make decisions, thereby cutting down on bureaucracy. RBM pushes for a fair 
employment, promotion and rewarding system based on meritocracy. The system was 
meant to improve issues of governance, accountability, transparency, prevent 
corruption and to motivate personnel, amongst other advantages. According to Vyas-
Doorgapersad (2011:238), “the elements of the new public management concept as 
a new paradigm includes the disintegration of centralised bureaucracy as well as 
decentralisation of units in the public sector”.  
The researcher observed that there is piecemeal implementation of the RBM system 
in the public sector. There is no political will to institutionalise the RBM system because 
of personal interests, thus creating loopholes for abuse of public office for self-
enrichment.  A Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet 
(Mhlanga 2019) emphasised the importance of having the right systems in place in 
public institutions. This is explained through figures 4.1 and 4.2 showing the 
determinants of performance. The figures show that in public institutions, 80% of 
performance is attributed to the organisational systems whilst 20% is apportioned to 
people; that is, human capital employed to execute the tasks. It was further explained 
that of the 20% of people, 16% is attributed to leadership and 4% to the rest of people. 
Clearly there is a need for public institutions to have the right systems and good 





Figure 4.1: The Determinants of Performance in Public Institutions 01 
 
Source: (OPC Department of Performance Management and Public Sector Reform 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The Determinants of Performance in Public Institutions 02 
 
Source: (OPC Department of Performance Management and Public Sector Reform 2019) 
Whilst the RBM system was introduced in government in 2004, the researcher 
observed that generally all the ministries and departments’ plans were slow in 
institutionalising the RBM principles. The major challenges noted were structural 
problems within the ministries and departments. Some of the chief problems identified 
were that the recruitment of personnel was not done on a meritocracy basis. It was 
also noted that the finance system was highly centralised and secluded which is 
against the RBM principles.  
Determinants of Performance
System 80% People 20%
Determinants of Performance
System 80% Leader 16% Rest 4%
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The principals in public institutions were not prepared to decentralise some of their 
authority to lower levels, thereby defeating the principles of the RBM system. However, 
R23 (PTTT 2018) said “implementation of the results based approach is the best 
solution to attain the desired results in government”. The study observed that public 
sector institutions needed to strengthen their capacities to respond to the demands of 
the nation. The days of ‘government knows best’ are over; hence the modern day 
government likes to work with informed citizens and competent public servants. It is 
imperative to have a public service that is responsive, technologically-empowered, and 
innovative to offer seamless service delivery and hence fulfil the needs of 
Zimbabweans and contribute directly to the success of Zimbabwe.  
The public institutions must be staffed with qualified, competent, non-corrupt and 
empowered civil servants. R7 (PDD 2019) highlighted that “Government should 
employ people based on merit to ensure that knowledgeable people occupy the right 
positions to implement policies”. The structures should have low levels of 
bureaucracy which makes it easy for decisions to be made in a speedy manner. R9 
(PDD 2019) said that “in order to achieve policy objectives there is a need to improve 
institutional structures within Government”. In support of this, R5 (FGDPR 2019) 
indicated that “to improve implementation of policies, there should be an independent 
overarching body established working with the stakeholders e.g. a Planning 
Commission”.  In support of this, R20 (PTTT 2018) said “I propose that a planning 
unit which reports to cabinet is set up to oversee policy implementation processes. 
This muscular unit should be able to over-ride ministerial decisions and be involved 
in budgeting for the programmes”.  
It is imperative that government must focus on building institutions, structures and 
systems that deliver. Without these in place in the public institutions, attainment of 
results is not guaranteed. Through observations, the researcher observed two key 
issues that ought to be urgently developed and strengthened in public institutions. 
These are: putting in place the correct systems that deliver the intended results; and 
having the right people at the right place all the right time. Moreover, these could be 
adequately addressed through the implementation of the RBM system. The central 
government needs to consider coming up with a legal framework compelling the 
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institutionalisation of the RBM system in all public institutions. This will ensure 
structures to charge stakeholders not abiding by the principles of the RBM system. 
4.2.7 Political Will 
Political will is defined by Abazović and Mujkić (2015:14) as “the extent of committed 
support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular 
problem”. Within that framework, Abazović and Mujkić (2015:14) suggest the following 
four components of political will: “sufficient set of decision makers; with a common 
understanding of a particular problem on the common agenda; is committed to 
supporting; and a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution”. 
In support of this notion, the Zim-Asset (2013:13) highlighted that the implementation 
of this plan would rely on political commitment and leadership from the highest level. 
As much as the authorities are aware of the importance of political will, its execution 
by the ruling party and government to implement drastic reforms required for national 
development, is questionable.   
The researcher observed that the levels of political will to address in earnest the 
challenges currently facing the nation were very low. The study findings show high 
levels of political interferences when policies are being formulated and implemented 
to protect political benefits at the expense of the socio-economic development of the 
general populace. For instance, the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) was abandoned mid-
way when the ZANU-PF got into power after the June 2013 elections. The policy was 
prematurely terminated because it was launched during the GNU era; hence it was 
deemed not to be politically correct. However, looking at the study findings, MTP is 
one of the policies that managed to achieve most of its objectives within a short space 
of time. The policy could have achieved more if it had been allowed to complete its 
term. R21 (PTTT 2018) said “Government should make policies be linked more with 
economic realities than political programmes”. 
The Global Competitiveness Report on Zimbabwe (World Economic Forum 2012) 
indicated that “surprises, however, arise not from the rankings, but rather from the 
policy disconnect, especially the unwillingness of policy makers to tackle the 
challenges identified, opting rather to focus on the soft factors which do not necessarily 
add value in lifting competitiveness rankings”. The hard factors which are critical for 
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Global Competitiveness, which the policymakers should focus on include property 
rights observance, national savings, breadth of value chains, quality of electricity 
supply, venture capital availability, amongst others. This article demonstrates the laxity 
by the authorities to address real issues affecting the implementation of policies whilst 
focusing on petty issues.  R2 (FGDPR 2019) indicated that “for economic policies to 
achieve their targets there is a need for buy-in from, and commitment by, the 
leadership”. All policies should be consistent with national priorities and not be based 
on partisan or political interests. There must not be conflation between the 
Government and ruling party. Those occupying leadership positions must address the 
needs of all Zimbabweans. R4 (FGDPR 2019) said “successful implementation of 
policies depends on availability of resources and commitment of leadership”. In 
support of this point, R6 (PTTT, 2018) also indicated that “leadership should be 
founded on a V3 leadership model of vision, values and virtue”. These were 
explained by Kouzes and Posner’s four attributes of leadership, which are (Kouzes 
and Posner 2007:29-41): “honesty (having integrity and character, being truthful, 
ethical and having principles); forward-looking (having a sense of direction and a 
concern for the future of the organisation); inspiring (being enthusiastic, energetic 
and positive about the future); and competent (having relevant experience and 
sound judgement”. The government of the day should always be sincere in socio-
economic development. The policies should be developed to uplift the standards of 
the general populace/the citizens and stakeholders should have the confidence and 
trust that the authorities are doing everything to benefit them. In addition, the 
authorities are required to be seen to be earnestly supporting these polices. 
Government must always do what is right, not what is popular or politically expedient.  
This is achievable if the policy making process is professionalised.  
4.2.8 Broad Consultations and Involvement 
Van Damme and Brans (2011:7) stresses out that, consultation “stresses the direction 
and intensity of interaction between public and government in the overall policy making 
process as a core element in the concept (from agenda setting over policy preparation, 
decision making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation)”. From a normative 
outlook, these consultations, and also participation processes “can increase the 
performance of policy (‘output legitimacy’). As for the output legitimacy, these 
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consultative and/or participatory processes need to contribute to policy decisions that 
are more efficient, more effective, etcetera. These consultative processes then need 
to generate clear ‘deliverables’” (Van Damme and Brans 2011:7). 
The researcher observed that in Zimbabwe, stakeholder consultations were limited 
throughout the policy cycle. R3 (FGDPR 2019) indicated that “economic policies 
should be informed by research, bottom up approach, and acknowledge initial 
conditions such as the poor state of the economy. Government should be flexible to 
allow structural policy changes”. In support of this, R2 (PDD 2019) also said the “public 
should be consulted before implementation of policies and the policies should address 
the public needs”. The researcher observed that citizens are hesitant to openly discuss 
and assess government policies. The same fear that has engulfed civil servants has 
also been extended to the citizens. As such, citizens and other stakeholders are no 
longer interested in participating in what the government is doing. They believe 
everything being done by government is to benefit the ruling party elite. This culture 
has killed the spirit of participation/involvement, democracy and unity in the country.  
Strong leadership guided by the philosophy of pragmatism is essential for 
development, where problems are solved using logical and reasonable ways of doing 
things. This creates trust and confidence in all governance systems in the country. 
Consequently, a trusted public service with citizens at the centre will be established, 
where everyone freely participates in the political, economic and social development 
of the country, with no-one above the law.  R8 (PDD 2019) expressed the view that “it 
is very critical to take into consideration that goals and objectives of policies must only 
perpetuate the interests of the general populace of Zimbabwe and not only the 
interests of the elites or capitalists. Poor people are the ones who should benefit so 
as to improve their economic and social development”. After consultations, the views 
of the citizens and stakeholders should be reflected in the final policy document. R11 
(PTTT 2018) said that, “I suggest that the government should engage the citizens and 
stakeholders to participate more in developing the policy for they are the beneficiaries 
of the outcome which can be brought by the policy, be it negative or positive. More so, 
the political differences should not limit anyone to contribute to policy development as 
policies benefit or disadvantage us all as citizens”. Economic policies as of my 
knowledge deals with projects, infrastructure developments that directly or indirectly 
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have a socio-economic bearing on citizens, so to a greater extent the inputs from 
citizens are of great importance. 
Learning from the Growth with Equity Policy, one of the major reasons why it 
succeeded in most of its objectives was because there was participation and buy-in 
from the citizens and other stakeholders. The study found that during the early years 
of independence the entire nation was united and together celebrated the birth of a 
new Zimbabwe. Every citizen was eager to participate in the rebuilding of the country 
which had been devastated by the effects of war. As such government policies were 
well received. During 1980 to 1985, government encouraged citizens in the rural areas 
to mould bricks and use other locally available resources to construct schools. 
Government would then contribute the roofing materials, cement, doors and other 
materials beyond the reach of communities.  
The church missionaries also played a pivotal role in implementing this government 
policy. This greatly contributed to the attainment of the Growth with Equity Policy 
objectives such as increasing national literacy levels. In the same vein, the Medium-
Term Plan achieved most of its objectives because it was an inclusive policy which 
was crafted during the Government of National Unity. During this period, most citizens 
and stakeholders wanted to rebuild the country which had experienced severe 
economic hardships for more than two decades. In support of this, R9 (PTTT 2018) 
said “the Government should try and involve everyone in these polices, for example, 
workers, students, unemployed and even potential investors. So that when the 
policies are implemented, everyone will participate fully in making the policies 
successful”. In the same vein, the FGDPR (2019) explained “the importance of 
inclusion and participation by the grassroots in all the stages of a policy life cycle. This 
will guarantee ownership by stakeholders and they will participate in policy 
implementation”. It is clear that the issues of consultations and involvement play a 
pivotal role in the policy discourse. Without involvement, ownership and willingness by 
the citizens and stakeholders, policies are deemed to fail no matter how good they 
may appear. Economic policy is all about human development; hence it should be 
developed for all, involve all and benefit all. For everyone to have confidence in the 
policy, experts should also be involved to provide objective and technical assistance.  
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4.2.9 Shared Vision, Inclusive Goals and Objectives 
A shared vision is “not imposed by one or a few people as an organisational mandate. 
Rather, it is derived from the members of the organisation, creating common interests 
and a sense of shared purpose for all organisational activities” (Senge 1990). To 
expound on Senge’s notion, Costa and Kallick (1995) said “the future is not a result of 
choice among alternative paths offered by the present, but a place that is created first 
in mind and will, created next in activity”. Senge (1990) suggests that, “leadership for 
creating a shared vision—one that will capture the collective mind and will—begins 
with creative tension”. Senge (1990) describes how creative tension “emerges from 
seeing clearly where we want to be (the vision) and describing truthfully where we are 
now (the current reality)”. The gap between the two generates creative tension (Figure 
4.3). 
Figure 4.3: Creative Tension 
 
Source: (Senge 1990, in Costa and Kallick 1995) 
This tension, according to Senge (1990), “can be resolved in two ways: by raising 
current reality toward the vision or by lowering the vision toward current reality”. It is 
suggested by Senge (1990), that “it is an individual's or organisation's continual 
assessment that provides a mirror for reflection about the relationship between vision 
and reality. Assessment is what drives the feedback spiral and provides the creative 
tension between what is and the best we can imagine”. Senge (1990) further explains 
that “effective leaders know how to cause creative organisational tension and how to 
harness the energy and intellectual stimulation it produces. They create for themselves 
and facilitate for others the process of developing visions of what could be, images of 
desired states, valued aspirations, and scenarios of more appropriate futures”.  
In this context of economic policies there should be a shared vision that incorporate 
the interests of all stakeholders and citizens in the country. The United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA 2009:3) mentions that “social 
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inclusion is understood as a process by which efforts are made to ensure equal 
opportunities for all, regardless of their background, so that they can achieve their full 
potential in life”. Social inclusion, according to UNDESA (2009:3) “is a multi-
dimensional process aimed at creating conditions which enable full and active 
participation of every member of society in all aspects of life, including civic, social, 
economic, and political activities, as well as participation in decision making 
processes. Social inclusion is understood as the process by which societies combat 
poverty and social exclusion”. The UNESCAP (n.d.) indicated that “a society’s well-
being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and 
do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires that all groups, but 
particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their 
wellbeing. Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results 
that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. 
It is very critical for the entire nation to have a common and shared vision”.  
R8 (FGDPR 2019) described the current situation as “lack of clarity and in some 
cases setting up of too ambitious, unrealistic goals and objectives which lead to 
failure by the nation to understand them”. In addition, R4 (PDD 2019) said that “the 
policies should be easily understood by all”. R11 (PTTT 2018) stated that 
“Government should focus more on the economic point of view than the political ”. 
The general populace must understand and articulate the vision, goals and objectives 
of the policy. The citizens and stakeholders can only meaningfully participate in policy 
implementation when they have a clear vision of where the policy wants to take them. 
R8 (FGDPR 2019) indicated that “stakeholder involvement was important to 
empower them to hold accountable those entrusted with realising the policy goals 
or objectives”. 
The researcher appreciated that in the case of the Growth with Equity Policy, 
stakeholders were clear that the vision of the policy was to economically and socially 
empower the indigenous people who had been disadvantaged by the colonisers. The 
policy was clear that education, health and infrastructure were going to be improved. 
This led to everyone having the zeal to participate in various ways in policy 
implementation, including such things as the provision of labour, finding local 
resources required for development, amongst other things. On the other hand, the 
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Framework for Economic Reform was a complicated policy with a lot of economic 
jargon that only a few people in the country could understand. The stakeholders did 
not know how they were expected to positively contribute to the success of the policy. 
The only thing that stakeholders were aware of is the untold socio-economic sufferings 
that they went through during the policy’s era.   
This research found out that when goals and objectives are being developed, there is 
a need for transparency amongst all stakeholders. Everyone needs to know who will 
benefit, how they will benefit and a clear pathway of how these goals and objectives 
will be implemented. During this research, some interviewees registered their 
displeasure with how the Zim-Asset policy was formulated. Zim-Asset (2013:1) states 
that “as the country moves forward, post 31 July 2013 Harmonised Election, there is 
urgent need to put in place an economic blue-print that is guided by ZANU-PF 
Manifesto and the Presidential Vision as encapsulated in His Excellency the 
President’s inauguration speech delivered on 22 August 2013”. Zim-Asset (2013: ix) 
also indicates that “the economic blueprint was developed through a consultat ive 
process involving political leadership in the ruling ZANU-PF party government, private 
sector and other stakeholders”. From these statements it is clear that the policy was 
not inclusive. It was put in place to further the interests of only one political party, 
closing out ideas from other political parties. In this regard, the entire nation did not 
have a common and shared policy vision, goals and objectives. Therefore, the policy 
was disowned by some stakeholders. 
4.2.10 Coordination 
Stoner and Freeman (1992:312) define coordination as “the integration of the activities 
of the separate parts of an organisation to accomplish organisational goals. This 
integration of individual, group, and department efforts makes it easier to achieve 
goals”. It is emphasised by Satyendra (2015:1), that the “coordinating function is the 
orderly arrangement of individual and group efforts to provide unity of action in the 
pursuit of a common goal. In an organisation, all the departments must operate in an 
integrated manner so that the organisational goals are duly achieved. The coordinating 
function involves synchronisation of different efforts of the various departments so that 
the planned objectives are achieved with minimum conflict”. 
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In support of this, R21 (PTTT 2018) indicated that “Government should avoid 
duplication of effort by implementing agencies and ensure firm coordination clarity of 
roles and responsibilities”. A FGDPR (2019) highlighted “the laxity of policy 
coordination by the responsible authorities”. This was cited as a problem contributing 
to underdevelopment in Zimbabwe. The research noted the importance of coordination 
in all the stages of a policy life cycle. R22 (PTTT 2018) emphasised the need for “clear 
institutional arrangements with proper linkages must be prescribed. The vertical and 
horizontal integration approach to development should always be the hallmark to 
developmental policies to foster buy-in and ownership”. 
The Department of Policy Formulation, Analysis and Coordination in its 2017 
Departmental Integrated Performance Agreement highlighted silo mentality in 
government as one of the key challenges affecting policy implementation in 
government. Government ministries and departments were not adequately consulting 
each other on policy matters, leading to policy inconsistencies, overlaps, duplication, 
competition, and disharmony. R7 (PTTT, 2018) exhorted “Government to avoid 
duplication of effort by implementing and ensure firm coordination, clarity of roles 
and responsibilities”.  Consequently, investors and other stakeholders became 
confused. Coordination of policies was poor at all the policy cycle stages, leading to 
resources being wasted, failure to achieve policy objectives and general despondence 
within the citizenry.   
4.2.11 Policy Clarity 
A “clear policy gives us the foundations of our daily activity in a way that is clearly 
understood by everyone in our organisation across the board. As ever clarity is the 
key. With clearly-articulated policy in a clearly organised delivery framework you won’t 
go far wrong. And the benefits could go well beyond keeping the auditors and 
regulators happy” (Walwyn and Cloete 2016). Policy inconsistency was cited by many 
respondents as a major problem in government. Policy inconsistency is very bad to 
the extent that policy announcements by cabinet ministers were sometimes conflicting; 
thereby creating confusion in the country.  
A FGDPR (2019) indicated that “policies were not in harmony and lacked continuity. 
Zimbabwe was experiencing disjointed policy pronouncements”. Kanyenze (2017:11) 
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narrates “an example of policy contradictions emerged when the Minister of Finance 
and Economic Development, Patrick Chinamasa, issued a statement on 24 December 
2015 outlining ‘revisions’ of the indigenisation law’. The minister indicated that a non-
indigenous business could hold the majority shareholding of a business for a period 
ranging up to five years, except for the energy sector which could go up to 20 years”. 
Kanyenze (2017:11) also mentions that “existing foreign companies were allowed to 
operate in all sectors of the economy but had to pay and indigenisation compliance 
levy as trade-off for non-compliance. However, the following day, on 25 December 
2015, the then Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, Patrick 
Zhuwao, rebuffed Chinamasa’s statement and insisted that no changes in the policy 
or law had been endorsed”. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZIs 2015:7) 
also indicated that unclear signalling through sometimes contradictory positions by 
different arms of government were a deterrent to FDI inflows. R24 (PTTT 2018) noted 
that “Government should make policies progressive and building on previous efforts 
rather than coming up with new ones which are sometimes conflicting”. The NBS 
(2003:42) highlighted that “the success of the 2003 budget to address the 
challenges that the country currently faces will depend on us implementing bold and 
painful economic policies timeously and in their entirety. Structures to minimise 
policy reversals, nurture participation of stakeholders and ensure the predictability 
and consistency of policies will be critical. These encompass the management of 
social and economic challenges in the national interest”. 
From “1999 to 2008, the country’s key sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and 
services) shrank significantly as a result of shifting government policies that weakened 
the country’s ability to weather external shocks. This period is known as the ‘lost 
decade’ because of the negative economic results which were brought by knee-jerk 
reactive measures. The country’s economy shrank from an estimated USD9 billion in 
1997 to USD4 billion in 2008” (Sachikonye 2011:85).  In the period from 1999 to 2008, 
Zimbabwe’s GDP declined by 52% (Kanyenze, Chitambara and Tyson 2017:1). The 
declining trend in economic productivity “can be attributed to a combination of 
challenges stemming from unstable and unpredictable policies that had led to high 
and unpredictable inflation, acute shortages of foreign exchange, an overvalued 
exchange rate, persistent fuel shortages, inadequate and costly infrastructure services 
(particularly power and water), inefficient transport, as well as price controls and a 
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shortage of skilled labour associated with brain drain and tough labour regulations” 
(AfDB n.d.:6). According to the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (2015:13), 
“these factors led to deindustrialisation that has reached catastrophic levels with dire 
consequences for the state of the economy”. The economy was increasingly in-
formalised, with informal employment increasing from 80% in 2004 to 84% in 2011 
and 94.55% in 2014. The informal sector suffers from a deficit of decent work, with 
their work being casual, ‘unprotected’, ‘excluded’, ‘unregistered’ or ‘unrepresented’ 
(Kanyenze et al. 2017:9). Due to these economic hardships, ZimStat (2017:19) 
indicated that, “in 2011/12, 72.3% of the population was living in poverty, whilst 22.9% 
were considered to be in the extreme poverty category. Rural individual poverty 
increased from 84.3 percent in 2011/12 to 86.0 percent in 2017”.   
Through observations the researcher noted that government ministries and 
departments were engaged in turf war. The primary focus for senior government 
officials was to be seen by the appointing authority to be doing something, instead of 
working together as one team complementing each other to achieve common 
government goals. If one is seen to be doing more work, then a huge budget will be 
allocated to that particular individual’s ministry or department. In addition, that 
particular individual will secure his/her job.  
Government should adopt an integrated approach and ensure that policies in different 
sectors, their outcomes, supporting institutions and implementation  work towards the 
achievement of a common goal. Government needs to be connected and well 
networked and to approach issues in a ‘whole-of-government’ manner. There exists a 
Department of Policy Formulation, Analysis and Coordination within OPC which is 
mandated to ensure policy consistency. However, government ministries and 
departments deliberately avoid working with it to further their narrow interests. The 
Department lacks the power to enforce ministries and departments to comply with the 
government policy formulation procedures. Inconsistent messaging on the part of the 
Government, especially after years of negative perceptions and press and denigration 
of the country, has been costly to government. 
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4.2.12 Corruption 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF 1998:8) defines corruption as “the abuse of 
public power for private benefit. In several cases of corruption, the abuse of public 
power is not necessarily for one’s private benefit but it can be for the benefit of one’s 
party, class, tribe, friends, family, and so on”. Corruption, according to Vyas-
Doorgapersad (2007:286), “symbolises any conduct or behaviour in relation to a 
person entrusted with responsibilities in public office which violates their duties as 
public officials and which is aimed at obtaining undue gratification of any kind for 
themselves or for others”. 
A “common view of corruption is that it is an abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
It is wrongdoing on the part of an authority through means that are illegitimate, immoral 
or incompatible with ethical standards; and it hurts everyone who depends on the 
integrity of people in positions of authority. Corruption in Zimbabwe comes in different 
shapes, forms and sizes” (Chimbganda 2013:1). At the highest level there is political 
corruption, that according to Nwogu (2015:136) “is the use of powers by government 
officials for illegitimate private gain”, hence jeopardy good governance. Corruption 
thrives in murky systems. Officials manipulate the system for self-gain.  The PTTT 
(2018) collectively agreed that “corruption was a scourge stifling government 
programmes and projects”. In the same vein, the PPD (2019) also bemoaned “the 
presence of corruption in public offices and political parties”. An even more serious 
form of political corruption is ‘patronage’, which refers to favouring political supporters 
as opposed to the inclusion of members of the opposition”. Chimbganda (2013:3) 
added that where patronage occurs, “the ruling party appoints top officials to its 
administration, such as permanent and deputy secretaries, mayors, judges, university 
vice chancellors, directors and so on from its own supporters. Quite often, the officials 
are selected not on merit but for their loyalty and as a way of rewarding them for 
supporting the regime”.  
As of January 2017, Zimbabwe was ranked the 12th most corrupt in the world and 11th 
in Africa by Transparency International. This demonstrated how deeply ingrained 
corruption has become in the public institutions. The Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern 
Africa (2012:1) posits that “Zimbabwe’s post-independence era is characterised by a 
political leadership that has consistently failed to provide the best examples for 
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accountability, transparency and integrity. The leadership itself, has since the 1980s, 
engaged in acts of corruption and also condoned such acts on the part of their 
associates, relatives and friends. This has frustrated efforts towards building a 
corruption-free Zimbabwe”. Yamamoto (2016:2) also concurs that “almost every 
corruption scandal in Zimbabwe invariably involves a major politician, and the 
politicians protect their fronts from persecution. No politician associated with any of 
the major corruption scandals has ever been prosecuted”.   
The general public view is that there is no political will to fight corruption. R 23 (PTTT 
2018) implored government “to reduce corruption for policies to achieve their goals 
and objectives”. Corruption has eroded citizens, investors and stakeholders’ 
confidence in public institutions’ ability to implement policies, projects and 
programmes. In his 2017 inauguration speech, the new President Dr E.D. Mnangagwa 
admitted the existence of grand corruption in government. He said “as we focus on 
recovering our economy, we must shed misbehaviours and acts of indiscipline which 
have characterised the past. Acts of corruption must stop forthwith. Where these occur 
swift justice must be served to show each and all that crime and other acts of economic 
sabotage can only guarantee ruin to perpetrators. We have to aspire to be a clean 
nation, one sworn to high moral standards and deserved rewards” (The Chronicle 25 
November 2017). If transparency, accountability, democracy, and rule of law are 
addressed, it will be very difficult for anyone to practice corruption since everything will 
be open for scrutiny. In this regard, proper systems need to be established which are 
clear and able to deliver the results. The implementation systems and structures must 
be watertight to prevent any form of corruption. 
4.2.13 Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions are defined as “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial 
relations for foreign- and security-policy purposes. Sanctions may be comprehensive, 
prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country, like the long-
standing U.S. embargo of Cuba, or they may be targeted, blocking transactions by 
and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals” (Masters 2019:1). The World 
Trade Organisation (WTO 2018:4) states that “sanctions cover trade-restricting 
policies between sovereign nations, including so-called ‘boycotts’ and ‘embargoes’. 
Boycotts are generally associated with the refusal to purchase goods and services 
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from a supplier, and embargoes imply that no goods and services will be supplied to 
the buyer”. The “scope of sanctions naturally varies with each case and can include a 
policy to completely isolate a country and break off economic and trade relations and 
which is perhaps the most difficult to accomplish. Rare are the cases where a full 
embargo was imposed with the purpose of cutting off all economic and trade relations 
with a specific country” (WTO 2018:4).  
The Government of Zimbabwe and ruling party argue that “Zimbabwe has been under 
economic sanctions for more than a decade imposed by the European Union (EU), 
the United States of America (USA) and Australia, accusing the government of human 
rights violations. However, the EU and USA consider the sanctions as targeted 
restrictive measures on Zimbabwe’s leadership and officials who support its rule” 
(Hove 2012:72). It was mentioned by Raftopoulos (2014:1) that “in the early 2000s a 
series of ‘targeted measures’ were introduced by the EU, US, and later Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada, against the movement and assets of particular individuals in the 
Mugabe regime. The measures were introduced as a response to serious electoral 
irregularities and human rights abuses in the Parliamentary and Presidential elections 
in 2000 and 2002 respectively”. Raftopoulos (2014:1) further adds that “for the 
opposition MDC, the civic movement and Western countries these measures were a 
just response to the repressive and authoritarian politics of the Mugabe regime and 
the violence and irregularities that marred most of the plebiscites in the decade of the 
2000s. During this period, the measures played an important role in keeping a focus 
on the abuses of the Mugabe state, and provided some measure of accountability for 
the gross violations of human rights carried out by the state in this period”.  
The European Union (EU) (2019) explained that “the measures adopted by the EU, 
as a result of the breakdown of the rule of law and human rights abuses, are the 
freezing of personal assets of senior members of government and other high-ranking 
officials, the prevention of the same to travel to EU Member States and the embargo 
on the sale of arms. None of these measures could affect or cause any hardship to 
the Zimbabwean population”. Furthermore, the EU (2019) shared the opinion 
expressed by a number of international organisations whereby “the main cause of the 
serious social and economic crisis which Zimbabwe is experiencing should be sought 
in inappropriate economic policies, the manner in which the land reform has been 
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carried out, the drought and the HIV/AIDS pandemic”. ZIMCORD (1981:1) explained 
that “it was recognised that at the time of the Lancaster House talks that land was and 
would remain at the heart of Zimbabwe’s political future and that the cost of its reform 
and development, pivotal elements in the strategy to attain an egalitarian society, 
would be far beyond the new nation’s means”.  
Almost two decades after the Lancaster house agreement, the process was at a snail’s 
pace and this brought frustrations to the Zimbabwean government which then decided 
to embark on land grab as it was also fast losing popularity due to the advent of a new 
political party, the MDC. Admittedly, the process seriously disrupted agricultural 
productivity as well as the economy which is agriculture based. It is a fact that the land 
reform programme greatly contributed to the demise of the economy due to the 
manner in which it was implemented. However, a giant step was achieved to have 
land owned by the indigenous people, albeit with multiple farm ownership by senior 
government and ruling party officials. Regrettably, some lives were lost in the process 
and abuse of human and property rights were also reported, which then attracted 
sanctions on senior government officials and selected companies. Raftopoulos 
(2014:1) asserts that “it was also clear that these sanctions interventions were a 
response to the state-led land acquisition process that unfolded for much of the 2000s, 
which radically transformed the property ownership structure on the land in favour of 
small scale farming”. Moving forward, it is critical for government to urgently 
compensate the former commercial farmers for the developments which were done 
on the farms, compensating them for all the private property lost. Importantly also, is 
to achieve an equitable allocation of the land amongst the Zimbabwean citizens 
balancing this with their capability to utilise it for maximum production, to ensure food 
security and revive the economy. However, there is room to reach a consensus 
between government and the affected parties and rectify this anomaly.  
The “suspension or re-orientation of certain financial and development cooperation 
programmes with the Government of Zimbabwe is mainly due to the fact that it has not 
complied with the provisions of the pertinent bilateral agreements, huge debt overhang 
with multinational institutions such as IMF and WB and to the political and economic 
environment which is not conducive to development cooperation with government 
structures (European External Action Service (EEAS n.d.: 1). The EU remains 
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committed to engaging the Government of Zimbabwe in a comprehensive dialogue on 
the present difficulties being experienced in the country with the aim of restoring 
political, social and economic stability” (EEAS n.d.:1). The USA Ambassador to 
Zimbabwe Brian A. Nichols, (2019:1) said “there are only 141 Zimbabwean people 
and companies on the U.S. sanctions’ list.  That’s right, just 141, in a country of 16 
million.  They are on the list for good reason.  These are people who have engaged in 
corruption, committed human rights abuses, and undermined Zimbabwe’s democratic 
process”.  Blaming “sanctions is a convenient scapegoat to distract the public from the 
real reasons behind Zimbabwe’s economic challenges–corruption, economic 
mismanagement, and failure to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law” 
(Nichols 2019:1). There is no U.S. trade embargo on Zimbabwe.  American companies 
are interested in investing in Zimbabwe but are deterred by the massive levels of 
corruption, economic uncertainty, and weak rule of law.  So, investors turn to other 
promising opportunities in the region and wait for the country to embrace the political 
and economic reforms that would make it a more attractive destination (Nichols 
2019:1).   
On the other hand, Chingono (2009:1) states that “the Zimbabwean government 
perceives the use of economic sanctions as an illegal tool meant to destabilise the 
internal political affairs of the country (particularly the land reform exercise) and a 
serious contravention of the principle of non-interference in political internal matters 
as they have caused a challenge on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty”. To reaffirm this mantra 
Raftopoulos (2014:2) highlighted that “for ZANU-PF the measures were not targeted 
but amounted to a broader regime of sanctions that affected not only particular 
individuals in the ruling party but the economy and the Zimbabwean populace more 
generally”. This “argument was based on the fact that these punitive measures from 
the West not only restricted the supply of military equipment to the Mugabe 
government but, aside from the provision of humanitarian assistance, prevented any 
substantive new investments from entering the country” (Raftopoulos 2014:2). 
Moreover, “as the terms of the US Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act 2001 set 
out, the US opposed any new loan, credit facilities or debt reduction initiatives being 
carried out by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). These measures effectively 
added to the investment pressures that had built up in Zimbabwe since the 
177 
Zimbabwean Government’s fall out with the IFIs in the late 1990’s” (Raftopoulos 
2014:2).  
The sanctioners and the sanctionees do not agree on the nature and objectives of the 
sanctions. As “such, these dissimilar views on expressions have further exacerbated 
the rift between these two parties rendering the prospects for a quick resolution murky” 
(Chingono 2009:067). In 2019, the then Reserve Bank Governor, Dr Gideon Gono 
regrettably indicated that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe led to the drying up of 
project finance and balance of payments support” (Hove 2012:75). Dr Gono (Hove 
2012:75) also indicated that, “sanctions had far reaching effects on the majority of the 
people and t this was noticeable through the following economic challenges: denial of 
medication to the unborn child; poor rural folks not able to grind their maize; school 
children not able to go to school; transport system grinding to a halt; workers walking 
to work because of fuel shortages; and blackouts due to electricity outages among 
many other ailments induced by sanctions”. However, the former minister of Finance, 
Mr Biti argued that Zimbabwe was not able to access funds from the international 
community because the country owed the lenders huge amounts of money. In support 
of this notion, the 2003 NBS (2002:15) stated that “the accumulation of arrears hinders 
our ability to fully participate in international financial system and imposes huge foreign 
currency cost to the economy. I, therefore, remain determined to initiate a credible 
programme to reduce these arrears. This will restore much needed credibility in 
international financial markets and relations with co-operating partners”.  
The main reason why Zimbabwe cannot access international funds is due to a huge 
debt overhang, which has largely affected the country’s credit ratings. Moreover, 
Zimbabwe’s financial institutions are regarded as weak, thus prone to money 
laundering. In addition, IFIs want government to put in place tight systems to curb 
financial abuse and corruption by government. It is also important to note that 
individuals on the targeted list had their off-shore bank accounts and assets frozen. 
So the lifting of sanctions will make it possible to access their ill-gotten funds. Grebe 
(2014:13) states that “a substantial amount of assets were withdrawn from Europe.” 
According to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC News 2002), “there are still a 
number of reports on successfully frozen bank accounts and assets. In 2002 two bank 
accounts with a combined value of 76,000 GBP were frozen” (BBC News 2002). Two 
years later, 29 bank accounts were frozen with assets of more than 513,000 GBP (The 
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Zimbabwe Independent 2004). The financial sanctions had an impact on individuals 
on the targeted list; hence the hullaballoo for sanctions to be lifted for individual 
benefits. 
Grebe (2010:3) argues that “sanctions to a larger extent are not effective”.  Grebe 
(2010:3) further indicates that “since the advent of sanctions, Zimbabwe has been 
marked by a decline in democracy, massive human rights abuses, economic meltdown 
and the presence of a military complex in the political state capture”. In fact, sanctions 
have been used by government and the ruling party as a scapegoat for all its failures, 
turning a blind eye to the major causes of economic woes such as corruption, 
unrealistic policies, fiscal indiscipline, lack of transparency and accountability by 
government institutions, amongst others. In March 2017, a war veteran and former 
cabinet minister Mr Christopher Mutsvangwa (former cabinet minister), lamented that 
“President Robert Mugabe's government had failed to push Zimbabwe's economic 
agenda forward and now hides behind western sanctions…[.] there were people who 
had the ability to move the country forward despite the targeted sanctions” (Pindula 
News 24 March 2017).  
Therefore, the researcher argues that to a larger extent, the economy of Zimbabwe 
has collapsed due to government’s poor governance, corruption and 
maladministration. The PDD (2019) also collectively expressed “the desire for illegal 
or legal economic sanctions to be unconditionally removed as they were hurting the 
entire nation. A call was made for all Zimbabweans to speak with one voice and 
engage the western countries to remove sanctions. As such, it is imperative for 
western countries’ governments to reach consensus and address the issues that are 
attracting sanctions”. Through interviews the researcher understood that economic 
sanctions were conditional. Some respondents exhorted the government of Zimbabwe 
to comply with international best practices on governance and the respect of human 
rights. As such, research respondents implored government to urgently: maintain the 
separation of powers between a party state and government; implement impartial 
enforcement of the law; take appropriate action against human rights violations; 
develop a culture of repaying debts; uphold the rule of law and respect of property 
rights; and strengthen the capacity of Accountability Bodies and Independent 
Commissions. If these issues are implemented, then the government can engage the 
countries that imposed the sanctions to review them.  
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4.3 Summary 
There are some shortcomings in the execution of the three roles of government: 
political, administrative and economic. In spite of legal, constitutional and legislative 
provisions on Public Finance Management and the Office of the Auditor General’s role 
in reinforcing transparency and accountability in the management of public funds, 
economic and political governance have remained challenges for Zimbabwe, leading 
to numerous problems. The study unearthed that for a policy to achieve its intended 
goals and objectives, there must be wide consultation. The policy must be inclusive 
right down to the grassroots level. Everyone within the country must have the same 
policy vision, understand it, own it and have the zeal to contribute to its implementation.  
All the policy stages must be transparent. Those with direct and indirect tasks must be 
accountable for their obligations. The institutions must be responsive to the nation’s 
demands and be open for criticism. Policies in Zimbabwe must have legal frameworks 
to enforce their implementation. This will create trust and confidence in public 
institutions and the entire policy system/environment in the country. Politics should 
always be separated from government businesses. The executive, judiciary and 
legislature must always play their roles independently without influence from other 
arms of government or politicians. With transparent systems in place, corruption will 
not thrive. However, all these determinants require strong political will to entrench a 
culture that delivers on results. This has to be the way of life for government, the 
private sector, civic societies and the general citizens.  With these critical success 
factors implanted, any government policy, programme or project is guaranteed to 
achieve the intended objectives.  Failure by the state to address the above 
determinants have led to corruption, mismanagement, disruptive conflict, inequality, 
economic decline, and political and social crisis. In this regard, deeply-seated 
structural changes need earnest attention. The chapter aimed to achieve the research 
objective “to explain the determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe” (see Chapter 
One, section 1.4). The next chapter offers an analytical framework on the determinants 




ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ON THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC 
POLICIES IN ZIMBABWE 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four articulated the determinants of economic policies on socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe, these being: good governance and democracy; conflation 
of party and government; politicisation of civil service and patronage; clear separation 
of powers; accountability; transparency; fiscal discipline; political stability; responsive 
public institutions; political will; broad consultation and involvement; shared vision, 
inclusive goals and objectives; coordination; policy clarity; corruption and economic 
sanctions. This chapter now seeks to present an analytical framework of these 
determinants in line with the research objectives  “to explain the Specific, Measurable, 
Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time Framed (SMART) policy objectives to improve 
economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe; to discuss adequate 
resources that are availed to support implementation/action plans to improve 
economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe; mechanisms that 
are available to monitor, evaluate and supervise implementation of economic policies 
in Zimbabwe; and political will that is available to support implementation of economic 
policies in Zimbabwe” (see Chapter One, Section 1.4).  
Zimbabwe has launched a mountain of economic policies since independence. 
However, this study only focused on four economic policies which were introduced at 
the beginning of each decade due to limited resources. The policies are: Growth with 
Equity Policy (1981); A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95); Zimbabwe 
Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme - MERP (2001-2002); and Five Year 
Medium-Term Plan (2011-2015). Findings on the research objectives were obtained 
through data triangulation where both primary and secondary data collection methods 
were employed. Document review was the main source of secondary data. These 
documents included publications from authors who studied similar thematic areas, 
publications from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Auditor General’s reports, 
Zimbabwe Statistical Agency and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
Also included are national economic policies, national budget statements, national 
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budget estimates, and the monetary and fiscal policies covering the duration under 
study.  
5.2 Policies’ compliance WITH SMART principles 
This section explains the specific and general analysis of the policies’ compliance with 
SMART principles. 
5.2.1 Specific Analysis of Policies’ Compliance with SMART principles 
Sapru (2012:14) points out that the development of the policy approach rests on the 
idea that government could, by making good policies, solve the problems of society. 
A good policy should have a clearly defined vision, goal and objectives, among other 
tenets. The University Centre Quayside (2018:3) acknowledges that “both Peter 
Drucker (1955) and Doran (1991) have been credited with developing the SMART 
model, although it is difficult to be certain whether either of these two were really the 
first people to use the term ‘SMART’ with reference to objectives” (Chartered 
Management Institute 2014:1). The “SMART acronym is a tool designed to help 
organisations and individuals set goals and objectives in an effective and productive 
manner,” thereby creating a good policy. SMART “goal setting brings structure and 
trackability” (Marquette University 2020:1) into policy’s goals and objectives. Instead 
of vague resolutions, “SMART goal setting creates verifiable trajectories towards a 
certain objective, with clear milestones and an estimation of the goal's attainability” 
(Marquette University 2020:1).  
SMART is an acronym standing for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and 
Time bound.  The following section analyses each policy’s compliance with every 
SMART principle.  
University Centre Quayside (2018:4) elucidates that “a specific goal/objective should 
describe the result that is desired in a way that is detailed, focused and well defined. 
It should be clear and unambiguous. To be specific, a goal/objective should have a 
description of a precise or specific behaviour, achievement or outcome which is, or 
can be, related to a percentage, frequency, rate or number”. When writing 
goal/objectives, the author is encouraged to use action-orientated verbs which 
describe what needs to be done to achieve the goal/objectives. For example, proper 
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words to use are analyse, apply, change, create, determine, identify, instigate, perform 
and differentiate, amongst others (University Centre Quayside 2018:4). The following 
policies are analysed under this section. 
5.2.1.1 Growth with Equity Policy (1981) 
The policy did not have both a vision and a goal. The policy had fourteen primary 
objectives each of which started with an actionable word which is commendable. The 
objectives also attempted to describe the desired outcomes but fell short on the 
inclusion of percentages, frequencies, rate or numbers. Regrettably, most of the 
objectives combined more than one idea making them too long, losing focus and 
becoming vague in the process. For example, the objective (number x) states “to 
provide, improve and extend rural economic and social services (including housing, 
health and education) to lower income groups in the urban and rural areas; and 
consider possible schemes for social security services where they do not exist, bearing 
in mind the overall responsibility of the state for the welfare and well-being of its 
citizens” (Growth with Equity Policy (GWEP) 1981:2).  
Furthermore, it was noted that some of the objectives overlap; for instance, objective 
(x) stated above and objective (viii), which states “to provide, improve, and extend the 
rural economic infrastructure so as to serve adequately the Zimbabwean urban and 
rural economy” (GWEP 1981:2). The two objectives basically attempt to achieve the 
same outcome. Objective (viii) merely facilitates the attainment of objective (x). This 
explains why too many primary objectives were developed in this policy. The primary 
objective should be one comprehensive statement succinctly outlining the broad 
objective of the policy. The researcher can conclude that the primary objectives were 
ambiguous, given the University Centre Quayside (2018:4)’s explanations of a good 
objective that meets the ‘specific’ principle criterion. 
The policy had sector specific objectives. After outlining the 14 primary objectives, the 
policy moved on to explain the various sectors the policy focused on. The sectors 
covered include agricultural and rural development; manufacturing; mining; energy; 
transport and communication; water; manpower, labour and employment; incomes 
policy; social infrastructure; science and technology; monetary, financial and fiscal 
policies; investment; institutional development; and regional and international 
cooperation (GWEP 1981:3-18). However, the specific objectives given for the sectors 
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did not describe the outcomes in quantifiable terms. Most of them were too long and 
vaguely stated. For example, under the health sector, paragraph 88 states that (GWEP 
1981:12): “in order to increase access to health services in rural areas, health clinics 
will be built at village level, manned by suitably trained primary health care workers, 
and backed up by rural health centres and hospitals, from district to provincial level. 
This objective and strategy in the provision of health care services will obviously 
require a considerable extension of training facilities for workers from the village health 
worker up to the fully trained nurse and midwife, including advisers in health education 
and nutrition”.  
5.2.1.2 A Framework for Economic Reform/ESAP (1991-95) 
The policy did not have both a vision and a goal.  The broad objective of the Policy 
was stated in paragraph 13. A Framework for Economic Reform (ESAP 1991:3) 
outlines that “the fundamental objective of economic reform in Zimbabwe is to improve 
living conditions, especially for the poorest groups. This means increasing real 
incomes and lowering unemployment, by generating sustained higher economic 
growth. In order to achieve this primary objective, the economy needs to be 
transformed to make it more competitive and productive”. This transformation, 
according to the ESAP (1991:3) entails “moving away from a highly regulated 
economy to one where market forces are allowed to play a more decisive role, while 
concurrently taking steps to alleviate any transitional social hardships which may arise 
from this transition.” This broad objective described the desired result in a detailed 
manner. It focused on transforming the economy to make it competitive and highly 
productive by moving away from a highly regulated economy. To a large extent, this 
broad objective meets the ‘specific’ principle of the SMART concept as given by the 
University Centre of Quayside (2018:4).  
Paragraph 14 narrates the specific objective of the policy. The ESAP (1991:3) informs 
that “the Government has adopted an economic growth target of 5% per year by 1995. 
To achieve this overall growth target in a sustainable way, industrial growth will have 
to be about 5.8% per year, agricultural growth about 3.2% per year, and service sector 
growth about 5% per annum. Investment will need to rise to 25% of GDP, and exports 
and imports will both need to also increase as a share of GDP”. This specific objective 
did capture the desired results from various sectors in a quantifiable manner. However, 
184 
the sectors were all lumped together in one paragraph making it difficult to clearly 
demarcate one from the other. The objectives lack actionable words which give 
direction on how each objective is intended to be executed.   
5.2.1.3 Zimbabwe Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme- MERP (2001-
2002) 
The vision of the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) is “to mobilise 
all national stakeholders under the leadership of the Government to implement a 
package of macro-economic stabilisation policy measures. Government, Business, 
Labour and Civil Society must, therefore, build a common vision and accept respective 
responsibilities towards restoring the vibrancy of the economy. Further, Government 
will seek support from international co-operating partners during implementation of this 
programme” (MERP 2000:5). The primary objective of this programme is to build 
confidence in our economy and restore vibrant economic growth by removing the 
fundamental causes of inflation, which is a cause of macro-economic instability (MERP 
2000:5). 
The specific objectives of MERP (2000:40) were to “build confidence in the economy; 
consolidate the fiscus; accelerate and complete public enterprise reform; reduce 
inflation and interest rates; stabilise the value of the Zimbabwean dollar and resolve 
the foreign currency crisis; engage the support of the international community; 
strengthen monitoring of the financial sector; stimulate growth of productive sectors; 
and economic empowerment and poverty reduction”. The vision/ goal/objectives did 
not have a description of a precise achievement or outcome which is, or can be, related 
to a percentage, frequency, rate or number. The objectives were lacking clear 
priorities, sequencing and binding targets. 
5.2.1.4 Five Year Medium-Term Plan (2011- 2015) 
The vision of the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) was, “enhancing a democratic 
developmental state anchored by a growing and transforming, socially just economy” 
(MTP 2011). This vision is difficult for an ordinary person to understand. The policy’s 
overall goal was “‘to transform the economy, reduce poverty, create jobs, maintain 
macro-economic stability and restore the economy’ capacity to produce goods and 
services competitively, building upon the gains achieved since the launch of STERP 
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in March 2009” (MTP 2011).  The policy presented objectives under various sectors. 
The sectors covered by the policy were (Medium-Term Plan 2011:22-229): economic 
policy framework; key economic enablers (energy, transport & communication, water 
& sanitation, local government; housing & construction; information, communication & 
technology; media, information & publicity; science, technology and innovation); 
investment promotion, coordination & regulation; private sector development; 
employment creation and poverty eradication; agriculture; manufacturing; mining; 
tourism; financial services; small and medium enterprises; environment and natural 
resources; public service; health; education; sport, arts and culture; population and 
development; social protection; persons living with disabilities; gender and 
development; youth development; governance and rights; and diaspora and economic 
development.  
Each sector had its own objectives supported by policy targets. For example, under 
macro-economic policy framework, paragraph 3.4 states that “the economic objectives 
will be to ensure economic recovery, growth and transformation to promote 
sustainable economic growth and development; poverty eradication; employment 
creation; price stability; and sustainable Balance of Payment position” (MTP 2011). 
Paragraph 3.5 outlines macro-economic policy targets. It is stated that the macro-
economic targets will achieve the following: “an average growth rate of 7.1% during 
the Plan period; single digit annual inflation; interest rate regime that promotes savings 
and fosters investment; current account deficit of not more that 5% of GDP by 2015; 
average employment creation rate of 6% per annum; sustained poverty reduction in 
line with MDGs targets; foreign Exchange Reserves of at least three months import 
cover by 2015; double digit savings and investment ratios of around 20% of GDP by 
2015; Budget Deficit to converge to SADC benchmark of less than 5% of GDP by 
2015; and reduce sovereign debt to at least 60% of GDP by 2015” (MTP 2011).  
The objectives were too short and did not have actionable words to guide 
implementing agencies on courses of action to be followed, in line with the University  
Central Quayside (2018:4) which specifies that “when writing goal/objectives, the 
author is encouraged to use action-orientated verbs which describe what needs to be 
done to achieve the goal/objectives”. The objectives described the desired outcomes 
but fell short on the inclusion of percentages, rates or numbers to make them 
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quantifiable. However, this shortcoming was addressed by the subsequent section on 
policy targets which gave desired results in figures. For example, objective (i) 
‘sustainable economic growth and development’ will be read together with policy target 
(i) ‘an average growth rate of 7.1% during the Plan Period.’ This improves the 
specificity of the objectives.               
5.2.2 General Analysis of Policies’ Compliance to SMART Principles 
This section discusses a general analysis of the policies’ compliance to SMART 
(specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely) principles.   
5.2.2.1 Policies’ compliance with ‘specific’ principles 
In Chapter Two, Sapru (2012:14) was quoted affirming that the first step in policy 
making is “to identify whether and why there is a problem at all. Defining the problem 
involves moving from mundane descriptions to a more abstract, conceptual plane. 
Problem recognition itself requires that a social problem has been defined as such and 
that the necessity of state intervention has been expressed. The analysis should be 
brought out in such a way that the essential points can be easily grasped and 
communicated”. Sapru (2012:15) further pronounces that the development of the 
policy approach rests on the idea that government could, by making good policies, 
solve problems of the society; hence, the need for developing clear specific visions, 
goals and objectives. The study observed that generally the policies under study did 
not have visions and goals, and where they existed, they were vague. The policies’ 
objectives did not adequately meet the ‘specific’ principle as outlined by the University 
Central Quayside (2018:4). Most of them did not include an actionable word which is 
important to give guidance to the implementing agencies on the course of action to be 
taken to execute the objective. The majority of the objectives did not clearly describe 
the desired outcome with the support of numerical figures. This again creates 
problems for the implementing agencies as it would be difficult to know if they have 
adequately executed the objective. In some cases, the broad and specific objectives 
were being interchanged. This attests that policy writers were not clear on the 
differences between these two words.  
It is therefore against this background why in Chapter Four, some of the determinants 
of economic policies on socio-economic development were identified as policy clarity; 
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and shared vision, inclusive goals and objectives. According to Peter Senge (1990), 
“a shared vision is what members want to create or accomplish as part of the 
organisation”. Now, if the policy is silent or has a vague vision how will the stakeholders 
know what they are expected to create or accomplish? The same applies with goals 
and objectives; they should be clearly stated in a simplified manner and understood 
by all concerned parties. This can be addressed by conducting broad consultations 
regarding inclusive and participatory tenets of good governance and democracy.  
It is therefore recommended that the policy formulation process needs to be 
professionalised to get clear policies to. ‘get it right the first time’. Currently, the 
formulation of economic policies is being done by a Department of Macro-economic 
Planning within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The 
Department only has twelve officers; thus it is under capacitated to execute this 
mammoth task. The Department of Policy formulation, Analysis and Coordination in 
the Office of the President and Cabinet must also be given legal powers to adequately 
supervise all stakeholders to genuinely contribute in the policy making cycle and 
ensure that the policy is clear to all. 
5.2.2.2 Policies’ compliance with ‘measurable’ principle 
The Chartered Management Institute (2011) illustrates that measurement is significant 
“to know that the objective has been achieved because evidence is available, derived 
from a system, method or procedure which has tracked and recorded the behaviour 
or action upon which the objective is focused”. In support of the above, the Corporate 
Finance Institute explains that a “SMART goal/objective must have criteria for 
measuring progress..[.]. ask yourself: how do I know if I have reached my goal?” 
(Corporate Finance Institute 2020:1). The following analysis is derived for selected 
policies: 
 Growth with Equity Policy (1981) 
The Growth with Equity Policy (GWEP 1981:2) gave an outline of 14 primary 
objectives.  The specific objectives were stated under each sector. However, both 
the primary and specific objectives lacked the measurability component. For 
example, primary objective (i) states that “to establish progressively a society 
founded on socialist, democratic and egalitarian principles which are inherent in 
188 
the policies and measures enunciated herein.” It is not clear how this objective is 
going to be measured to assess if it has achieved the intended results. 
Furthermore, specific objective (i) under the agricultural and rural development 
sector indicates “an acceptable and fair distribution of land ownership and use” 
(GWEP 1981:4). Measurability of this objective is subjective and can be 
manipulated by various interest groups.  
 A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95) 
The objectives were stated in a measurable manner. For example, one of the 
policy objectives was “an economic growth target of 5% per year by 1995” (ESAP 
1991). Such an objective can be scientifically measured to assess the progress of 
its execution. 
 Zimbabwe Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme-MERP (2001-2002) 
The objectives did not adequately inculcate the measurability aspect, and the 
desired target; for instance, objective (i) build confidence in the economy, and (vi) 
engage the support of the international community (MERP 2001). It may be difficult 
to hold implementing agencies accountable with such objectives. In this case, a 
minor positive change may be regarded as an achievement yet it does not warrant 
being the ultimate desired result. 
 Five Year Medium-Term Plan (2011- 2015) 
The objectives alone were not measurable. However, the Medium-Term Plan 
(MTP) had a follow-up section on targets under the objectives. The targets outlined 
measurability aspects of the objectives. For example, under the energy sector, the 
MTP (2011:50) states the objective as “to restore and increase power generation 
capacity to meet national demand for the attainment of economic recovery and 
growth and for export in the region”. One policy target was “restoration of 
generation capacity at Hwange to installed capacity by 2012” (MTP 2011).  In this 
regard, the policy objectives and targets complement each other to have 
‘measurable’ objectives. As such it is possible for implementing and supervising 
agencies to measure progress and check if they are still on track to reach the goal. 
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Measurability of results is the only aspect that determines if a policy is successful or 
not. As such it is a very important component of a policy that should not be overlooked 
when a policy is being formulated. Three of the four policies under study satisfy the 
measurability attribute. A measurable policy brings policy clarity to the implementing 
agencies, thereby making it easy for some of the determinants of policies outlined in 
Chapter Four to be realised. These are policy clarity, transparency, coordination and 
accountability. 
5.2.2.3 Policies’ compliance with ‘achievable (or agreed)’ principle 
In Chapter Two, Lindblom (1979:31) states that studies have “made a strong case 
against the rational model of decision making.  Which policy option will be finally 
adopted depends on a number of factors; two of them being: first, the feasible set of 
options is reduced by basic substantial parameters”. Some policies, according to 
Lindblom (1979:31), “are excluded because of scarcity of resources and not only in 
terms of economic resources, but also political support presents a critical resource in 
the policy making process.  Second, the allocation of competencies between different 
actors (e.g. government) plays a crucial role in decision-making”. 
In this study it has been observed that all the four policies under study did not have 
adequate funding from the national budgets. As such they depended on the possibility 
of receiving external funding to implement policy goals and objectives. It appears 
policies were not drawing lessons from the past where inadequate external funding 
was also being received to support policies.  The government did not have adequate 
budgets to support the implementation of policies, which made it difficult for policies ’ 
objectives to be realised. It is recommended that government prioritise its projects and 
programmes and implement what is feasible given the available resources and 
manpower.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of National Critical Skills Audit Results 
No. Sector Availability Surplus/deficit 
1. Engineering and technology 6.43% -93.57% 
2. Natural and applied sciences  3.09% -96.91% 
3. Business and commerce 121% 21% 
4. Agriculture 12% -88% 
5. Medical and health sciences 5% -95% 
6 Applied arts and humanities 82% -18% 
Source: (National Critical Skills Audit Report 2018:vi) 
This National Critical Skills Audit Report (2018: vii) indicates that the skills analysis as 
shown in the table 5.1 revealed that except for the Business and Commerce skills 
cluster, which has a surplus of 21%, all the other skills clusters have skills deficits. Of 
those with a deficit of critical skills only the Applied Arts and Humanities had a modest 
deficit (18%), with the rest having critical shortages above 90%. The Engineering and 
Technology skills cluster showed a skills deficit of 93.57%. The Natural and Applied 
Sciences skills cluster showed a skills output deficit of 96.91%. As mentioned before, 
the Business and Commerce skills cluster showed a skills output surplus of 21%. The 
Agriculture skills cluster showed a skills deficit of 88%. With agriculture contributing 
68% of employment in Zimbabwe, this shows the majority of them are not formally 
skilled. The Medical and Health Sciences skills cluster showed a skills deficit of 95%. 
The Applied Arts and Humanities skills cluster showed a skills output deficit -18%. The 
NBS (2009:20) acknowledges that a “massive brain drain has resulted in more than 4 
million Zimbabweans now residing in the diaspora”. This was described as a structural 
development trap. Given such critical skills deficits in the country it is difficult for a 
policy to be effectively executed. 
In Chapter Four it was noted that for policies to attain the desired results, there is a 
need to put the right human capital and systems in place. In congruence with this, it 
was highlighted that government should employ people based on merit to ensure 
that knowledgeable people occupy the right positions to implement policies. The 
researcher also observed that in most cases the policy goals and objectives are over-
ambitious given fiscal constraints and critical skills shortages necessary to execute 
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policies. Given this scenario, it implies that the achievability of policies at formulation 
stage is doubtful, thus demoralising implementing agencies. The requisite skilled 
manpower and adequate financial resources are important to convert any policy into 
action. The study recommends that policy drafters always conduct cost-benefit-
analysis procedures before policies are launched. It is also imperative for 
government to mobilise adequate human and capital resources first before a policy 
is launched. The alignment of resources with the policy is crucial for effective 
implementation, motivation, accountability and transparency to be realised. 
5.2.2.4 Policies’ compliance with ‘realistic’ principle 
University Centre Quayside (2018:4) articulates that “the concepts of ‘realistic’ and 
‘achievable’ are similar and this may explain why some use the term ‘relevant’ as an 
alternative. ‘Realistic’ suggests that there is a clear understanding of how the 
goal/objective might be reached; that there are no circumstances or factors which 
would make the achievement of the goal/objective impossible or unlikely; and that any 
potential obstacles and constraints have been taken into account”. ‘Relevant’ suggests 
that the goals/objectives set are appropriate to the individual or team and their job role 
and function, or at organisational level, they align with the overall purpose and strategy 
of the organisation (University Centre Quayside 2018:4). The following analysis is 
revealed for the identified policies:   
 Growth with Equity Policy (1981) 
The assessment, by the Government of Zimbabwe, of the resource requirements for 
post-war recovery and land settlement and rural/agricultural development and 
technical assistance was indeed foreseen at the Lancaster House Conference, as 
enormous and well beyond the capacity of Zimbabwe or a single donor. Thus, 
government did not have adequate local resources in the form of financial and skilled 
human capital in the early years of independence. The Zimbabwe Conference on 
Reconstruction and Development-ZIMCORD (1981:15) states that the economy had 
just emerged from a war and from one and half decades of international economic 
isolation which had distorted its economic structure. Further it explains that “because 
of the magnitude of the tasks and the resources required it is essential that in the first 
critical years Zimbabwe should receive external financial support in the form of grants, 
as well as soft and commercial loans”. ZIMCORD (1981:47) acknowledges that 
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Zimbabwe inherited an economy which faced a critical shortage in the supply of skilled 
manpower for its development. 
It was clear from the formulation stage that the government of Zimbabwe did not have 
adequate funds and skills to implement the Growth with Equity policy. In contrast, the 
policy outlined 14 primary objectives and numerous specific objectives under fifteen 
sectors which required a huge budget outlay and several skilled manpower sectors 
such as doctors, nurses, engineers, architects, managers, accountants, teachers, 
amongst others.  University Centre Quayside (2018:4) postulates that, “if objectives 
are seen to be unachievable those responsible for them are likely to lose motivation 
and become demoralised. Individuals will be unwilling to invest energy and enthusiasm 
into something which they do not believe to be possible”. This could be the reason 
why that Kavran (1989, in WB 2012:5) in his Zimbabwe Public Service Review 
Commission Report found inter alia “a bureaucracy characterised by lack of 
performance management culture; arrogance and poor attitudes to work.”  Kavran’s 
report asserts that civil servants’ demotivation may be because they did not believe in 
the huge targets that they were being given against limited resources. 
 A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95) 
A Framework for Economic Reform (1991:19-20) explains that the total foreign 
financing required for the five years, 1991-1995 was estimated at US$3.44 billion, 
translating to about US$690 million per annum. This implies an increase of about 
US$1.75 billion, or double compared to recent trends. The policy states that raising 
this amount of additional financing, while maintaining the share of grants and 
concessional loans in the overall portfolio, would be a major challenge. This budget of 
US$3.44 billion was coming from foreign financing. A Framework for Economic Reform 
(1991:19) further states that Zimbabwe needed a major increase in both grants and a 
blend of concessional and other long-term lending. Short-term lending was not very 
helpful given that the problems were structural and investment related. The policy 
further acknowledges that the lack of external support and structural changes would 
perpetuate low investment levels, a worsening of unemployment, and low growth. 
Under that scenario, Zimbabwe’s progress in extending health and education to the 
poor could not be sustained.  
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The success of this policy heavily depended on external funding and technical 
assistance. However, the University Centre Quayside (2018:4) explains that a 
goal/objective can be said to be achievable if the necessary resources are available. 
In the case of this policy there were inadequate local resources to execute the policy 
objectives and goals. In this case, it was important for the policy makers to outline only 
a few goals and objectives which could be supported by available resources rather 
than planning based on promised budgetary support.  
 Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Programme - MERP (2001-2002) 
There was no stated budget for MERP. This made it difficult for the central government 
to align policy and the national budget. The policy can be applauded for having an 
implementation plan with clear responsibilities, responsible authorities and timeframes 
to complete each task. However, generally the country did not have adequate skills to 
implement this policy. The harsh economic environment had caused a massive brain 
drain.   
 Five Year Medium-Term Plan (2011- 2015) 
The Medium-Term Plan-MTP (2011:4) states that, “approximately US$9.2 billion total 
investment was required in order to meet the policy growth and development targets. 
This was expected to be harvested from the country’s natural resources and growth 
dividend. Foreign Direct Investment, though critical was considered as a bonus”. In 
addition, “private sector credit lines and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) were 
viewed as critical funding mechanisms during the Plan period. Clearly, adequate 
funding was not available to support policy goals and objectives. The policy hoped that 
revenue inflows would be generated from liquidating the country’s natural resources. 
However, since independence these resources were failing to support the nation’s 
budgetary requirements” (MTP 2011:4). The University Centre Quayside (2018:4) 
explains that, “a goal/objective can be said to be achievable if the necessary resources 
are available or similar results have been achieved by others in similar circumstances. 
In this case, previous policies had failed to meet their budgetary requirements although 
the country had plenty of natural resources”. The MTP (2011:34) also states that 
“government was going to pursue programmes targeted at skills retention that include 
in-service training, enhanced professionalism of the civil service, career development 
programmes, and improvement of salary and non-salary benefits”. This statement 
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affirms that there were skills gaps to implement the policy. It is commendable that the 
policy acknowledged this shortcoming and came up with strategies to close the 
deficiencies. 
Generally, all the policies under study did not have adequate budgets and human 
capital, yet each policy had over-ambitious objectives. It is recommended that policies 
be realistic at formulation stage, where there is proper alignment of resources and 
human resources available.  
5.2.2.5 Policies’ compliance to ‘timely’ principle 
All the policies had distinct life-spans. However, most of the policies’ objectives were 
not timed. Normally policy objectives should have different timelines spanning from 
weeks to months or years to fully achieve them. In most cases objectives complement 
and feed into each other. It is thus important to properly give specific timelines for each 
objective according to their sequence as these will ultimately contribute to the 
attainment of the overall policy goal after its full term. It is therefore recommended that 
all policies’ objectives in Zimbabwe should have clear timelines. This makes sure 
implementing agencies become committed to action. It also makes it easier for 
supervising agencies to track progress. It actually poses a danger to wait for the tenure 
of the policy be completed before monitoring and evaluation of each objective is done. 
This might cause precarious unintended results which will be difficult to reverse 
causing more economic and social harm to the nation. 
For “goals/objectives that may take weeks or even months to fully achieve it is good 
practice to identify milestones or key steps and to set deadlines for these to help keep 
progress towards the end goal/objective on track. A deadline helps to create the 
necessary urgency, prompts action and focuses the minds of those who are 
accountable for the commitments that they have made in agreeing to the 
goals/objectives” (Corporate Finance Institute 2020:2). The following analysis is 
conducted for the identified policies:  
 Growth with Equity Policy (1981)    
The Growth with Equity Policy was clear that it was going to be implemented from 
1981 to 1985. However, both the primary and specific objectives were not timed. For 
example, the Growth with Equity Policy (1981:4) spells out some specific objectives 
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for the agricultural and rural development sector as (i) an acceptable and fair 
distribution of land ownership and use; (v) achievement and maintenance of food self-
sufficiency and regional food security; (viii) conservation of land and the environment 
for future generations; including a programme of conservation awareness. No time-  
frames are mentioned, therefore it is difficult to track results of these individual 
objectives throughout the policy’s lifetime.  
 A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95) 
The Framework for Economic Reform policy was distinct in that its life span would 
begin in 1991 and end in 1995. The policy objectives were also given annual timelines. 
For example, A Framework for Economic Reform (1991:3) states that industrial growth 
will have to be about 5.8% per year, agriculture growth about 3.2% per year, service 
sector growth about 5% per year. The objectives are easy to track as there are clear 
targets sought to be achieved per annum. 
 Zimbabwe Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme - MERP (2001 – 
2002)  
The Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme’s life span was 30 months, running 
from July 2000 to December 2002 (MERP 2000:5). The Vision, goal and objectives 
were not time framed. Generally, the policy needed time to restore macro-economic, 
social and political stability.    
 Five Year Medium-Term Plan (2011- 2015) 
The Medium-Term Policy clearly indicated its lifespan as 2011 to 2015. The policy 
objectives did not exclusively incorporate their timelines. However, policy objectives 
were reinforced by policy targets which were clear on deadlines for the various policy 
objectives. For example, under the transport and communications sector, The 
Medium-Term Policy (MTP 2011:57) stated policy objectives “as ‘to have a well-
developed trunk road network’ and ‘a well-developed and maintained rural and urban 
road network’”. The policy targets of MTP (2011) are: “dualisation of Beitbridge to 
Chirundu road by 2015; Potholes repaired on urban roads by 2013; well-maintained 
rural roads by 2012; and enhanced maintenance performance of rural access roads 
by 2012” (MTP 2011:57). The clear policy targets provide room to track policy 
objectives’ results as implementation of the policy is progressing.  
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The research observed that formative and summative evaluations were not being 
conducted in Zimbabwe. To compound the problem, no baseline data was given for 
each objective. Without clear policy milestones it is difficult to carry out evaluations. 
Yet if the milestones are clear, implementing agencies will be compelled to 
continuously generate reports on the status of attaining stated key goals. The 
implementation of the results-based approach is the best solution to attain the 
desired results in government. The results- based management approach requires 
objectives to have clear timelines for realisation of policy goals.   
The following sections describe usage of financial resources to support 
implementation of plans; structures to monitor, evaluate and supervise implementation 
of economic policies by government agencies; and existence of the political will to 
support the implementation of economic policies. Information is gathered from primary 
and secondary sources. Primary data was obtained from interviews conducted with 
the Policy Transition Think Tank (PTTT); A Focus Group Discussion on Policy and 
Regulatory (FGDPR); and Political Parties Dialogue (PPD) ; Minister of State for 
Provincial Affairs; Officers employed in the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), 
the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works (MLGPW), and the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development (MFED); a former National Economic Planning 
Commission (NEPC) Officer; and a policy making expert in the Department of 
Monitoring and Evaluation (see Chapter One, Section 1.10 and 1.18.1; also Chapter 
Four, Section 4.2). Data was also collected through observation by the researcher 
(See Chapter One, Section 1.18.2), complemented with secondary data to compile the 
relevant information. 
5.3 Usage of financial resources which were availed to support 
implementation of plans 
Sapru (2012:151) insists that the process of policy implementation can begin only 
when adequate funds have been allocated for pursuit of goals. University Centre 
Quayside (2018:4) emphasise “the importance of aligning budget to policy objectives. 
If objectives are seen to be unachievable those responsible for them will not waste 
their effort trying to implement something they know is unachievable”. In this regard, 
this section sought to find out if the national budgets were linked to the policy 
objectives. Also, the study sought to check if adequate resources were availed to 
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support the implementation of macro-economic policies. In addition, the study was 
interested to know if the allocated funds were put to good use as intended. Therefore, 
the researcher collected and analysed data from the National Budget Statements, 
Financial Statements and Budget Estimates which were produced during the period 
under study. Furthermore, data was also collected from national and international 
publications such as ZimStat, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, World Bank and United 
Nations. This information was important to check if the national budgets were aligned 
to the existing policy. Interviews with the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development were held to validate the findings as well as assessing the usage of 
resources allocated to policy implementation.  
 Growth with Equity Policy (1981) 
The Growth with Equity Policy was introduced in the years of independence “aimed at 
redressing colonial era imbalances by assimilating previously marginalised people into 
the mainstream economy. These indigenous people did not have the means and 
capacity to participate in the economic programmes. As such government launched 
this policy to capacitate indigenous people through providing free education and 
health, job creation and land resettlement” (Sibanda and Makwata 2017:1). The 1984 
and 1985 Budget Statements were linked to the objectives of the Growth with Equity 
Policy (Table 5.2).   
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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Total Government 
Revenue and Grants (Z$ 
million) 
$ 675 $ 949 $ 1 365 $ 1 781 $ 1 997 $ 2 212 
Government Expenditure 
on Education (Z$ million) 













































to GDP ratio 
31% 29% 32% 36% 41% 32% 
Budget Deficit  
(Z$ million) 
$-375 $-335 $-317 $-466 $-630 $-711 
Government Debt  
(Z$ million) 
$1 840.2 $2 095 $2478.6 $2 850.3 $3 744 $4 638.6 
Source: (ZimStat 1986; Budget Statements 1984/85; National Budget Estimates 1982/83, 
1984/85) 
As shown in table 5.2, government’s total revenue was on an upward trajectory over 
the five-year period. Similarly, expenditure on education was constantly increasing 
from 14.9% of GDP in 1980, 26.4% in 1983 to 28.7% in 1985. As a result of high 
budgetary allocations to education, government was able to implement the free basic 
primary education for all policy, which resulted in the building of primary and secondary 
schools. In support of this, the Economic Intelligence Unit (1988:7) reveals that 
“education provision has greatly improved since independence, with spending up from 
Z$98 million in 1979 to Z$168 million in 1986/87 (nearly 10% of GDP). In 1981 
enrolments in the first form of secondary school multiplied nearly fourfold over 1980 
and in 1986 were nearly eight times higher at over 170 000”. In congruence with this 
the Growth with Equity Policy achieved high levels of literacy rates during its tenure. 
In the health sector, the main thrust was to effect a reasonable balance between the 
rural and urban population and ensuring equity in service delivery and significantly 
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levelling out rural disparities. From table 5.2, it is clear that government expenditure 
increased exponentially from 8.1% in 1980, 9.3% in 1983 to 10.5% in 1985, thereby 
supporting the development of the health sector. The Economic Intelligence Unit 
(1988:7) states that “health provision has greatly improved since independence, 
although it is still much skewed toward the urban areas. The health service is free for 
all earning less than Z$150 per month. Life expectancy at birth was 45 in 1960, rising 
to 56 in 1985. The crude birth rate per thousands of the population was 48, and the 
crude death rate 13, the infant mortality rate was 82 per thousand live births”. 
Regarding resettlement of indigenous people, very little budget was set aside for this 
exercise. From table 5.2, it can be noted that the average budgetary allocation towards 
housing and community social amenities was averaging 3.9% over the five years, 
indicating the same level of resource commitment during the colonial era. According 
to ZIMCORD (1981), “at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979, Britain made 
commitments to mobilise the support of the international community to assist the 
independent Zimbabwe with financial and technical resources for land settlement and 
rural and agricultural development”. The Growth with Equity Policy was also 
characterised by land resettlement as the indigenous people did not have financial 
support and resources to purchase land. The policy also could not evolve to address 
the aspects of land resettlement. 
The general economic conditions during the 1981 to 1985 period were characterised 
by a controlled state environment wherein citizens were completely dependent on the 
government for economic support meaning too much dependency on government for 
survival by the citizens. The economy was tightly controlled by the state. The economy 
recovered “significantly in the early years of independence averaging 10 percent 
growth during 1980-82”. This was mainly because the country had inherited one of the 
most structurally developed economies and effective state systems in Africa (AfDB 
n.d.:2). The Economic Intelligence Unit (1988:7) reveals that “the arrival of peace and 
international legitimacy, combined with exceptionally good rains in 1980/81, and 
stimulation of internal demand by large wage increases, permitted spectacular 
economic growth during the first two years of independence”. Thereafter, as 
highlighted by AfDB (n.d.:2), “until towards the end of 1990s, growth was characterised 
by periods of economic booms and busts corresponding essentially to periods of good 
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weather or severe drought. The general trend of the 1990s is that the economy showed 
signs of weakening on account of low investment, an adverse internal environment 
and cutback in production by manufacturing industries due to foreign exchange 
shortages”. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the lack of growth in productive sectors 
resulted in lower demand on exports that in turn reduced capital investments in the 
country.  The 1984 Budget Statement (1984:1) expressed that the economy went 
through yet another year of difficulties and contraction in 1983, with GDP falling in real 
terms by 3%, and almost all productive sectors registering significant negative growth 
output. The Economic Intelligence Unit (1988:29) indicated that the “budget deficit has 
been increasing sharply since 1980 while capital expenditure outturns have 
persistently been below 10% of the total budget. Budget deficits recorded in 1982/83 
was Z$223 million, 1983/84 amounted to Z$432 million, 1984/85 it stood at Z$428 
million and 1985/86 it was Z$508 million”. The 1984 Budget Statement (1984:11) 
indicated the current expenditure gobbled 83% of total expenditure in the 1984/85 
financial year, which the minister said was dangerous and unacceptable. In this 
regard, the main thrust of the 1984/85 budget was towards the containment of rapid 
monetary expansion which had characterised the previous fiscal year, when total 
money supply grew by 20%. Due to subdued economic growth, money supply was 
being used to finance expansionary expenditure, clearly marking the beginning of 
fiscal indiscipline in the public sector. 
In summary, the positives from the Growth with Equity Policy provided development 
in the social sectors, such as access to education, health and employment 
opportunities from 1980 to 1985, greatly supported by the national budget. This led to 
an improvement of the general social being of the indigenous majority. The 1984 
Budget Statement (1984:26) acknowledged that “government efforts were significantly 
augmented by voluntary participation of the community at large. It remains of 
paramount importance that conditions of stability and social tranquillity be maintained 
in all corners of Zimbabwe, so that the people and government can go about the 
business of developing the country without interference or hindrance from violent 
activity”. Therefore, it can be argued that in the areas of education and health which 
received adequate funds, the policy recorded a significant success. However, the 
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productive sector of the economy was subdued as it received little national budgetary 
support. As was explained in Chapter Four, availability of an adequate budget, political 
stability, involvement and participation of communities are critical to the realisation of 
policy goals. 
 A Framework for Economic Recovery (1991-95)  
After ten years of independence, the Government noted that the economy was not 
growing at the desired pace as it was heavily biased towards a socialist state. In view 
of this, a new policy was introduced on 18th of July 1991, called as A Framework for 
Economic Reform (FER). The goal of the programme was “to transform the economy 
from being heavily regulated to liberalisation” (FER 1991). This was expected to 
rapidly grow the economy. This was done through national budget allocations as 
stated in table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: National Budget Allocations and other Economic Indicators for the Period 1991-1995 
Key Indicators 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual 
National Budget 
(Z$) 
9017 060  
000 
 
12 073  
000000 
 









GDP Growth Rate 
% 
4.3% 7.1% 4.4% -8.4% 4.6% 2.1% 4.8% 5.8% 5.0% 0.2% 
GDP per Capita 
Growth Rate 
1.6 2.91% 1.7 -11.0% 1.9 -1.0% 2.2 7.16% 2.4 -1.64% 
Total Department 
of Defence (in 
US$) 
3056 1 728 3398 2 575 3727 3 161 3996 4 924 4209 7 166 
Department of 
Defence/GDP % 
51.4 58.3 57.9 74.8 62.9 74.4 64.0 87.7 63.2 115.6 
Gross 
Investment/GDP % 
23.3 19.1% 24.3 20.2% 25.2 22.8% 25.1 23.7% 25.3 19.7% 
Private 
Investment/GDP % 
13.0 18.29% 14.7% 19.59% 16.0% 20.84% 16.2% 18.65% 16.4% 21.88% 
Domestic 
Savings/GDP % 
23.0 -16.89 24.3 -6.1 25.2 -2.9 25.1 -9.8 25.3  
National 
Savings/GDP 
17.1 -16.9% 17.9 -6.1% 19.2 -2.9% 19.9 -9.8% 21.3  
Total Public Sector 
Revenue/GDP % 
40.4 22.8 40.9 27.2 40.8 25.3 40.6 24.4 40.2 26.7 
Total Public Sector 
Exp./GDP % 
48.6% 28% 48.1% 32% 47.3% 32% 46.1% 28% 45.3% 35% 
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Key Indicators 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 




16.0 23.3% 14.0 42.1% 12.0 27.6% 10.0 22.2% 10.0 22.6% 
Terms of Trade 
(1987) 
0.97  1.05  1.05  1.05  1.05  
Real Export 
Growth Rate % 
4.8 -4.38 5.2 -5.32 5.6 22.7 5.7 9.39 5.8 0.48 
Real Import 
Growth Rate 
8.5 20.13 7.1 3.49 3.7 -9.76 3.7 13.53 3.7 6.17 
Current Account 
Deficit/GDP % 






5.2 -4.62 4.0 -5.16 
Current Account 
Deficit (in US$) 






325.2 -0.318 268.7 -0.369 
Net Reserves (in 
US$) 




 0.494  0.481  0.476  0.473  0.467 
Source: (IMF 2008; ZimStat 2016)  
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The 1992 Budget Statement (1992:1) begins by acknowledging that ESAP was in its 
second year of implementation, identifying achievements and gaps thereof. The 
budget statement further outlines ESAP’s principal objectives which the budget sought 
to support. The 1992 Budget Statement (1992:18) indicates that “the budget proposal 
was extremely difficult to put together under the present circumstances where 
expenditure demands far exceed the revenue available”. This statement demonstrates 
that there were not sufficient financial resources to support the implementation of 
ESAP. From table 5.3, it is seen that the national budget was exponentially increasing 
every year albeit due to inflationary pressures. The National Budget Statement 
(1992:19) expresses that the recurrent expenditure for 1992/93 was Z$10.898 million, 
whilst the capital expenditure stood at Z$2.315 million. Furthermore, the National 
Budget Statement (1993:13) outlines that the recurrent expenditure budget for 
1993/94 was Z$11.5 billion and capital expenditure stood at Z$4.374 billion. The 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe attributed the rise to the high domestic bank financing of 
the budget deficit and substantial foreign inflows. 
The bulk of the national budget was channelled towards consumption which negatively 
affected the implementation of the policy objectives, leading to spiral inflation. Inflation 
figures in the table indicate an upward spiral trend. In 1991, the figure stood at 23.5% 
and rose to 27.65% in 1993. By 1995, the inflation figure was 22.6%. This indicates 
that during ESAP inflation got worse and it eroded people’s purchasing power, which 
also contributed to domestic de-savings. In 1991 domestic savings were reduced by -
16.9%, whilst in 1994 the figure stood at -9.8%. Likewise, government also faced 
challenges in funding its budget. By the end of ESAP in 1995 the deficit had worsened 
to 13% of GDP and government funded this gap through domestic borrowing which in 
the process crowded out indigenous businesspeople of resources.  On civil service 
reform, 94% of target posts were abolished and the wage bill was reduced from 16.5% 
GDP in 1990/1 to 10.4% in 1994/95.  
In the financial sector, removal of barriers of entry resulted in more new merchant 
banks, discount houses and commercial banks which were started by indigenous 
black Zimbabweans. By 1995 all price and distribution controls had been removed 
while transport deregulations ushered in more players to compete with ZUPCO. ESAP 
reforms also allowed for the remittance of profits and dividends by foreign investors. 
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The highest GDP growth rate of 7.1% was realised in 1991 whilst the lowest figure of 
-8.4% was recorded in 1992. Generally, the growth rates were below the targeted 
figures. By 1995 the GDP growth rate stood at 0.2%.  Largely, the performance of the 
economy under ESAP was largely unimpressive such that significant declines in real 
incomes were noted. As indicated in the table above, most of the ESAP targets were 
not met. During ESAP, the national budget was continuously being eroded by inflation, 
which contributed to inadequate funds mobilisation to implement the policy’s 
objectives. 
 Zimbabwe Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme - MERP (2001- 2002)  
The Zimbabwe Millennium Economic, Recovery Programme- MERP (2001:1) outlines 
that MERP was introduced in response to the fundamental macro-economic 
imbalances that had characterised the economy during that period. These imbalances 
were characterised by high levels of inflation and interest rates, unsustainably high 
budget deficits and debt burdens, declining savings and investment, a weakening 
Zimbabwe dollar, lack of mutual trust and confidence among citizens, foreign 
exchange shortages, unstable local currency, lower industrial capacity utilisation, 
sluggish economic growth rate, low disposable real incomes and poor living standards, 
and an overall economic contraction.  
The prime objective of this programme was therefore to restore vibrant economic 
growth by among other policy measures, removing the fundamental causes of 
inflation, which had been identified as the major sources of the economic instability. It 
also sought to restore normal cooperative relations with the international community. 
The 2001 NBS (2000:1-2) succinctly acknowledged that the nation was in a crisis. With 
a view to combat unprecedented government expenditure, the 2001 NBS (2000:9) 
expresses that “during 2001, a cash budgetary system will be introduced. 
Expenditures will be limited to budgeted resources and we will not allow unbudgeted 
expenditures, except for natural disasters”. This was a noble policy to guide 
government expenditure. The 2001 NBS (2000:9) explains the budget objectives’ aims 
were to achieve the MERP objectives. To achieve the policy targets, the Budget 
Statement proposed to implement a three year rolling budget with the following targets 
(NBS 2000:9): “revenues of $140 billion in 2001, $195 billion in 2002 and $232 billion 
in 2003; total expenditure and net lending of $224 billion in 2001, $254 billion in 2002 
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and $258 billion in 2003; and a budget deficit of $83.6 billion or 15.5% of GDP in 2001, 
in 2002 and about 3% in 2003”. The national budget allocations and other economic 
indicators are stated in table 5.4. 
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Revenue 87 300 573 000 -$140 billion (in 2001) 
-4195 billion (in 2002) 
$140 283 000 000 $265 600 000 000 
National Budget (Z$) $175 062 573 000 - $258 239 000 000 $481 707 409 000 
Total Expenditure   -$224 billion  (in 2001) 
- $254 billion (in 2002) 
$402 457 903 000 $782 411 228 000 
Capital Expenditure $12 277 562 000 - $32 883 058 000 $90 432 531 000 
Recurrent Expenditure $150 024 081 000 - $365 354 381 000 $679 501 000 000 
Real GDP  Growth Rates % -4.2 -2% -0.2 -5.9 
Gross Capital Formation 
(total investment) 
11 749.3 93 209 11 156.4 25 421.3 
Budget Deficit Z$ million -$68 706 -$83 600 -$30 742 -$41 241 
Budget Deficit to GDP -3.4 Reduction to 3.8% of GDP -3.5 -3.6 
Government Debt Z$ 
million 
$230 753.5 - $246 043 $292 402 
Government Debt to GDP 57.7 - 31.4 52.3 
Inflation Rate 55.22% - 71.9% 133.2% 
External Assistance 
(grants/or soft loans) USD 
billions 
0.175 640 - 0.100 210 0.199 130 
Source: (ZimStat 2016)
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From table 5.4, revenue for 2001 stood at Z$140 283 000 000 which was consistent 
with the 2001 budget targets. In 2002, the revenue figure was $265 600 000 000, 
surpassing the 2002 budget target. However, it is important to note that the real 
monetary values of these budget figures were eroded by hyper-inflation which stood 
at 133% in 2002. With respect to expenditure, $402 457 903 000 was realised against 
a target of $140 000 000 000 in 2001. This demonstrates that there was budget deficit 
of -$261 000 000 000 in 2001, whilst in 2002 it stood at -$477 000 000 000. The huge 
budget deficit outlay was against the 2001 budget objective of adhering to cash 
budgeting. The bulk of the total expenditure was recurrent expenditure, constituting as 
high as 92% of the total budget in 2001. The expenditure pattern was not conducive 
to growth and development. The 2002 Budget statement (2003:9) acknowledged that 
the high budget deficits compelled government to borrow excessively, placing the 
country in serious debt problems. 
The Report of the Auditor General for the Financial Year Ended December 31 (2012) 
bemoaned acts of propelling fiscal indiscipline within public institutions over the years. 
These include unsupported expenditure, violation of laws and procedures, wasteful 
expenditure, poor bookkeeping, unreconciled expenditures, unauthorised transfers of 
funds, fraudulent expenditure, unauthorised borrowings, excess expenditure, non-
servicing of loans, overstated expenditures, and payments made for goods not 
delivered. These results exhibit the fiscal indiscipline challenges that were faced by 
government during the MERP era. This behaviour exacerbated the macro-economic 
imbalances that MERP sought to address. The 2002 NBS (2003:11) explained that 
many businesses over the previous year had ceased operations, putting many people 
out of employment and reducing the economy’s output. Inflation continued to erode 
purchasing power with salaries and wages continuing to reduce, in real terms. From 
the table above, most of the macro-economic indicators were not favourable during 
the policy lifespan. Overall, the MERP thus did not achieve its intended objectives. 
The major reason why the policy did not achieve its objective was lack of fiscal 
discipline. Excessive spending funded by borrowed money created serious 
fundamental challenges to the economy. The MERP objectives had prioritised fiscal 
discipline as its major objective, however there was no political will to adhere to 
approved budgets. 
209 
 Five Year Medium-Term Plan (2011- 2015) 
The MTP “was launched in July 2011 to guide all Government plans and programmes 
beyond short-term stabilisation. Its theme was restoration and transformation of 
capacities for sustainable economic growth and development” (MTP 2011). The 
objectives of MTP were amongst other things: “infrastructure development with 
emphasis on rehabilitation and completion of outstanding projects, employment 
creation, human centred development, entrepreneurship development, macro-
economic stability, and ICT and science & technology development” (MTP 2011). 
Additional objectives include “good governance, investment regulation, coordination 
and promotion, resource utilisation and poverty reduction, gender mainstreaming into 
economic activities, all focusing on promotion of programmes that promote gender 
parity in access to education, health and other social services” (MTP 2011). The 
national budget allocations and other economic indicators are stated in table 5.5. 
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Target 2011 2012 2013 
National Budget US$2.055 million - US$2.746 million US$4.000 million USD3.396 million 
Capital Expenditure US$ 1 .678 billion - US$0.411 billion US$0.610 USD0.786 billion 
Recurrent Expenditure US$ 572 million - US$2 173 million US$3 200 million US$3 584 million 
Health Expenditure 8.58% 15% of total expenditure 9.33% 8.64% 3.8% 
Education Expenditure 22% 12% of total expenditure 23% 25% 1.6% 
Agriculture Expenditure 14% 10% of the Budget 8% 8% 1.5% 
GDP Average Growth Rate p.a 12.58 7.1% p.a 15.44 14.78 5.53 
Inflation Rate 3.03 Single digit p.a 3.28 3.92 1.63 
Interest Rate (lending rates)  - 12.28 16.04 14.4 
Gross National Savings  
to GDP 
-5.33 20% of GDP by 2015 -7.44 -10.3 -12.9 
Revenue 
Collection (% increase) 
 Increase 11.3 10.5 4.3 
Budget Deficit -2.8 
Less than 5% of GDP 
by 2015 







Target 2011 2012 2013 
Gross investment as a ratio  
of GDP 
23.92 
20% of GDP  
by 2015 
22.39 14.2 14.4 
Imports Growth 52.8 - 15.68 4.87 
-17.8 
6 






Unemployment %  - 5.37 5.37 5.3 
Sovereign Debt to GDP 63.76 
Less than 60% of GDP 
by 2015 
51.7 56.2 54.3 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(USD Millions) 
656.9 
At least three months 
import cover by 2015 
723.0 678.4 590.9 
GDP per Capita US$ 976 - 1 132 1 310 1 428 
Human Development Index 0.467 - 0.478  0.505 0.516 
Source: (National Budget Statements 2010 to 2015; ZimStat 2016) 
 
Note: The Zimbabwean currency rate during 1980-2015 (tables 5.1-5.5) is stated in Annexure D.
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The 2012 NBS (2011:16-17) indicated that the 2012 budget was premised to 
implement the objectives of the Medium-Term Plan. However, the 2012 NBS (2011:5) 
highlighted that, “the demands on the Budget are so large vis-à-vis the resource 
envelope.” Further, the budget outlined that “the crafting of the 2012 Budget was a 
daunting task, given the triple demons of a highly charged political environment, 
insatiable fiscal demands on the State and a highly volatile global, financial 
environment” (NBS 2011:5). With a view to minimise fiscal indiscipline, the 2012 NBS 
(2011:16) emphasised that “it is important that the top leadership of our Government 
remain at the forefront of fiscal prudence and discipline in this economy. Without their 
oversight and enforcement, their discipline and their wisdom, this economy will fail”. 
The Report of the Auditor General for the financial year ended December 2012 (2013: 
iv) validated that “ministries were diverting funds to meet appropriation accounts 
expenditures of parent ministries causing unauthorised excess expenditure. One 
ministry loaned an amount of US$11 499 781 from its fund to a parastatal. The money 
was not reimbursed to the respective fund. Consequently, the achievement of 
objectives of the funds from which resources were diverted was compromised”.  
Clearly, the issues of availing adequate budgetary support to the policy was 
compromised by fiscal indiscipline within the public sector. The 2012 NBS (2011:68-
74) demonstrated that “there was a perennial challenge of disproportionate share of 
recurrent expenditures at US$1.68 billion, against capital expenditures of US$0.192 
billion. Recurrent expenditures continued to be skewed towards employment costs, 
which were originally budgeted at US$1.4 billion, but are now projected at around 
US$1.8 billion or 63% of the total budget, following the salary and wage review for civil 
servants effected in July 2011”. With “regard to capital development expenditure, a 
total annual allocation of US$551 million was made in 2011. Of this amount, US$438.8 
million was allocated to projects in sectors presenting a socio-economic 
developmental impact” (NBS 2011:68-74). This budget statement demonstrates that 
not enough resources were being channelled towards the realisation of MTP policy 
goals and objectives. A budget position which is biased towards recurrent expenditure 
compromises the attainment of economic policies. 
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In Chapter Four, the study found that fiscal discipline was very important for macro-
economic policies to attain their intended results. As such, the 2012 NBS (2011:13) 
re-introduced a strategy “to avoid fiscal sclerosis of unbudgeted expenditures, whether 
it be on account of wages, travel, support to ailing parastatals, among others. We have 
an obligation to shift Government resources from corrosive recurrent expenditure in 
favour of inclusive and pro-poor growth areas”. These were stringent measures 
introduced to minimise fiscal indiscipline that had been a menace in the previous 
years. The study recommends a strong political will to contain fiscal indiscipline to 
achieve economic policies’ objectives. This can be achieved through establishment of 
a water-tight system and enforcement of public financial management laws. 
The statistics in table 5.5 indicate that the MTP achieved most of its objectives despite 
the fact that it was aborted in 2013. The GDP average growth rate increased from 
12.58% in 2012 to 14.78% in 2013/2014. The inflation rate was maintained at single 
digits as was MTP’s target.  However, the MTP did not achieve its targets in the areas 
of accumulating gross investments, reducing unemployment and increasing revenues. 
The critical success factors for the MTP, however, were that the policy’s objectives 
were aligned to the national budgets. The government made a concerted effort to 
minimise fiscal indiscipline through cash budgeting. As a result, there was economic 
stability which promoted economic growth. The country was generally peaceful due to 
the establishment of the Government of National Unity.  
In summary, generally there were no adequate resources to support the 
implementation of the policies’ objectives. The bulk of the national budgets were 
allocated towards recurrent expenditure leaving meagre resources for capital 
expenditure which is important for the realisation of policies’ objectives. The study 
therefore recommends to government to formulate policies with few objectives which 
can easily be supported by financial resources available. In addition, government 
needs to reduce consumption expenditure drastically and redirect the resources 
towards capital financing. Importantly also is the issue of containing financial 
indiscipline which includes excessive money supply growth, fraud, corruption, non-
adherence to procurement regulations, weak enforcement of public finance 
management systems, mismatch between what is budgeted for and what is actually 
funded, amongst others. In Chapter Four, some of the factors negatively affecting the 
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implementation of economic policies were cited as inadequate budget allocations, 
fiscal indiscipline and corruption. In this regard, there is a need for strong political will 
to address the challenges affecting the financing of national economic policies in 
Zimbabwe. The CoZ pronounces most of these weaknesses. As such, government 
should enforce Section 9 of the CoZ which calls for “the adoption and implementation 
of policies and legislation for fostering efficiency, competence, accountability, 
transparency, personal integrity and financial probity in all institutions and agencies of 
government at every level and in every public institution” (CoZ 2013). In addition, all 
recommendations made by the Auditor General should be implemented by the 
relevant institution without fail. The Report of the Auditor General for the financial year 
ended December 2012 (2013:vi) laments that the “audit revealed that 14 out of 35 
ministries addressed the weaknesses observed in the previous years to some extent 
and some fully. If audit recommendations are implemented, accountability, efficiency 
and effectiveness of operations by ministries would be improved”. 
5.4 Structures in place to monitor, evaluate and supervise implementation 
of Economic Policies by Government agencies 
Pressman and Wildavasky (1973:15) define implementation as “a process of 
interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them”. Toole 
(2000:266) articulates that “implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent 
links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results.” Policy implementation is 
broadly defined as “what happens between the establishment of an apparent intention 
on the part of the government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the 
ultimate impact in the world of action” (Hill and Hupe 2006:8). Meter (1975:52) 
observed that “at present we know relatively little about the process of policy 
implementation” while Hagrove (1975:31) labelled implementation “as the ‘missing 
link’ in the study of social policy”.  
In the case of Zimbabwe, the researcher looked for documentation on implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of national economic policies that had been launched since 
1980. However, such information was not available within the government institutions. 
The Department of Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation within the Office of the 
President and Cabinet lacks documents on implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
of the policies that were launched from 1980 to 2014. This Department, therefore, was 
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established in 2014 to supervise the implementation of all government policies, 
programmes and projects, after the government had realised the need to close the 
gap regarding supervising and documenting policy implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. The missing information on implementation of national economic policies 
necessitated this study to be conducted to identify the critical success factors for 
economic policies in Zimbabwe. 
This section discusses the structures for formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of economic policies; monitoring and evaluation of government policies, 
programmes and projects; and effective implementation and evaluation systems. 
5.4.1 Structures for Formulation, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation 
of Economic Policies 
This section looks at the structures that were in existence from 1980 to 2015 to 
formulate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of economic policies. The 
institutions that had such mandates were located in the Office of the President and 
Cabinet (OPC), Ministry of Local Government and Public Works (MLGPW), Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development, National Economic Planning Commission 
(NEPC). The researcher therefore held interviews with officials who served in these 
institutions to understand the structures that were in place.  
5.4.1.1 National Economic Planning Commission 
The National Economic Planning Commission (NEPC) was established in 1993 and 
abolished in the year 2000.  It was housed within the Office of the President and 
Cabinet. It was headed by a Commissioner, a post which was equivalent to a cabinet 
minister. He also sat in the cabinet.  NEPC had four departments; namely Planning, 
Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP), Monitoring and Evaluation, and 
Economic Research. The Planning Department was responsible for formulating 
economic policies and national plans. The PSIP department was responsible for 
“Government’s medium term strategic investment tool for the development of the 
country. It was a budgeting and strategic planning tool employed by the government, 
to translate its priorities and plans into tangible programmes and projects” (Ministry of 
Planning and Development 2020:1). The Monitoring and Evaluation Department was 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of all donor funded 
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projects/programmes and producing financial reports detailing the usage of resources 
from the donors. However, there was no monitoring and evaluation of government 
policies, projects and programmes. Economic research was responsible for 
researching on economic issues. The staff complement was approximately 80. The 
NEPC did not have decentralised structures in the provinces. As such, the Planning 
Department would ride on the structures of the Ministry of Local Government and 
Public Works to formulate both economic policies and national plans. 
 With respect to the formulation of both national plans and economic policies, NEPC 
held consultative meetings at provincial levels only. After the MLGPW had gathered 
their provincial plans, the NEPC would carry out validation consultative workshops at 
provincial level before the crafting of national plans. R1 (2020) a former NEPC officer 
(now a director in the OPC, Department of Policy Formulation, Analysis and 
Coordination) indicated that “the consultative workshops were attended mainly by 
government ministries to validate projects to be implemented in the provinces. All the 
provincial plans fed into the national plans”. Regarding the formulation of economic 
policies, R1 (NEPC, 2020) indicated that “these were mainly driven by the donor 
community such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These institutions 
would provide a consultant in the name of providing technical assistance and funding 
to government”.  
In Chapter Two, Amoah (2008:43) stated that “in the early 1930s, developed nations 
had put in place conscious, deliberate and organised processes to dominate public 
policy formation globally with neo-liberal ideas”. Sapru (2012:101-102) also indicated 
the existence of pressure groups that influence policy making processes. Pressure 
groups serve as links between individual citizens and policymakers. They have the 
expertise and technical data in the relevant subject matter. They also have funds and 
necessary resources for policy formulation and implementation. Consequently, most 
third world countries depend on pressure groups in all the policy cycle stages. Radin 
(2000:31) explains that there are institutions which can dominate the policy formulation 
process to further their interests without necessarily addressing the community’s 
problems.  
During interviews with NEPC former staff, it was disclosed that economic policy 
consultations were done at provincial level only, due to capacity constraints. The 
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districts and grassroots people did not have an opportunity to give their input in the 
formulation of national economic policies. Hence the reason why the economic policies 
and national plans were divorced.  R1 (NEPC, 2020) emphasised that “NEPC was not 
well resourced, thus the consultations were not as effective as they ought to be.  In 
this regard, ordinary people were (and even currently) ignorant of policy visions and 
goals”. In addition, he said “a major challenge which NEPC faced during economic 
policy consultations was dominance by political figures” (R1 NEPC 2020). In that case, 
NEPC would just budge to the dictates of the politicians. Due to political dominance 
and influence, some policies could be prematurely terminated leading to policy 
inconsistences. Another challenge mentioned by R1 (NEPC, 2020) was “government 
planned big without the requisite funds and skills to execute the policies and plans”.  
From the discussion above, it is clear that economic policies in Zimbabwe follow a top-
down approach furthering the interests of the donor community and politicians. This 
does not resonate well with the determinants of economic policies outlined in Chapter 
Four, such as wide consultations, grassroots participation and inclusion, shared policy 
vision/goals and objectives, provision of adequate funds and skills to the planning 
commission, policy consistency, de-politicisation of economic policies, political will to 
address the needs of the ordinary people, among others. R1 (NEPC 2020) 
recommended “the establishment of an independent National Planning Commission 
(which should be outside OPC structures). The Commission should have a board of 
directors drawn from skilled personnel in the public, private and civil organisations. 
The head of the Commission should be a cabinet member. The Commission will be 
apolitical thus serving the interests of all Zimbabweans”. In congruence, R20 (PTTT 
2018) said “I propose that a planning unit which reports to cabinet is set up to 
oversee policy implementation processes. This muscular unit should be able to 
over-ride ministerial decisions and be involved in budgeting for the programmes ”. 
Concerning the implementation of the economic policies, R1 (NEPC 2020) illustrated 
that government ministries/departments, parastatals and state owned enterprises, the 
private sector, the donor community and communities were all coordinated by the 
Ministry of Local Government and Public Works in the implementation of these 
policies. In the late 1990s, government decided to embark on a market driven 
economy. As such, the NEPC was abolished in the year 2000 to allow the private 
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sector to do their own plans and grow the economy. The formulation of macro-
economic policy functions was then transferred to the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development. In support of this move, R18 (PTTT 2018) said “Government 
must stick to policy formulation while inviting the private players to do 
implementation. This will instil investor confidence thereby improving Foreign Direct 
Investment that is critical for resource mobilisation”. The study thus recommends an 
independent Planning Commission be established which is responsible for policy 
formulation. An apolitical Commission may be acceptable by all and stakeholders 
would have confidence to support its activities. The Commission must have legal 
powers to formulate, budget and supervise the implementation of economic policies. 
5.4.1.2 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
The Department of Macroeconomic Planning is mandated to formulate economic 
policies, carry out impact analysis and come up with appropriate strategies to address 
policy gaps for sustainable economic growth and development. Policies are prepared 
through comprehensive research and inputs from stakeholder consultations. The 
Department is also responsible for preparing implementation matrices for policy 
papers such as the National Budget, Short-Term, Medium-Term and Long-Term Policy 
Documents. Then it is meant to follow up on the relevant departments responsible for 
the deliverables of the matrix. However, the study failed to get documentation on the 
performances of previous economic policies. This may imply that there were no policy 
implementation reports being generated for future use. 
The researcher held interviews with two officers in the Department of Macroeconomic 
Planning, who explained the policy formulation processes, staff capacity issues, policy 
budget allocations and challenges being faced throughout the policy life cycle. When 
formulating economic policies, the OPC gives the overall policy direction, aligned to 
the national vision. Then the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development’s 
Department of Macroeconomic Planning kick-starts the process through consultations. 
Consultations are normally done throughout the country’s ten provinces with the 
assistance of the Provincial Administrators (in the Ministry of Local Government and 
Public Works) who link up with the district administrators and councillors to mobilise 
the people for policy consultations. Nonetheless, these structures have not been very 
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useful for policy consultation purposes as shall be explained below under the Ministry 
of Local Government and Public Works.  
The Department of Macroeconomic Planning has been facing several challenges in 
policy formulation. These include policy inconsistency and unpredictability of the 
economic variables which makes planners often miss targets, making long-term 
planning difficult. Also lack of political will throughout the policy life cycle is hampering 
socio-economic development. Lack of political will also manifests itself through partial 
implementation of government policies and programmes; for example, the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme’s (ESAP) objectives were partially implemented. 
During the literature review, the study noted that government hesitated to fully 
liberalise the economy as postulated by ESAP’s objectives. In some cases, 
implementing agencies may highlight a number of areas and initiatives that are lagging 
behind in terms of implementation, but these will not be addressed. R1 (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development 2020) explained that “sometimes the country 
experiences rushed policies without full consultation of public. For example, the 
Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Programme which was a reactionary policy 
responding to severe macro-economic and political instability”. Therefore, such 
policies lack ownership and accountability through Government structures and general 
citizens. The study noted that quite a number of policies were prematurely terminated 
without proper justification being given. For example, the Medium-Term Plan and Zim-
Asset, among others were abandoned. This demoralises stakeholders and they lose 
confidence in government policies. R1 (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development 2020) also said “stakeholders’ fatigue is a major challenge as previously 
consulted projects remain unimplemented. Inadequate provision of funding to finance 
the government policies and programmes was negatively affecting the implementation 
of economic policies”. 
The Department has a staff complement of twelve officials. The head is a Chief 
Director, supported by a deputy director and ten economists. R2 (Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development 2020) explained that “a lot of government departments 
are now staffed with young and fresh university graduates with limited or no practical 
experiences yet they are expected to lead the policymaking process except for very 
high positions like the Director and Deputy Director levels upwards, which may lead to 
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inadequate administrative capacity”. The brain-drain which led to most officers leaving 
government to search for greener pastures during years of economic difficulties also 
led to a loss of trained officers who already had the requisite skills. Difficulties in 
retention of experienced officers result in loss of institutional memory since they would 
have gone through government supported training programmes. The researcher 
observed the capacity gap in all government ministries and departments. Government 
needs to vigorously train its employees and reward them with competitive salaries to 
retain skilled personnel. 
5.4.1.3 Ministry of Local Government and Public Works 
 During the period under study, the Ministry used to administer the Provincial Councils 
and Administration Act, 1985 [Chapter 29:11]; Traditional Leaders Act, 1998 [Chapter 
29:17]; Urban Councils Act, 2015 [Chapter 29:15]; Rural District Councils Act, 1988 
[Chapter 29:13]. These pieces of legislations gave the Ministry of Local Government 
and Public Works (MLGPW) powers to establish structures. This Provincial Councils 
and Administration Act, 1985 [Chapter 29:11] empowered the Ministry to establish 
Provincial Council structures to coordinate the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of government policies from the village, ward, district and provincial levels 
feeding into the national level (central government). These were government’s 
established structures to reach out to every citizen and all implementing agencies in 
the province in a coordinated manner.  The structures were devised such that 
developmental requirements (policies, programmes, projects, plans) come from the 
grassroots village level, cascading upwards from the village, ward, district, and 
provincial up to national level where approval would be given by Cabinet. Resources 
were presumed to be disbursed to support the implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of those policies using the same structures. Figure 5.1 below depicts the 
structures that existed. 
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Figure 5.1: Policy Formulation, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Structure 
  
Source: (Researcher’s own illustration) 
5.4.1.4 Provincial Councils 
Before the enactment of the new CoZ, there were eight provinces, that were 
established in line with the Provincial Councils and Administration Act 1985. The 
information includes the following: 
 Membership of the Provincial Councils: The Provincial Councils and 
Administration Act (PCAA) 1985, “section 14 (1) provides for the membership of 
provincial councils as:  the provincial governor of the province; the mayor or 
chairman, one other councillor appointed by each municipal council, town council 
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and local board, the area of which lies wholly within the province; the chairman of 
and one other councillor appointed by such rural district councils, the areas of 
which lie wholly or partly within the province, as the minister may designate by 
notice in writing to the councils concerned; and one chief appointed from amongst 
its membership by each provincial assembly of chiefs, the area of which lies wholly 
or partly within the province”. The Act also states that “three persons appointed by 
the president of whom one shall be appointed for his skill and experience in 
political affairs within the province; one shall be appointed to represent women in 
the province; and one shall be appointed to represent youth in the province” 
(PCAA 1985). 
 Functions of Provincial Governors: The PCAA 1985, section 10 outlines the 
functions of provincial governor as: “to be the chairman of the provincial council 
established for his province; By a process of consultation, suggestion and advice, 
to foster and promote the activities of various Ministries and organs of central 
government in implementing development plans prepared by the provincial council 
established for this province; to coordinate the preparation of development plans 
for his province and to promote the implementation of such plans by other 
Ministries, authorities, agencies or persons; and to perform any other functions 
within or behalf of his province that may be confer upon him or in terms of this Act 
or any other enactment” (PCAA 1985). According to section 4 (1) of the PACC 
(1985), “the President may appoint any person to be the provincial governor of 
any province.” Section 5 of the PACC (1985) indicates that “a person shall be 
qualified for appointment as a provincial governor if he qualified for election or 
appointment as a member of Parliament”.  
It is deduced that the Provincial Councils are dominated by politicians. The office of a 
Provincial Governor was an exclusive domain for politicians.  R2 (Ministry of Local 
Government and Public Works, 2020) confirmed that “the Governor was the political 
leader in a province. The previous trend has been that all provincial governors were 
members of the ruling party”. Section 19 (3) highlights that some decisions could be 
made through votes. Thus, this gave an advantage to politicians who constituted the 
majority of Provincial council membership. In this case it was most likely that Provincial 
Council’s decisions would be biased and push for the interests of the political party 
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with majority representation in the council, thereby defeating the spirit of promoting 
local governance which the Provincial Councils and Administration Act purported to 
be encouraging.  
The literature review points out the risk of policies being biased. Zhou and Zvoushe 
(2012:213) argue that, “equally important is the need to appreciate the intimate link 
between public policies and their ecological contexts. Public policies are influenced by 
the political, economic or other factors that will be dominating during the time of their 
development”. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012:213) further add that, “in fact, public policies 
in terms of content and practice usually carry the imprint of their environment. Each 
environment has its own set of socio-politico-economic dynamics which interact to 
either facilitate or disable sound policy making in the polity”. In support of this, Kenis 
and Schneider (1991:5) indicate that, “numerous policy studies have convincingly 
argued that the processes in the preliminary stages of decision making strongly 
influence the final outcome and very often shape the policy to a larger extent than the 
final processes within the parliamentary arena”.  
Given the central role that Provincial Councils were playing in policy/plans 
development, there were high chances for the policies to favour the political interests 
of the party which they represented. However, in Chapter Four it was argued that the 
right people (apolitical) should occupy the right offices as a determinant for economic 
policies on socio-economic development. This recruitment system closed out talented 
citizens (not aligned to the ruling party) from participating in the development of their 
provinces. Furthermore, other members of the political parties and apolitical 
implementing agencies would disown such provincial plans/policies. 
The enactment of the CoZ introduced a democratised local governance where 
community members elect their local leaders at provincial and local government levels 
through elections, except for the metropolitan provinces (Harare and Bulawayo). 
However, the researcher established that since the dawn of the CoZ the Provincial 
Councils have not yet been established throughout the country. As such, the president 
has been appointing Ministers of State Provincial Affairs (formerly provincial 
governors). The Ministers of State Provincial Affairs are housed within the Office of 
the President and Cabinet, but resident in the various provinces across the country. 
This has created tension between MLGPW staff who are expected (but not provided 
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for in any Act of Parliament) to have dual reporting systems through the MLGPW 
structures as well as the Office of the President and Cabinet through Ministers of State 
for Provincial Affairs (MSPA). This was confirmed by R1 (MSPA 2020) an officer within 
the Minister of State for Provincial Affairs that, “there were operational challenges 
between their Office and the MLGPW”.  This vacuum (created by non-implementation 
of the CoZ) has worsened the coordination of formulation, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of government plans, policies, programmes and projects.  
 Functions of Provincial Councils: The PACC (1985), section 13 articulates the 
functions of provincial councils as: “to promote the development of the province; 
to formulate policies, both short- and long-term, for the provinces; to prepare 
annual development and other plans for the province; to review and evaluate the 
implementation of development plans and policies within the province; and to 
exercise any other functions that may be conferred upon it by or in terms of this 
Act” (PACC 1985). The Provincial Councils and Administration Act 1985 is silent 
on the mandate of Provincial Councils’ engagement in the formulation of national 
economic policies. Furthermore, the Act is mute on the linkages between national 
economic policies and provincial plans. In an interview with an officer in the 
MLGPW (R1 2020) he mentioned that “in most cases the Ministry was not involved 
in the formulation of macro-economic policies. Instead, economic policies were 
prescribed by the ruling party, e.g.  ZimAsset”.  He further indicated that there was 
a mismatch between provincial projects and economic policies (R1, MLGPW 
2020). In addition, R1 (MSPA 2020), a former District Administrator (now a deputy 
director in the Office of the Minister of State responsible for Harare Metropolitan 
province) also established that “the MLGPW structures were not involved in 
consultations during the formulation of economic policies”. In an interview with a 
former officer in the NEPC, it was confirmed that “policy consultations with 
grassroots people were not being done due to resource constraints” (R1 NEPC 
2020). R1 (MLGPW 2020) said “Zvinhu zvaingoitika”, meaning if ever there were 
achievements recorded in the provinces that were in line with economic policies, 
this was purely by coincidence. This confirms lack of coordination between central 
and local government. Sapru (2012:145) articulates that “the policymaking 
process begins with the ideas people have about the actions they want the 
government to undertake.” Regrettably, in Zimbabwe most economic policies 
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follow a top-down approach becoming elite-centric as confirmed by the findings in 
Chapter Four. In support of this, ZIMCODD (2016:9-10) asserts that “the citizens 
of Zimbabwe as the major contributors of state resources in the face of dwindling 
aid resources, and recipients of public service delivery should be fully engaged in 
decision making to ensure ownership in national and local decision-making and 
service delivery. Their input is indispensable and must be at the centre of decision 
making by the different arms of state”.  
During interviews with R1 and R2 (MLGPW, 2020) the researcher learnt that soon 
after the enactment of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act in 1985, 
members of the Provincial Councils genuinely used to coordinate communities to 
participate in the formulation of annual provincial plans, although the plans were 
divorced from the macro-economic policies. Nevertheless, Provincial Councils would 
consult (through the established structures) their respective grassroots people and 
capture the needs/aspirations of the voiceless for inclusion in the annual plans for 
onward submission to the permanent secretary for MLGPW or the NEPC during its 
existence. The Provincial Councils, however, did not have their stand -alone budgets 
to support these plans. Whilst the Provincial Councils were required to produce 
budgets aligned to their plans, these were hardly funded.  Instead the treasury would 
release funds directed to the implementing agencies such as District Development 
Funds, Ministry of Health and Childcare, Ministry of Education with a view to 
implementing projects in the various provinces. This created an uncoordinated 
approach to the usage of resources within a province. Also, provincial councils were 
rendered powerless to hold to account implementing agencies on the usage of project 
funds. R1 (MLGPW, 2020) also revealed that “sometimes Provincial Councils would 
get funds for unbudgeted for projects”. This negatively affected the implementation of 
provincial plans.  
With time Provincial Councils, District councils, Ward Development Committees and 
Village Development Committees developed an apathy towards the crafting of annual 
plans which they knew would barely be implemented. Since it was an obligation for 
Provincial Councils to submit annual plans, they ended up changing dates of the 
previous annual plans and resubmitting them to the MLGPW, without the involvement 
of the grassroots people. All confidence was lost in the process of developing and 
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implementing annual provincial plans which never materialised over the years. The 
grassroots people gradually started to distance themselves from government 
developmental plans, projects, programmes and policies. R1 (MLGPW, 2020) 
succinctly described how communities disown government projects as “Ndezve 
hurumende”, meaning projects that belong to government and they have nothing to do 
with it. The study recommends the decentralisation of formulating plans and polices 
and well as public finance. The WB (2001) affirms that “many developing countries 
and traditional economies have a mandate to decentralise some aspects of the public 
finance. The argument is that decentralisation will increase economic efficiency since 
local governments are better positioned to deliver public services that match local 
preferences and needs than national government”. 
Of interest to note was that the MLGPW development structures incorporated other 
interested agencies such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The 
researcher noted that NGOs meetings are often oversubscribed. In an interview with 
R2 (MLGPW 2020), he explained that “donor meetings are well attended and 
participation overwhelming because villagers felt that they were being involved in the 
development of their communities. More so, they enjoyed the fruits of the projects 
which became an incentive for their continuous participation”. In Chapter Four, some 
of the determinants of economic policies were identified as extensive consultation, 
involvement and participation by citizens. These principles have to be respected and 
entrenched in all government developmental plans, policies, projects and programmes 
to attain the desired results. 
 Provincial Development Committees:  PDCs were established in line with the 
PCAC 1985 [Chapter 29:11]. Section 26 (1) states that “every provincial council 
shall establish a PDC. Section 26 (2) posits that a  PDC shall consist of the 
following members- the provincial administrator for the province; the town clerk, 
principal officer, secretary or senior council officer of every municipal council, town 
council, local board, rural council or district council whose mayors or chairman, as 
the case may be, are members of the provincial council; the senior officer in the 
province of-; the Police force; and the organisation known as the Central 
Intelligence Organisation; and the Zimbabwe National Army; the provincial head 
of each Ministry within the province that the Minister may designate by notice in 
227 
writing to the provincial governor; and such further members representing other 
organisations and interests as the Minister, on the recommendation of the 
provincial governor, may appoint” (PACC 1985). Section 27 of the PCAC, 1985 
postulates that “the provincial administrator shall preside at all meetings of PDC 
at which s/he is present and, in his/her absence, the members present shall elect 
a provincial head of a ministry or department” (PACC 1985). Section 28 of the 
PCAC, 1985 provides for Functions of PDC as: 
(a) “To make recommendations to the Provincial Council as to matters to be 
included in the annual development and other long-term plans for the 
province;  
(b) To assist the provincial council in preparing the annual development and other 
long-term plans for the province; and 
(c) When instructed to do so by the provincial council, to investigate the 
implementation of annual development plans for the province” (PCAC 1985). 
The PDC was the operational arm of the Provincial Council. Although the PDC was a 
body of technocrats and implementing agencies, it did not have powers to make 
decisions. Everything was controlled by the Provincial Council which is an organisation 
peopled with a majority of politicians. In most cases, these councillors are ignorant of 
developmental issues. They occupy those offices because they were voted in by 
electorate not appointed based on merit but merely by virtue of vigorous campaigning 
strategies.   
During interviews with an official at the MLGPW, the researcher was informed that the 
“provincial administrator (director level) was the head of secretariat for the PDC. S/he 
was the most senior civil servant mandated to coordinate all developmental activities 
at provincial level. However, s/he faced resistance from other directors in other 
ministries when s/he calls for a meeting. Also, most provincial administrators did not 
have coordination skills. Fellow directors in other ministries were not taking such 
meetings seriously and would send junior officers to represent the ministry” (R1 
MLGPW 2020). The study analysed the Act and noted that both the Provincial Council 
and Provincial Administrator were not empowered to crack a whip against such rowdy 
behaviours. The Act rendered the Provincial Council toothless thereby creating weak 
accountability and transparency systems. R2 (MLGPW 2020) explained that “with a 
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view to address this challenge, the Public Service Commission (PSC) introduced a 
PSC inspectorate to supervise the implementation of all government projects and 
programmes within a province. However, the PSC inspectorate faced resistance from 
civil servants within that particular province”. As a result, this intervention did not yield 
the desired results.   
5.4.1.5 District Development Committee  
The District Council (DC) and the District Development Committee (DDC) were 
governed by the Urban Councils Act (UCA), 2015 [Chapter 29:15]; or Rural District 
Councils Act (RDCA), 1997 (Chapter 29:15), as the case may be.  The District Council 
was chaired by the Council Chairman, who was elected by the full council. The DDC 
was an operational arm of the District Council. The RDCA (1997:22) outlines 
membership of the district development committee to consist of “the district 
administrator; the chairman of every other committee established by the council; the 
chief executive officer of the council and such other officers of the council as the 
council may determine; and the senior officer in the district of  the Zimbabwe Republic 
Police; the Zimbabwe National Army; and the President’s Department”. The Act also 
states that “the district head of each Ministry and department of a Ministry within the 
district that the Minister may designate by notice in writing to the district administrator” 
(RDCA 1997:22).  
The DDC is headed by the District Administrator, a deputy director post in the MLGPW. 
The purpose of the DDC was to consolidate ward plans and formulate the District 
development plans for recommendation to the District Council.  Section (9) of the 
RDCA (1997), explains that “the chairman of the council may at any time direct that a 
joint meeting be held between the council and its rural district development committee 
for the purpose of considering and approving the district development plan for onward 
submission to the Provincial Council”. R2 (MLGPW 2020) indicated that “the DDC was 
also responsible for monitoring the implementation of district development plans, 
projects and programmes, as tasked by the District Council”. R1 (MLGPW 2020) 
specified that “councils did have the critical skills such as engineers, required to 
supervise implementing agencies and ensure that projects meet the required 
government standards”. Through analysis the study noted that like in the case of 
Provincial Councils, the District Council was an organisation dominated by politicians, 
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most of whom lacked critical skills in project management and general administration. 
This created room for some plans to be politically biased. 
During interviews, R2 (MLGPW 2020) stated that “in the late 1990s civil servants 
serving in the rural areas were drastically disturbed by war veterans who accused 
them of supporting the newly launched opposition party, the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). This resulted in civil servants deserting their workstations, thereby 
negatively affecting the implementation of projects and programmes in the districts”. 
According to African Affairs (2002), the “ruling party has used veterans’ disruption to 
newly conflate party and state structures and district, provincial level, and set up new 
channel of authority”. Civil servants were vetted to ascertain their political inclination. 
In Chapter Four, it was acknowledged that political stability and de-politicisation of 
public institutions were critical success factors for economic policies to attain their 
goals and objectives. Importantly also was the need to fight the conflation of party and 
patronage. Through analysis, the study sees the strong influence of politics in the 
policy cycle, starting from the formulation and implementation stages. It is therefore of 
paramount importance that politics is kept at bay from national development issues. 
This requires strong political will by the highest offices in the country. 
5.4.1.6 Ward Development Committees  
Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) were governed by the Traditional Leaders 
Act, 1998 and Rural/urban Councils Act, whichever was appropriate.  WADCOs were 
coordinated at ward level. Membership comprised Village Development Committees 
(VIDCOs), village heads, traditional chiefs, and civil servants from line ministries with 
on-going projects in that particular ward. The WADCO was chaired by a councillor, 
who is a political figure. These are voted into power through the national electoral 
system. The purpose of WADCO was to coordinate the consolidation of VIDCOs’ 
developmental plans. At this stage, members would agree on projects to be included 
in the ward development plan. The approved ward plan would be sent to the District 
Development Committee.   
5.4.1.7 Village Development Committees 
Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) are governed by the Traditional Leaders 
Act, 1998 and Rural Council Act, 2015. The villagers elect members of their respective 
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VIDCO, chaired by the village head. Through consultations with villagers, the VIDCO 
was responsible for compiling developmental needs/plans of the village.  A village 
assembly which comprised all villagers, would be convened to approve village 
developmental plans. The approved plans would then be forwarded to the WARDCO. 
This system promoted local governance through the “creation of participatory and 
democratic structures capable of identifying local needs and translating them into 
programmes of action” (de Visser, Steytler and Machingauta 2010:8). It is further 
claimed by Sapru (2012:157) that participatory democracy may give to those involved 
considerable influence over the application of programmes at the grassroots level. 
Fatile and Ejalonibu (2015:4) also explain that “local government is an administrative 
agency through which control and authority relates to the people at the grassroots or 
periphery”.  
Generally, these structures were satisfying the determinants of economic policy on 
socio-economic development as articulated in Chapter Four. The structures were 
starting from the national government cascading downwards to the communities to 
promote local governance. However, in an interview with R1 (MLGPW 2020), it was 
indicated that “these structures were only short-lived, they suffered a natural death 
because the villagers’ plans were not being financially supported by government. In 
some cases, office bearers lacked objectivity and abused their political muscles to 
further their personal interests. As such, villagers started to distance themselves from 
these projects/plans. The villagers lost confidence in the structures”. The study also 
found that there was disharmony in the distribution of funds for projects. Since most 
of the senior officials in these structures were politicians, they fought for projects within 
their constituencies to be funded with a view to gratify their electorate, which would 
ensure they continue to secure their offices. Sapru (2012:83) points out that “politicians 
in power maximise the likelihood of winning elections through manipulating the 
economy”.  Adefeso (2014:1) asserts that “it has also been argued that the control of 
macro-economic policies and particularly corruption at lower levels of government, 
would be more difficult as it gives room for politicians to embezzle public funds”.  It is 
important to acknowledge that many countries across the globe have adopted local 
governance structures to effectively promote socio-economic growth and are realising 
huge benefits. The study took a closer look and noted lessons from some countries 
who have decentralised government structures ahead of Zimbabwe to lower levels.  
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 Chinese case-study: The establishment of provinces started in 1927 and includes 
provincial-level administrative divisions or first-level administrative divisions are 
the highest-level Chinese administrative divisions. There are 34 such divisions 
claimed by the People's Republic of China, classified as 23 provinces, 
four municipalities, five autonomous regions, and two Special Administrative 
Regions” (Wikipedia 2020).  Provincial-level administrative issues are “nominally 
led by a provincial committee, headed by a secretary. The committee secretary is 
first-in-charge of the province; second-in-command is the governor of the 
provincial government. Municipality is directly under the administration of the 
central government is a higher level of city which is directly under the Chinese 
government, with status equal to that of the provinces” (Wikipedia 2020).  In 
practice, “their political status is higher than that of common provinces. The four 
municipal cities are Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing and Shanghai. They are headed 
by a mayor who is a delegate in the National People’s Congress and Deputy 
Secretary of the CPC municipal committee. Autonomous regions are a minority 
subject which has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group along 
with its own local government, but an autonomous region theoretically has more 
legislative rights than in actual practice (Wikipedia 2020).  The “governor of each 
autonomous region is usually appointed from the respective minority ethnic group. 
Special Administrative Regions are highly autonomous and self-governing sub 
national subjects of the People's Republic of China that are directly under the 
Central People's Government. Each SAR has a chief executive as head of the 
region and head of government. The region's government is not fully independent, 
as foreign policy and military defence are the responsibility of the central 
government, according to the basic laws’” (Wikipedia 2020).  Xu (2006: 2) explains 
that “local governments are major players to the bulk of the Chinese economy. 
Under the supervision of the central government they initiate, negotiate, and 
implement policies, rules and laws. They drive, influence or hamper 
regional/national economic development, macro-economic condition, 
environment, social stability, etc. That is, Chinese reform trajectories have been 
shaped by regional decentralisation”. Xu (2006:2) further explains that “the 
regional government officials are appointed based on merit. The appointment and 
promotion of regional government officials are served as instruments for the 
central government to induce regional officials to follow centre’s policy”. What is 
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important to learn here is the fact that senior public positions in Council offices 
should be awarded to knowledgeable people who will be able to articulate national 
policies and link them with local development plans. Xu (2006:3) further articulates 
that “the governance of the national economy is delegated to multi-levels of 
regional governments. Regional economies (from provincial level to county level) 
are relatively self-contained and regional governments have overall 
responsibilities to initiate/coordinate reforms”. In Zimbabwe, similar structures 
exist from the provincial level down to the village level. However, the Provincial 
Councils and Administration Act do not give Councils autonomy to be self-
contained and make decisions/reforms regarding the development of their 
respective regions. It is, therefore, important for the Act to be revised and give 
councils legal powers to fully take responsibility in the development of their 
respective regions. 
 Nigerian case-study:  Umaroho (2006:20) explains that “Nigeria experienced a 
form of decentralisation between 1967 and 1975 when twelve states were created 
out of the previous four regions. The number of states increased to nineteen in 
1976, twenty-one in 1987 and thirty-six in 1991, with managerial responsibility 
transferred to the state and local governments for specific functions”. Umaroho 
(2006:20) further articulates that “in a federal system decentralisation entails the 
sharing of powers or devolution of powers from the national to the state 
governments and then to the local authorities, i.e. three-tier government system. 
Such territorial demarcations of authority have greater capacity to ensure efficient 
socio-economic progress and a degree of power-sharing and democratic 
participation. It entails the downward transfer of power and resources to lower-
level authorities which may be more democratic. As sub-divisions of the state they 
are expected to be, within limits, autonomous self-governing and devoid of 
administrative agents of the central government”. Fatile and Ejalonibu (2015:9) 
expound that though, “decentralisation is primarily a strategy for transferring 
authority and responsibility from the central government to sub-national (regional 
and district) levels of government, many African leaders only adopt the concept in 
theory but fail to delegate powers to the districts and regions”. Steytler (2009:255) 
explains the monitoring and evaluation systems in place in Nigeria for local 
government, stating that “local government is supervised mainly by the state 
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government. It does this through a number of supervisory mechanisms. By law, 
the councils’ planning processes, financial transactions, and building and 
construction projects are supervised by the state ministry or bureau for local 
government affairs. The state government supervises and sets standards for, the 
appointment, promotion and discipline of local government employees through 
Local Government Service Commission. It also establishes guidelines for the 
appointment, promotion and discipline of junior local government”. In “terms of the 
state law, the state Houses of Assembly must approve the budget of the local 
governments as well as monitor their expenditures through committees of the state 
legislature” (Steytler 2009:255).  It was stated by Asaju (2000:101) that there are 
four critical dimensions of local government, these include: “(a) Local government 
must be a legal entity distinct from the state and federal government. (b) Local 
government must be administered by democratically elected officials. (c) Local 
government must have specific powers to perform functions assigned to it by law. 
(d) Local government must enjoy substantial autonomy to perform an array of 
functions, plan, formulate and execute its own policies, programmes and projects, 
and its own rules and regulations as deemed for its local needs”. This autonomy 
includes power to control its finance, recruit and discipline its staff (Asaju 
1999:101). In the Zimbabwean case, all four of these dimensions need to be 
entrenched into the local governance systems. 
 South African case-study: Steytler (2009:255) states that “the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution (1996) introduced metropolitan, district and local municipalities. 
By so doing, it establishes two forms of local government; namely metropolitan 
local government and non-metropolitan local government. There are six areas with 
metropolitan local governments; single-tiered metropolitan municipalities, that 
have exclusive municipal authority over their area of jurisdiction. What made these 
areas ‘metropolitan’ is defined in the legislation with reference to indicators such 
as population density, movement of integrated development planning”. The rest of 
the country is divided into district and local municipalities that, according to Steytler 
(2009:255), “share municipal authority over their respective jurisdictions and rely 
on a statutorily defined divisions of authority. This division is a point of 
contestation, partly because there is role confusion. There is little disagreement 
that local municipalities are the interface with local communities and should 
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perform community services, but the role of district municipalities is less clear”. 
Steytler (2009:255) further explains that “national and provincial governments may 
assign or delegate further powers to local government in general or to individual 
municipalities. The instrument of assignment is a form of devolution. It entails the 
transfer of discretion over the functions and the financial risk as well as entitlement 
on intergovernmental funding. However, municipalities are involved in a variety of 
essential public services without always having sufficient authority over 
resources”. However, devolution has brought some challenges as cautioned by 
Vyas-Doorgapersad and Ababio (2010: 515) who state that “there has been a 
marked increase in unethical  conduct  and  corruption  in  local government  in 
South Africa”. The government, according to Vyas-Doorgapersad and Ababio 
(2010: 515) “has acknowledged that the matter has to be addressed as a matter 
of urgency in South Africa as it impacts negatively on service delivery. The 
Republic of South Africa Constitution (1996) provides the  constitutional  basis  for 
promoting ethical conduct”. The Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 
of 1998 is accompanied by a code of conduct for councillors. The Local 
Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 also has introduced a code of 
ethics for employees and officials. The aim of code of conduct is to create a culture 
of ethical actions, deeds and decision by political office-bearers and public office 
bearers in municipalities. 
Zimbabwe can learn from South Africa to delegate executive authority to local 
governance, where the head of the provincial council and district council will have 
executive authority to make decisions within their jurisdictions. Importantly, also is the 
decentralisation of budgets by the national government down to the local government. 
However, Nyikadzino and Vyas-Doorgapersad (2020:247) caution that, “since 
devolution entails restructuring of the state governance machinery, the legislative and 
institutional frameworks that predate and that are not aligned to the CoZ should be 
reviewed and aligned to the devolution spirit. There is, therefore, a need for the 
government to conduct a thorough review of the existing Acts, institutions, and 
practices to determine whether they are still consistent with the CoZ”.   Also, it is 
important that, with a view to curb corruption, a stringent code of conduct must be put 
in place to guide local government officials and protect them from undue influence by 
politicians. Zimbabwe can adopt the ‘Code of Conduct for Councillors’, adopted and 
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implemented by the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa to 
avoid unethical behaviour, conduct and action at the local government level. 
5.4.2 Monitoring and Evaluation of Government Policies, Programmes and 
Projects 
The monitoring and evaluation of government policies, programmes and projects at 
provincial level was being done through meetings, which were to be held once every 
three months. Where necessary a special meeting could be convened. Due to limited 
resources, field visits to monitor and evaluate policies, programmes and projects were 
very limited. Regarding attendance at the meetings, section 22 (1) of PCAA (1985) 
articulates that “a member of a provincial council, other than the provincial governor, 
who is absent without the permission of the provincial council from three consecutive 
meetings thereof, including special meetings, shall, one week after the next meeting 
of the provincial council, cease to be a member of the provincial council; and in the 
case of a member who is a mayor, chairman or councillor of a local authority, ceases 
to be a councillor of that local authority” (PCAA 1985).  
Attendance at meetings was meant to promote information sharing amongst provincial 
members and holding to account any member for not having done, or failing to 
execute, tasks bestowed upon him/her. The Act only penalised councillors for failing 
to attend meetings for three consecutive periods. However, at district level, this 
provision was not applicable. The Act was also silent on other members who were not 
councillors, thereby creating inconsistences. The Act was quiet on members who 
failed to perform their duties. During an interview with an officer in the MLGPW (R1 
2020), the researcher learnt that “there were no recorded cases of any member who 
was ever expelled from the Provincial council, due to non-attendance of meeting or for 
not performing as required. In most cases, the provincial governor and councillors 
would be from the same political party so they wouldn’t want to embarrass their party. 
In addition, once the councillor is expelled, fresh elections would need to be conducted 
and there would be fear for the party to lose the seat to an opposition”. In this regard, 
the monitoring and evaluation system was weakened. It is recommended that the 
Provincial and District Councils have legal powers to hold to account all members to 
enable them to execute their duties. Devolution of budgets by central government to 
local authorities is also paramount to capacitate Provincial and District Councils to 
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execute their obligations. It is also important to for Provincial Councils to recruit 
talented people to occupy senior positions. These would be knowledgeable enough to 
coordinate consultations on the formulation of macro-economic policies with 
grassroots people and facilitate their linkages with village, ward, district and provincial 
plans. As such, funding of these plans would be done through the national budgets 
when economic policies are being funded. 
5.4.3 Effective Implementation and Evaluation Systems 
The literature reviewed from Zaaba and Gunggut (2014:2) pinpointed four criteria for 
effective implementation, that are supported with primary and secondary information:   
(1) Clearly specified tasks and objectives that accurately reflect the intent of policy.  
Section 5.1 above aims to find answers to research questions (see Chapter 
One, Section 1.3) and analysed the objectives of the policies (see Chapter One, 
Section 1,4; and Chapter Five, Section 5.6) under study. The analysis noted 
that most of the policies’ objectives did not adequately meet all the SMART 
principles which makes it difficult to unpack the policies and come up with 
actionable tasks to achieve the policy’s goals/vision. It is thus recommended 
that future policies should have clear visions, goals and objectives. In Chapter 
Four, one of the determinants of economic policies was identified as having 
clear policy goals and visions. This is in congruence with Zaaba and Gunggut 
(2014:2)’s first criterion for effective implementation. 
(2) A management plan that allocates tasks and performance standards to sub-
units. The research observed that implementation plans for the policies were 
non-existent, which did not allow for an integrated/coordinated approach by 
various implementing agencies towards policy implementation. In addition, 
Provincial Council did not have implementation plans as the implementing 
agencies had lost confidence in the planning process. In Section 5.2.2.4, the 
literature reviewed from University Centre Quayside (2018:4) indicated the 
importance of developing policies or plans which are ‘realistic’ and ‘achievable’ 
to win implementing agencies’ confidence. Failure to meet these attributes 
results in demotivated staff not willing to implement something they already 
know will not achieve the intended results.  R1 (MLGPW 2020) indicated that 
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“some Provincial Administrators did not have the coordination skills”.  In 
Chapter Four, one of the determinants on economic policies was identified as 
good coordination. Without implementation plans in place which allocate tasks 
to implementing agencies as well as specifying timelines and performance 
indicators, then effective coordination cannot be attained.   
(3) An objective means of measuring performance of sub-units. The study noted 
that there were no objective means of measuring performance of units during 
the period under study. It is recommended that an implementation plan which 
is developed by all implementing agencies, serves as an objective tool for 
measuring performance of sub-units. The implementation plan should clearly 
articulate tasks, responsible agency/unit, performance indicators, timelines and 
means of verification.  
(4) A system of management controls and social sanctions sufficient to make 
subordinates accountable for their performance. Zaaba and Gunggut (2014:2) 
state that “successful implementation entails compliance with statutes 
directives and goals; achievement of specific success indicators; and 
improvement in the political climate”. During the period under review, the 
Provincial Councils and Administration Act did not have any provisions to 
penalise implementing agencies who failed to execute their mandates. In 
Zimbabwe, the Results Based Management System was introduced in 2004 by 
government as a management control tool to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of policies and programmes. However, this has not yet been 
institutionalised by government ministries and other implementing agencies, 
thus creating room for non-accountability of results. It is therefore 
recommended that there be legal frameworks that compel implementing 
agencies to institutionalise and comply with the RBM principles. Apart from 
penalising non-performers, the RBM system must also reward good 
performers.  
Given the above analysis, the monitoring and evaluation structure and systems were 
very weak. During interviews with MLGPW officials, it was highlighted that the country 
had a deficiency of monitoring and evaluation experts. In addition, there were no 
budgetary allocations for the monitoring and evaluation function by the Provincial 
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Councils. It is recommended that government capacitates its employees with the 
requisite monitoring and evaluation skills and to also provide adequate budgetary 
requirements for monitoring and evaluation.    
5.5 Existence of political will to support the implementation of economic 
policies 
Sarajevo (2015:14) defines political will as the “extent of committed support among 
key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem. Within that 
framework, there are four important components- sub-conceptual areas -of the 
proposed definition of political will: 1. A sufficient set of decision-makers; 2. with a 
common understanding of a particular problem on the common agenda; 3. is 
committed to supporting; 4. A commonly perceived, potentially effective policy 
solution”. Hence, according to Sarajevo (2015:14), “the presence of political will is 
detected under the condition that all four areas are activated; in other words, provided 
that there is a sufficient set of decision makers who share understanding of a problem 
and who are fully committed to providing support, and provided that there is agreement 
on effectiveness of the policy; whilst the absence is detected in the event that one or 
all of the sub conceptual areas are not covered”. Funkhouser (2018:1) affirms that 
“political will is not some kind immutable and innate personal quality. It is not the same 
as political courage or conviction. It is a deliberate social construct, and every positive 
advance of public policy rests upon its successful”. The willingness or capability of 
political leaders to see that a policy they publicly advocated actually gets implemented, 
and outcomes achieved, in the way they imagined when they went through the trouble 
of advocating something, means a reasonably large and interesting body of literature 
focusing on policy implementation has been developing within the policy studies field” 
(Kielkopf 2014:1). The key components of political will from the literature reviewed are 
involvement and agreement on decisions, determination to solve the problems, 
willingness/commitment and capability by key stakeholders. All this must be 
championed by individuals occupying the highest government offices. There are 
minimum features required for a policy to meet required standards from formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation to be able to ultimately achieve its intended 
goals and objectives. It requires political will for these standards to be met. 
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At the formulation stage of the economic policies, the researcher noted that the 
policies followed a top down-down approach as was confirmed by MLGPW, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development, National Economic Planning Commission 
and several other respondents. This indicates that the authorities responsible for 
formulating policies had no political will to address the needs of the grassroots level. 
The dominance of elites in the form of economic, political and technocrats is evidently 
seen in the policy life cycle. In literature reviewed in Chapter Two, it was observed that 
international, regional and national policies were mainly serving the interests of the 
elite and Zimbabwe has unfortunately fallen onto the same path. From the global level 
modernisation theories (such as the theory of development, theory of dependency, 
theory of world systems and theory of globalisation) which were adopted by African 
countries, it appears these were serving the interests of the former colonial masters. 
The continental policies such as the Monrovia strategy for economic development of 
Africa, Africa Union Agenda 2063 and The New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD), have strong linkages with the North at the expense of the development of 
the South. Within the SADC region, again the policies’ benefits can be traced to 
feeding the core, through resource exploitation from the periphery.   These regional 
policies include: the regional indicative strategic development plan, SADC industrial 
development policy framework and SADC free trade policy. In Zimbabwe, policies are 
also excluding the grassroots level; thus fulfilling the interests of the economically 
powerful and political elite. 
All the interviewees and secondary data confirmed that the policy budgets surpassed 
the resources available, thereby demotivating the implementing agencies. Also, the 
critical skills required to execute the policies were scarce. Although there are 
established devolved structures from national cascading downwards to the grassroots 
level, these were not effectively functional as they did not have the requisite legal 
powers to autonomously run their respective regions. Also, the abuse of the structures 
for self-benefit by those entrusted to champion development contributed to the 
collapse of these systems, albeit with no consequences.  
At implementation stage, there was no structured monitoring and evaluation system 
that would compel implementing agencies to be accountable and sincerely execute 
the policy objectives. The study noted that from the 1980s when the Zimbabwe 
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introduced the Growth with Equity Policy, government was struggling to contain 
excessive expenditure (sometimes incurred through illegal ways), with recurrent 
expenditure gobbling the bulk of the national budget. Surprisingly, all budget 
statements reviewed acknowledged this misdemeanour and promised to address it, 
but that was never done. The Auditor General’s reports outline recommendations that 
public institutions should pay attention to, and address areas of weaknesses, but these 
are rarely followed. No agent is mandated to ensure compliance with the Auditor 
General’s recommendations. Cases of a criminal nature are barely followed by the law 
enforcement agencies. In fact, the problems have grown out of hand year after year. 
Such incidences demonstrate the weak political will in existence to genuinely address 
the problems at hand. This study therefore recommends genuine reforms within the 
public service to improve the socio-economic development of the country. The reforms 
include recruitment process of senior civil servants, de-politicisation of the public 
institutions, clear separation of powers amongst the three arms of government, 
enforcement of laws such as the CoZ, Anti-corruption Act, Public Finance 
Management Act, amongst others.  
In Chapter Four, respondent R33 (PTTT 2018) mentioned that “there was weak 
political will to support the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
economic policies”. Sapru (2012:151) advocates that “political and judiciary support is 
critical (from legislative, executive and judiciary wings of government) for successful 
formulation and implementation of policy”. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1993, in Sapru 
2012:159), indicate “a critical condition for the successful implementation of policies 
as that the leaders of the implementation agencies possess substantial managerial 
and political skill and are committed to statutory goals”.  
In summary, the determinants of economic policies are shown in figure 5.2 below. 
These are interwoven and depend on each other for the success of macro-economic 
policies. It is therefore crucial that all these factors are respected and given the due 
attention they deserve. From the diagram the arrows represent the strong political will 
required to drive all the factors in the figure. Without it at any stage of the policy cycle, 
nothing will materialise. 
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Figure 5.2: Determinants of Economic Policies on Socio-economic 
Development 
 
Source: (Researcher’s own illustration) 
Figure 5.2 above succinctly summarises the critical success factors of economic 
policies in Zimbabwe throughout the policy’s life cycle. At the formulation stage, there 
should be wide consultation, participation and inclusion of the citizens and other 
stakeholders with a view to collectively identify and agree on the actual needs or 
problems in the economy, society or political sphere. The contributions from citizens, 
especially the most vulnerable members of the communities, must be listened to and 
their concerns addressed in the policy. It is at this point where the policy must be 
clearly understood by all, right from the start to ensure policy clarity. Thus the vision, 
goals and objectives ought to be expressed in a simplified manner and satisfying the 
‘SMART’ principles. A cost- benefit analysis must be done to guide the policy and 
avoid an overambitious policy which is not achievable. The policy must have a clear 
implementation plan and structures, allocating responsibilities and timeframes to 
242 
stakeholders. The study found that policy formulation must be done by a professional 
body which is apolitical. The same body will be responsible for conducting coordination 
roles as well as monitoring and evaluating the implementing agencies. These must be 
carried throughout the policy life cycle.  
At the implementation stage, adequate resources must be allocated and decentralised 
to the implementing agencies. Employment of personnel (apolitical) should be based 
on merit; that is, the- right -skills -at -the -right -place -at -the -right -time to execute the 
policy, adhering to the principles of accountability and transparency. With transparent 
and accountable systems in place, corruption and fiscal indiscipline will be thwarted 
and the public will have access to performance information all the time. Accordingly, 
the public will be able to identify implementing agencies failing to execute their tasks 
and thus being punished whilst those performing well are rewarded. All government 
institutions ought to be apolitical and accessible by all. The right people must occupy 
the right offices and adhere to tenets of professionalism. Political stability and political 
will have to be entrenched throughout the policy life cycle, as without it the critical 
success factors explained above will be in vain. The implementation of all these 
determinants of economic policies on socio-economic development automatically 
addresses the issues attracting sanctions on Zimbabwe. All these determinants are 
intertwined and depend on each other. As such, they have to be simultaneously 
implemented in their entirety. 
5.6 Summary  
This chapter addressed all the research objectives as outlined in Chapter One section 
1.4 and also outlined in section 5.1 in this chapter, such as: “to explain the Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time Framed (SMART) policy 
objectives to improve economic policies for socio-economic development in 
Zimbabwe; to discuss adequate resources that are availed to support 
implementation/action plans to improve economic policies for socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe; mechanisms that are available to monitor, evaluate and 
supervise implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe; and political will that is 
available to support implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe” (see Chapter 
One, Section 1.4). In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter utilised primary 
and secondary sources of information to provide an analytical framework of the 
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determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe. The chapter offered a specific and 
general analysis of selected policies in their compliance with SMART principles. The 
chapter thereafter analysed the usage of financial resources which were availed to 
support implementation of plans; structures in place to monitor, evaluate and 
supervise implementation of economic policies by government agencies; structures 
for formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of economic policies; 
monitoring and evaluation of government policies, programmes and projects; effective 
monitoring and evaluation systems; and existence of political will to support the 
implementation of economic policies. The results revealed that policy development, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation were being done in a top-down manner. 
There was minimal, or a total lack of, involvement of stakeholders in policy issues. 
Some respondents indicated that the policies are politically prescribed and not linked 
to economic realities of the citizens. Hence, most citizens were divorced from the 
policy discourse. The researcher trusts that if all the determinants of economic policies 
explained in this study are adhered to, there will be rapid social, economic and political 
development in the country. It is important to note that the wholesome implementation 
of CoZ will address most of the aspects outlined in this study; nonetheless it takes 
political will to do that. Those in the positions of authority in government must create 
political will. It is therefore imperative for everyone within Zimbabwe to adhere to all 
the provisions of the Constitution. Constitutionalism must be simultaneously 
implemented with the rule of law by all to bring sanity to the country. The next chapter 
summarises the whole study, evaluating if all the objectives were met. The chapter will 




SYNTHESIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis was to understand the determinants of Zimbabwe’s 
economic policies on socio-economic development. The information and data were 
gathered to understand the critical success factors of these economic policies that 
were implemented in Zimbabwe. Against the background of the thesis, conceptualised 
and contextualised economic policies, and the socio-economic environment of 
Zimbabwe that requires effective implementation of economic policies for 
development, were evaluated. Various economic reforms were discussed reconciling 
indigenous and endogenous strategies for helping Africa, the SADC and Zimbabwe in 
particular to reclaim their own development path. 
This final chapter of the thesis offers a synthesis of the main findings of the study. The 
aim is to draw conclusions and propose recommendations for improvement. The 
thesis used a qualitative approach to gather data. In order to strengthen the research 
methodology, obtrusive and unobtrusive methods were triangulated in the study. 
Various data collection methods were used to obtain insightful information and 
responses; hence aiming to fill the identified gap in literature. 
As indicated in Chapter One, the main research guiding question to be addressed is: 
“What are the determinants of economic policies, and what critical success factors are 
required to improve economic policies for socio-economic development in 
Zimbabwe?” (see Chapter One, section 1.2).  
The guiding research question presented above was sub-divided into nine research 
objectives (see Chapter One, section 1.4), which were discussed in the first five 
chapters of the thesis. These research objectives include the following: 
 To conceptualise and explain the meaning and evaluation phases of the concept 
‘public policy’; 
 To discuss economic reforms experienced in Africa, the Southern Africa 
Development Community and in Zimbabwe; 
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 To discuss the economic policies in Zimbabwe; 
 To explain the determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe; 
 To explain the Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time 
Framed (SMART) policy objectives to improve economic policies for socio-
economic development in Zimbabwe; 
 To discuss adequate resources that are availed to support implementation/action 
plans to improve economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe; 
 To discuss mechanisms that are available to monitor, evaluate and supervise 
implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe; 
 To discuss political will that is available to support implementation of economic 
policies in Zimbabwe; and 
 To provide the possible recommendations to improve economic policies for socio-
economic development in Zimbabwe. 
A synthesis of the study and conclusions that are drawn from the study are discussed 
in the proceeding sections in line with the above-stated research objectives.   
6.2 Synthesis and findings of the research objectives 
The study utilised the triangulation of both obtrusive and unobtrusive methods. These 
methods were considered significant for collection of both primary and secondary data 
to address the research questions (see Chapter One, Section 1.3) and research 
objectives (see Chapter One, Section 1.4). The findings have assisted the researcher 
to draw recommendations regarding identifying the critical success factors for effective 
implementation of economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. 
6.2.1 Economic Reforms in Africa, Southern Africa Development Community 
and Zimbabwe 
Chapter Two clarifies research objectives one and two of the study (see Chapter One, 
section 1.4) which are: to conceptualise and explain the meaning and evaluation 
phases of the concept ‘public policy’; and to discuss economic reforms experienced in 
Africa, the Southern Africa Development Community and in Zimbabwe. In order to 
achieve the objectives, the chapter finds answers to the following research questions 
(see Chapter One, section 1.3): 
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 What is the meaning of, and evaluation phases of, the concept ‘public policy’?   
 What are economic reforms experienced in Africa, the Southern Africa 
Development Community and in Zimbabwe? 
Chapter Two discusses three distinct phases of public policy showing a trend that 
public policy processes have followed over some years.  The stages are namely; The 
Neo-Liberal Stage, Post-independence Policy Formulation in Africa and the 3G Public 
Policy Formation in Africa. The stages seek to demonstrate the neo-liberal domination 
of the “public policy formation agenda which was bolstered by the elections of the 
Thatcher Government in 1979 and the Reagan Administration in 1980” (Dietz, 
Havnevik, Kaag and Oestigaard 2011:328) (see Section 2.2.1). In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the pre-independence policies were biased towards enrichment of the 
minority colonial regime. The trade agreement signed between South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia was also controlled by the Europeans. The intention behind the 
trade agreement was to cater for the expanded European population (see Section 
2.2.1.1). In the case of Zimbabwe, the post-independence era was experienced in the 
early 1980s after Zimbabwe had attained its independence. The post-independence 
government launched a home grown development policy named ‘Growth with Equity 
Policy’ published in 1981. Policy making “was generally expansionary and 
redistributive with a definable bias to meet the goal of widening accessibility of public 
goods and services” (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012:215). Based on the unsustainable 
expansionary and redistributive policies in the 1980s, the Government of Zimbabwe 
then realised the need to focus on creating more wealth which ushered in a new phase 
of an economic structural adjustment programme with the objective of stimulating 
higher rates of economic growth (see Section 2.2.1.2).  
During the 3G (third generation public policy) formulation phase, the Government of 
Zimbabwe considered that the FER/ESAP “policy measures carried high political and 
social costs for both society and the political leadership. Cutting the size of the civil 
service and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, withdrawal of subsidies and 
grants and the introduction of user fees in hospitals carried huge socio-politico-
economic costs for the public and the national leadership in most African countries. 
Thus, the political will to implement these reform prescriptions and bear the attendant 
social costs was on a low note” (Zhou and Zvoushe 2012:217) (see Section 2.2.1.3).  
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The economic reforms in Africa witnessed the dominant policies in Africa’s 
development strategies and include: modernisation theories of the 1950s; the inward-
looking industrialisation (Import Substitution) model of the 1960s; the growth-with-
equity paradigm of the 1970s; the neo-classical paradigm of the 1980s; and the 
sustainable economic development model of the 1990s. Finally, after reviewing the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)’s economic agenda for the 21st 
century, Africa has put forward a model that could reconcile indigenous and 
endogenous strategies for helping Africa to promote socio-economic development 
(see Section 2.3). Modernisation theories (see Section 2.3.1) emphasised a theory of 
development (see Section 2.3.1.1); theory of dependency (see Section 2.3.1.2); theory 
of world systems (see Section 2.3.1.3); theory of globalisation (see Section 2.3.1.4); 
and Arthur Lewis’ industrialisation by invitation model (see Section 2.3.1.5). 
The researcher’s analysis suggests that African development may need policies which 
consider its people’s culture and traditions. Prebisch (1950) developed the Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy which was predominant in the 1960s.  
African countries during this phase were economically dependent on the West for their: 
technology and capital goods industries; managerial skills; finance; and marketing 
skills (see Section 2.3.2). The Growth with Equity Policy failed due to the recession 
faced by many African countries (see Section 2.3.3). The Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) dominated the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in 1980s. This 
demonstrates that the developed nations and the world financial institutions only 
supported African policies which served their ideologies; hence the advent of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa (see Section 2.3.4).  
In order to access financial credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB), African countries were forced to undertake Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) as another Economic Reform for the development of Africa (see 
Section 2.3.5). NEPAD has also not done well because on the international market, 
Africa does not possess the same leverage as the West (see Section 2.3.6). This study 
noted that most of the flagship projects are yet to take-off. It is important for the African 
Union (AU) to identify the challenges being faced by member countries lagging behind 
and proffer viable solutions (see Section 2.3.7). 
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Economic reforms in the SADC include the Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan (RISDP) that was extended to 2020 (see Section 2.4).  The plan continues to be 
improved and aims to be finalised taking into account the SADC Industrial 
Development Policy Framework (IDPF) (see Section 2.4.1); the IDPF which is in line 
with the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) adopted in 
2012 (see Section 2.4.2); and  the Free Trade Area (FTA) which was established in 
the SADC Region during 2008. The SADC is the brain child of the western countries, 
and its policies are meant to directly or indirectly benefit the core. In this regard, South 
Africa (metropolis of the region) remains the biggest beneficiary of these policies. 
Zimbabwe has not benefited to a large extent (see Section 2.4.3). 
Economic reforms in Zimbabwe resulted in policies that were meant for high-growth 
reaching nearly double-digit rates each year for a decade. Several institutions were 
created to support industrialisation. These include the Industrial Development 
Corporation, Industrial Promotion Corporation of Central Africa Limited, Tribal Trust 
Lands Development Corporation, Agricultural Land Bank, Mining Council, Universal 
Exports, amongst others (see Section 2.5).  The literature highlights that like in the 
international and regional fraternity, in Zimbabwe, to some extent the public policies 
are biased towards political feasibility. 
6.2.2 A Review of Economic Policies in Zimbabwe 
Chapter Three clarified research objective three of the study provided in Chapter One 
(section 1.4) that is: to discuss economic policies in Zimbabwe. In order to achieve 
these objectives, the chapter provides answers to the following research question (see 
Chapter One, section 1.3):  
 What are economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
Chapter Three discussed all of Zimbabwe’s national economic policies that were 
developed from the period of 1980 to 2015. The chapter focused on the reason these 
policies were developed, the achievements and challenges of the predecessor policy, 
vision, goals and objectives, targets of the policy under review, strategies to address 
the goals and objectives, budget and funding mechanisms, and monitoring and 
evaluation plans associated with these policies. The chapter discussed the following 
249 
National Economic Policies in detail, such as: Growth with Equity (1981); Transitional 
National Development Plan (1982/83 -1984/85);  Zimbabwe: A Framework for 
Economic Reform (1991-95); Second Five-Year National Development Plan (1991-
1995); Vision 2020 (2000); Ten Point Plan (2002); National Economic Revival 
Programme: Measures to Address the Current Challenges (2003); Zimbabwe: 
Towards Sustained Economic Growth- Macro-Economic Policy Framework (2005-
2006); Short-Term Economic Stabilisation Programme (2008); Short Term Emergency 
Recovery Programme: Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again (2009); Three Year Macro-
Economic Policy and Budget Framework: STERP II (2010-2012): Reconstruction With 
Equitable Growth and Stability; Zimbabwe Medium-Term Plan (2011-2015); and 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset) 
October 2013-December 2018. 
The Growth with Equity Policy (GWEP) was introduced in the years of independence 
“aimed at redressing colonial era imbalances by assimilating previously marginalised 
people into the mainstream economy. These indigenous people did not have the 
means and capacity to participate in the economic programmes. As such government 
launched this policy to capacitate indigenous people through providing free education 
and health, job creation and land resettlement” (Sibanda and Makwata 2017:1) (see 
Section 3.2). The Three Year Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) had its 
roots in the GWEP. The Plan should have prioritised programmes and projects which 
could be quickly implemented, with high impact and easily implementable 
programmes/projects with respect to financial and technical resources. The Plan 
heavily depended on external funding for its execution, which was not sustainable (see 
Section 3.3). The Framework for Economic Reform (FER) was a complete departure 
from the GWEP’s focus. In the financial sector, “removal of barriers of entry resulted 
in more new merchant banks, discount houses and commercial banks which were 
started by the indigenous black Zimbabweans. On trade and exchange market 
liberalisation, FER resulted in the deregulation of exchange control regimes” (SDM 
Institute for Management Development 2020:1) (see Section 3.4). The Second Five-
Year National Development Plan (SFYNDP) was meant to be implemented 
simultaneously with A Framework for Economic Reform (FER) i.e.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The SFYNDP focused on 
economic growth without a human face. It placed emphasis on economic growth whilst 
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introducing harsh socio-economic conditions for the general citizens. Austerity 
measures such as cutting the civil service, privatisation of the state enterprises, 
withdrawal of subsidies and grants, were some of the burdens that ordinary citizens 
were to live with (see Section 3.5). The Vision 2020 policy was also known as the 
National Long-Term Perspective Studies (NLTPS). The aspirations of the people as 
espoused in the Vision 2020 were necessary aspects for building fundamental 
systems for sustainable national development. The Vision sought to entrench tenets 
of inclusivity and participation by all in the affairs of the country, which was essential 
for building systems that promote sustainable development (see Section 3.6).  
One of the main objectives of the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme-MERP 
2000 was to enhance economic growth in the country. This policy was put in place to 
stabilise the economy which was not performing well. The challenges being faced at 
that time were spiralling inflation, unstable local currency, lack of mutual trust and 
confidence among citizens, huge budget deficit, lower industrial capacity utilisation, 
dwindling investment inflows, sluggish economic growth rate, high interest rates, low 
disposable real incomes and poor living standards. It also sought to restore normal 
cooperative relations with the international community (see Section 3.7). The Ten-
Point Plan was a Presidential proclamation. It was a top-down policy where citizens 
and other stakeholders were not consulted. Generally, the policy sought to promote 
the implementation of the land reform programme, which was a political issue. 
Furthermore, the Policy intended to directly and indirectly, involve government in the 
control of the economy. Also, the policy wanted to give more powers to the local 
indigenous people in economic development (see Section 3.8). 
 The National Economic Revival Programme (NERP 2003: i) was a follow up on 
challenges observed in the 2003 Budget. NERP was reacting to the economy that was 
performing badly. Sanctions, negative perceptions of the country’s international image 
and low confidence in the economy were key issues highlighted by NERP which 
needed attention. In this regard, the policy is commendable for introducing a new 
policy aspect of a Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) comprising Government, 
business and labour with a view to build consensus on national issues (see Section 
3.9). The policy framework called Towards Sustained Economic Growth- Macro-
Economic Policy Framework (MEPF) 2005-2006 took over from the National 
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Economic Revival Programme (NERP) which was implemented from 2003 to 2004. 
The MEPF had a clear linkage with its predecessor, NERP. The policy highlighted the 
achievements and challenges faced by NERP and gaps, which ought to have been 
addressed by the MEPF. This linkage is important in the policy discourse to foster 
national development. Like other previous policies, the MEPF was faced with the same 
challenges of economic development. Policy goals, objectives, targets, 
implementation plans and how the policy would be funded were all clearly articulated 
(see Section 3.10).  
The Short-Term Economic Stabilisation Programme (STESP) was introduced to deal 
with severe economic challenges that the country was facing. The STESP was top-
down as it was formulated by the National Security Council and consultations were 
done with the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF). Clearly there was no 
input form the citizens’ business community and civic organisations (see Section 3.11). 
The Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) was a short-term 
stabilisation programme. STERP’s goal was to stabilise the economy which had 
collapsed. It also focused on political and governance issues, social protection 
programmes and supply side reforms. The inclusive government, first and foremost, 
wanted to put the structural fundamentals in place laying out the foundation for 
economic development. The policy therefore focused on short-term deliverables such 
as the use of multi-currencies, banning of quasi-fiscal expenditure and cash budgeting 
to curb inflationary pressures in the economy (see Section 3.12). The Macro-Economic 
Policy and Budget Framework: STERP II (2010-2012) was aimed to bridge the gap 
between STERP and the Medium-Term Plan (MTP). STERP II was formulated as a 
result of full engagement and wide consultations with various stakeholders. The policy 
had clear linkages with its predecessor. Thus it sought to concretise the gains of 
STERP as well as addressing the outstanding challenges (see Section 3.13).  
The MTP was produced as the premier economic and social policy document of 
Zimbabwe. The MTP had a strong linkage with the previous policies. It was an all-
inclusive policy which was developed through consultative processes. The policy had 
clear goals, objectives, targets, implementation matrix and budget (see Section 3.14).  
The aim of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
(Zim-Asset) was to develop a country with a growing economy. The policy did not have 
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a linkage with the previous policy. It did not have goals, objectives, targets and budget.  
Instead, it was a document with a ballooned list of programmes and projects grouped 
into four clusters which were expected to be implemented within the lifespan of the 
Zim-Asset.  There were no measures to execute the policy (see Section 3.15).  
6.2.3 Determinants of Economic Policies in Zimbabwe 
Chapter Four aimed to achieve research objective four that is: to explain the 
determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe (see Chapter One, Section 1.4). In 
order to achieve this objective, the chapter aimed to find answers to the following 
research question (see Chapter One, section 1.3):  
 What are determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
The Chapter discusses the determinants of economic policies in Zimbabwe based on 
findings gathered from primary and secondary data sources. Data triangulation was 
important to validate the findings, the gist of this research. The study believes that if 
these determinants are implemented in their totality, all economic policies will achieve 
their goals and objectives. Above all, the fundamental challenges pulling down the 
country will be a thing of the past and Zimbabwe will flourish economically, socially, 
culturally, politically and in all other developmental trajectories. 
The success and failure of economic policies depends on how the government 
executes its three roles, the  political, administrative and economic. The study noted 
that good governance and democracy are neatly interwoven. From the research 
findings, the key issues that need to be addressed in Zimbabwe to achieve positive 
socio-economic development were identified as good governance and democracy. 
Here, good governance and democracy apply to political, administrative and economic 
spheres (see Section 4.2.1). The governance in Zimbabwe was discussed into two 
categories, both political and economic. In Zimbabwe, the issue of illegitimate 
governments has been an issue of concern since the main opposition party MDC first 
contested for presidential elections in 2002. This has led to numerous demonstrations 
by citizens expressing their dissatisfaction with how the country was being governed, 
particularly due to the economic meltdown driving the majority of people into poverty. 
In response to this, government has been using excessive force by deploying state 
security agencies to quell the demonstrations (see Section 4.2.1). The political and 
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economic governance issues are intertwined, hence simultaneously discussed in the 
chapter.  
The chapter explores various concerns related to governance in Zimbabwe. Citizens’ 
concerns are rarely addressed since those in power tend to focus on self-enrichment, 
which is the sole reason why they contest for highest office in government. Most 
importantly, state institutions will only exist to serve loyal members of the political party 
in power. The rest of the citizens are neglected, yet they contribute to the fiscus 
through paying taxes (see Section 4.2.1.1). With appointing powers of critical positions 
in public institutions centralised, it is very difficult for checks and balances to be 
effectively conducted on how government business is being run (see Section 4.2.1.1). 
Bad governance has turned Zimbabwe into the source of man-made economic 
decline. This includes failure to implement electoral reforms, unrealistic economic 
policies and fiscal indiscipline (such as large scale printing of local currency by the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe), among other things. Lack of good governance and 
democracy manifests itself in many other problems (see Section 4.2.1.3).  
The chapter discusses a few aspects demonstrating how some government 
institutions have lost autonomy and professionalism when executing their mandates 
making it difficult for accountability to be entrenched. One such case (that is in the 
public domain) is stated as: an example of how the judiciary system has been captured 
(lost accountability) is explained by the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa 
(2012:16), as quoted “the then Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 
Patrick Chinamasa was fingered as having interfered with the functions of the judiciary 
in a case involving the Associated Newspaper Group of Zimbabwe (ANZ) and the 
Media and Information Commission (MIC). The ANZ, a duly registered company, was 
banned from publishing its newspaper, ‘the Daily News’” (see Section 4.2.2). The 
study found that a lack of transparency created fertile grounds for corruption, 
nepotism, inefficiencies in the usage of resources and a lot of problems that hinder the 
effective implementation of the policies (see Section 4.2.3).  
The chapter further discusses legislative and regulatory frameworks related to fiscal 
management that include: the Constitution of Zimbabwe (No 20) 2013, Public Debt 
Management Act 2015, Joint Venture Act 2015, Public Entities Corporate Governance 
Act 2018, Public Finance Management Act 2016, and Public Procurement and 
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Disposal of Asset Act 2017 and Regulations. The institutional arrangements mandated 
to effectively manage public funds include the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, Parliament, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Auditor General’s Office. The 
procedures/ instructions to be followed in the management of public finances with a 
view to ensure transparency, accountability and clear reporting structures include the 
Public Finance Management Systems, Treasury instructions and manuals (see 
Section 4.2.4).  
Furthermore, political instability has attracted economic sanctions on Zimbabwe. This 
resulted in lack of access to medium- and long-term financing for critical investment in 
infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance as well as limited access by business to 
lines of credit. Some parastatals and state enterprises accused of funding political 
violence were also placed on the sanctions list inhibiting them from exporting; thereby 
further affecting foreign currency inflows to the country (see Section 4.2.5). The 
chapter discussed some cases exploring the responsiveness of public institutions. 
One such case (that is in public domain) discussed was: “in the mid-1980s, there was 
a government facility to purchase government vehicles from Willowvale Motor 
Industries for official use. The Willowvale scandal implicated several ZANU-PF elite, 
cabinet and senior government officials, after being found guilty of breaching the law 
that governed the buying and selling of second-hand cars. Individuals abused this 
facility and purchased vehicles at lower prices and resold them in the market at 
exorbitant prices for a profit. This pushed President Mugabe to set up a Commission 
of Inquiry led by Justice Wilson Sandura which was to be known as the Sandura 
Commission of Inquiry and the whole motor scandal dubbed the ‘Willowgate Scandal’. 
The Sandura commission fingered many senior officials who had huge sums of 
deposits in their bank accounts which they failed to account for and they admitted to 
their crime without perjury” (Dari and Hamauswa 2016:3) (see Section 4.2.6).  
The political interferences may also emanate from the international community thereby 
affecting the smooth implementation of policies. The Framework for Economic 
Recovery was an internationally politically induced policy which created havoc in the 
country. The policy advisors were not sincere in addressing the socio-economic 
problems of Zimbabwe. There was no international political will from the authors of the 
policy to address the country’s then challenges (see Section 4.2.7). It is important to 
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note that economic policies should never be formulated, implemented and evaluated 
using a top-down approach. In addition, policies should not be prescribed by anyone 
who is not an intended beneficiary. The Government should always engage the 
citizens (especially the grassroots levels) and all the stakeholders to participate more 
in developing the policy for they are the intended beneficiaries of the policy outcome, 
who know exactly what they want in their lives (see Section 4.2.8). 
Inappropriate state dominated policies should not have space in the development 
agenda. Due consideration should be taken that the vision, goals and objectives of 
policies are prioritised and realistic. These should be developed after stakeholder 
consultations to perpetuate the interests of the general populace of Zimbabwe.  The 
vision, goals and objectives ought to be economically linked and not politically linked 
(see Section 4.2.9). Effective coordination is crucial in the policy discourse. The 
success of any policy depends upon the quality of coordination.  Coordination helps 
to improve the efficiency of operations by avoiding overlapping efforts and duplication 
of work by all implementing agencies. It simplifies tasks, promotes transparency and 
minimises wastage of resources (see Section 4.2.10). The study also noted that some 
policies were being prematurely terminated, mainly for political reasons. For example, 
the MTP was aborted because a new government had assumed power. The MTP was 
crafted during the Government of National Unity (GNU) era. As such it was labelled as 
politically incorrect. However, it is prudent for policies to complete their terms once 
launched.  
Policies should only be abandoned after thorough evaluation and all stakeholders 
agree that the policy has to be terminated. After a policy has been launched, a policy 
regulatory framework must be put in place. This will provide a legal basis to enforce 
the implementation of the policy until the end of its tenure (see Section 4.2.11). The 
study observed that corruption has become deeply rooted in Zimbabwe and has a 
negative impact on the implementation of government policies and as such requires 
immediate and drastic action to deal with it. Some of the major grand corruption cases 
witnessed in Zimbabwe that are in public domain are: 1987- Zisco Steel blast Furnace 
Scandal; 1987- Air Zimbabwe Fokker Plane Scandal involving $100 million; 1986-
National Railways Housing Scandal; 1988-Willowgate Scandal; 1989-Zimbabwe 
Republic Police (ZRP) Santana Scandal; 1994-War Victims Compensation Scandal; 
256 
1995-Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Grain Scandal; 1996-Very Important Person (VIP) 
Housing Scandal; 1998- Boka Banking Scandal; 1998- ZESA YTL Soltran Scandal; 
1998- Telecel Scandal;  1998- Harare City Council Refuse Tender Scandal; 1999- 
Housing Loan Scandal; 1999- Noczim Scandal; 1999- DRC timber and diamond Un 
reported scandals; 1999-GMB Scandal; 1999-Ministry of Water and Rural 
Development Chinese tender scandal; 1999-VIP Land Grab Scandal; 2001-Harare 
Airport Scandal; 2008-2014- Airport Road Scandal; 2012-Diamonds scandals; 2012-
Abusing of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF); 2016-Command Agriculture 
Scandal; 2018-ZESA scam involving Samuel Undenge’s criminal abuse of office; the 
perpetual milking of Zimbabwe and the pillaging of the central bank under Gideon 
Gono (Yamamoto 2016:1; also refer to the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa 
2012:7) (see Section 4.2.12).  
In addition, failure to win international support for the land reform would not only 
undermine the confidence of the citizens of Zimbabwe but also possible reactions to 
such failure would have disastrous consequences for the country with serious 
ramifications in the region as a whole (see Section 4.2.13). The chapter discussed that 
a strong culture of accountability by citizens, government, civil society and the private 
sector must be established. Everyone must be held accountable for having done or 
failed to do his/her obligations. A culture of rewarding performers and punishing the 
underperformers must be entrenched in the country. A principle of ‘reward for work, 
work for reward’ is required. Everything ought to be done on a meritocracy basis. 
Meritocracy attracts the best talent. There is a need to put in place correct incentives 
to ensure that each individual will strive; a stake for everyone and opportunities for all. 
6.2.4 Analytical Framework on The Determinants of Economic Policies in 
Zimbabwe 
The aim of Chapter Five was to clarify research objectives five to eight in Chapter One 
(see section 1.4) that are: to explain the Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-
Oriented and Time Framed (SMART) policy objectives to improve economic policies 
for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe; to discuss adequate resources that are 
availed to support implementation/action plans to improve economic policies for socio-
economic development in Zimbabwe; mechanisms that are available to monitor, 
evaluate and supervise implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe; and 
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political will that is available to support implementation of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter sought to provide answers 
to the following research questions (see Chapter One, section 1.3):  
 What are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-Oriented and Time Framed 
(SMART) policy objectives to improve economic policies for socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe? 
 What are adequate resources availed to support implementation/action plans to 
improve economic policies for socio-economic development in Zimbabwe? 
 What mechanisms are available to monitor, evaluate and supervise 
implementation of economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
 What political will is available to support implementation of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe? 
The first objective was to assess economic policies’ compliance to ‘SMART’ principles. 
Regarding the ‘specific’ aspect, most of the policy objectives did not meet this 
principle. The policy goals and objectives did not clearly describe the intended 
outcome with the support of numerical figures. Thus they were too vague for 
implementing agencies to know what they are expected to work towards or achieve. 
Concerning ‘measurability’, the majority of the policies satisfied this principle. It is an 
important inherent aspect of the goals and objectives as this makes it possible to track 
the implementation progress. Without it, stakeholders are not adequately equipped to 
objectively/scientifically assess the magnitude of change that has occurred. On the 
principles of ‘achievability and reliability’, it was observed that this aspect was being 
overlooked by policy drafters. Nevertheless, for a good policy to be adopted, a 
thorough cost-and-benefit-analysis has to be conducted to determine the availability 
of resources (both financial and human skills) and political support required to 
implement the policy. In this study, all four policies did not have adequate funding from 
the national budgets. Instead, the policy depended on the possibility of receiving 
external funding to implement policy goals and objectives, which often occurred not in 
the anticipated quantum. In addition, there was a massive critical human skills gap. As 
such the policies were hardly implemented, which demoralised stakeholders, leading 
to apathy when they are called upon to participate in the crafting and implementation 
of successive policies. With respect to the ‘timely’ principle, all the policies had distinct 
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lifespans. However, most of the policies’ objectives were not timed. Normally policy 
objectives should have different timelines to complement and feed into each other.  It 
is therefore recommended that all policies’ objectives in Zimbabwe should have clearly 
defined timelines (see Section 5.2).  
The second study objective was to assess the usage of financial resources which were 
availed to support the implementation of policies. The researcher observed that policy 
budgets availed were inadequate. Government planned big without the requisite 
financial support. Government faced challenges in funding its national budgets 
compelling it to borrow excessively, leaving the country with serious debt problems. 
Importantly also to note was that the bulk of the national budgets were channelled 
towards consumption which negatively affected the implementation of the policy 
objectives. The few funds availed to implement the policies were subjected to serious 
fiscal indiscipline within public institutions over the years. These include unsupported 
expenditure, violation of laws and procedures, wasteful expenditure, poor book-
keeping, corruption, unreconciled expenditure, unauthorised transfers of funds, 
fraudulent expenditure, unauthorised borrowings, excess expenditure, non-servicing 
of loans, overstated expenditures, and payments made for goods not delivered. 
Regrettably, few offenders (normally junior staff) were prosecuted. It is essential for 
watertight systems to be put in place to curb these vices and channel resources 
towards the implementation of policies (see Section 5.3).  
The third study objective was to identify and evaluate the structures in place to 
formulate, monitor, evaluate and supervise implementation of economic policies by 
government agencies.  The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development with a 
staff complement of ten is mandated to formulate the macro-economic policies. The 
responsible department is understaffed and manned mainly by fresh graduates with 
no skills in policy formulation and operating on an insufficient budget. The Ministry 
rides on the structures of the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works 
(MLGPW) to conduct policy consultations. The MLGPW has structures cascading 
downwards to the grassroots level, with most of the senior positions occupied by 
political figures. These are the same structures used to monitor, evaluate and 
supervise the implementation of policies. However, these structures are 
malfunctioning because of political interference, inadequate budget, lack of skilled 
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personnel, general apathy from the communities to participate, abuse of resources for 
political gain, uncoordinated implementation of projects, lack of accountability and 
transparency, among other issues.  
The MLGPW is also not legally empowered to compel stakeholders to execute their 
duties. Consequently, the weak accountability systems in place are creating room for 
stakeholders to abuse their office and renege their duties. It is therefore vital for these 
structures to be legally empowered to address all the shortcomings currently existing. 
Importantly also, is that the devolution, if earnestly implemented as outlined in the CoZ, 
will address most of the challenges being faced (see Section 5.4). 
The last study objective was to determine the existence of political will to support the 
implementation of economic policies. Throughout the policy cycle, political will was 
identified as a critical element that was missing to address the challenges being faced 
by stakeholders. Political will is the engine that drives all other determinants of macro-
economic policies to attain the desired change required. As such, the government 
must have the commitment to earnestly institute reforms necessary for political, 
economic and social development to be realised in Zimbabwe (see Section 5.5).  
6.3 Proposals for the effective implementation of economic policies in 
Zimbabwe 
For the successful implementation of economic policies, an analytical framework 
highlighting critical success factors is provided in Chapter Five as a primary 
recommendation. The following secondary recommendations are proffered to the 
Government of Zimbabwe, political parties, citizens, private sector and civil society: 
 Good governance and democracy are identified as the most critical factor that 
needs to be addressed if the country is to realise any type of development. Here 
good governance and democracy applies to political, administrative and economic 
spheres. The country requires strong leadership that stands for what is right, 
guided by the philosophy of pragmatism. The current problems faced by the 
country can only be solved using logical and reasonable methods. Leadership 
must make bold decisions on reforms which benefit the nation at large, not 
particular individuals or political parties. All stakeholders must freely participate in 
the political, economic and social development of the country. Everyone must be 
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treated equally without considering his/her political affiliation. The rule of law must 
be upheld by all.   Everything should be done in the correct manner, in accordance 
with the Constitution and other laws of the country. It is important to preserve clear 
separations of power between the executive, judiciary and legislature.   
 It is important to instil the principles of accountability for all public office bearers. 
The standard of meritocracy in the government systems has to be inculcated. 
Government officials should earn what they deserve. Non-performers must be 
punished. The issue of accountability must also be extended to everyone else in 
the country. Citizens must also be accountable for their obligations, such as 
participating in consultative meetings, positively marketing the country, paying 
taxes, amongst others. 
 Transparency is a necessary ingredient in the formulation, implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation of economic policies. The lack of clarity can make other 
stakeholders withdraw their participation in the implementation of policies. 
Stakeholders want to be clear on everything; in other words, the whole policy 
cycle. Transparency is crucial as it creates trust and confidence in all governance 
systems in the country. This will afford the entire nation to move in unison towards 
the attainment of national goals.  
 Fiscal discipline by government is very important for development. The budgeting 
and usage of policy funds need to be clear to most of the stakeholders. 
Implementing agencies of the policy always want to know, have access to, and 
control of, the funds available for them to effectively execute their work. This also 
applies at national level, where stakeholders want to know how national resources 
and funds are being used.  
 The country requires political stability and tolerance to prosper. Currently, there is 
deep political polarisation between the ruling party and the main opposition party. 
These parties are spending most of their resources fighting for political expedience 
at the expense of national development. Political instability has manifested itself 
in violent protests leading to violations of human rights, negative publicity of the 
country to the international community, loss of lives and properties, amongst other 
ills. It is therefore important for the government of the day to genuinely engage all 
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political parties and reach consensus. This will create an environment where 
everyone obeys the rules, recognises the prevailing government’s legitimacy, 
while supporting and participating in national developmental initiatives. Political 
stability inter alia leads to administrative integrity of the government, the ability to 
collect taxes, equitable access to state services by all citizens, and creates a 
harmonious environment conducive to development.  
 The current perceived political instability by the international community makes it 
difficult for the country to trade and interact with the outside world. The prevailing 
situation deters potential investors from establishing themselves in Zimbabwe. In 
addition, the country cannot access lines of credit from the international 
community, making it difficult to fund macro-economic policies and other 
developmental initiatives in the country. 
 The public sector institutions need to be strengthened in their capacities to 
respond to the demands of the nation. The provision of tools of trade, improvement 
of organisational culture and conditions of service, amongst others, need to be 
addressed. It is important to create a dynamic, progressive and nimble public 
service, where decision making is decentralised to lower levels. It is imperative to 
have a public service that is responsive, flexible and innovative and which 
continuously meets the evolving needs of Zimbabweans and contributes directly 
to the success of Zimbabwe. 
 The public institutions must be staffed with qualified, competent, non-corrupt and 
empowered civil servants. The structure should have low levels of bureaucracy 
which makes it easy for decisions to be made in a speedy manner. Government 
must focus on building systems that deliver. Without proper systems in place in 
the public institutions, attainment of results is not guaranteed. A legal framework 
must always be put in place to enforce the implementation of any policy. 
 The government of the day should always be sincere in socio-economic 
development. Drastic reforms must be implemented without fear and favour, to 
create  an environment conducive to development. The policies should be focused 
on further developing the entire nation, not to pursue individual or certain political 
party interests. The issues of state capture by the political elite ought to be 
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addressed. In the same vein, conflation between the ruling party and government 
business should be eliminated. This will boost stakeholder confidence and trust 
that the authorities are doing everything to benefit all. In addition, the authorities 
are required to be seen to be earnestly supporting those polices. Government 
must always do what is right, not what is popular or politically expedient.   
 Economic policy is all about human development; hence it should be developed 
for all, involve all and benefit all. In this regard, government should earnestly 
undertake broad consultations with everyone, especially at the grassroots level 
during all the stages of a policy life cycle. After consultations, the views of the 
citizens and stakeholders should be reflected in the final policy document. 
Moreover, political differences should not limit anyone to contribute to policy 
development as policies benefit or disadvantage all citizens. For everyone to have 
confidence in the policy, experts should also be involved to provide objective and 
technical assistance. The policy formulation process must be professionalised. 
There should be separation of powers between experts responsible for policy 
formulation and those responsible for implementation. 
 Stakeholders need to be clear on the government’s policy vision, goals and 
objectives. It is important for everyone in the country to be clear on the nation’s 
development aspirations. Everyone can meaningfully contribute to the 
development trajectory only when the nation is clear on where the policy wants to 
take them. The policy vision, goals and objectives must be simple and clear and 
relevant to the upbringing of the general populace’s livelihoods. Special attention 
must be given to involve the youth, women, people living with disabilities and other 
marginalised groups in society. The vision, goals and objectives ought to be 
economically linked and not politically linked. Government must demonstrate the 
strategies to achieve the vision, goals and objectives.  
 Implementing agencies need proper coordination from government. Coordination 
helps to improve the efficiency of operations by avoiding overlapping efforts and 
duplication of work. It simplifies tasks, promotes transparency and minimises 
wastage of resources. 
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 Before the implementation stage, a clear policy implementation plan and structure 
must be put in place, clearly indicating who should do what, with clear timeframes. 
The coordinating agency must be given powers to place the right personnel at the 
right places, reward performers and punish the non-performers. The coordinating 
agency must also have access and/or control of funds and other resources 
required to execute the policy. The coordinating agency must also be accountable 
to higher authorities.  
 The Department of Policy Formulation, Analysis and Coordination housed within 
the Office of the President and Cabinet needs to be capacitated to effectively 
coordinate policies when they are being formulated. A clearly defined system must 
be established that compels all government ministries to engage this Department 
at the formulation stage of any policy. This will reduce instances of policy 
inconsistencies, overlaps, duplication, gaps, disharmony and competition.  
 Policy inconsistency is a major problem in government   to the extent that policy 
announcements by cabinet ministers were sometimes conflicting; thereby creating 
confusion in the country. Some policies were also being abruptly terminated with 
no justification being given to the stakeholders. Policy clarity and consistency can 
only be achieved if the proper methods of developing a policy are duly followed, 
such as extensive consultations, involvement of experts in developing policies, 
amongst others. Sometimes policy inconsistency rose from political interference 
with government business. For instance, the Medium-Term Plan was terminated 
because it was deemed politically ‘incorrect’ since the policy was developed during 
the tenure of the inclusive government. Such exclusionary actions must be 
avoided as they erode the confidence of the general populace, who wonder whose 
agenda will be pursued by policies.    
 Corruption exists in public institutions. The Auditor General’s annual reports point 
to gross mismanagement, misuse and abuse of public funds. However, there is 
little or no evidence to show that there is any effort to fight the scourge. The 
general public view is that there is no political will to fight corruption. Corruption 
has eroded citizens’, investors’ and stakeholders’ confidence in any public 
institutions’ ability to implement policies, projects and programmes. All the law 
enforcement agencies must be capacitated and allowed to independently execute 
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their mandates. These are the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, 
Prosecutor General and Zimbabwe Republic Police. Investigations of corruption 
cases highlighted in the Auditor General’s reports will be a big milestone in the 
fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. Whistle-blower protection is a critical 
element in the fight against corruption. Corruption thrives in blurred systems. In 
this regard, proper systems need to be established which are clear and able to 
deliver the results. Preventive measures are critical in the fight against corruption. 
The implementation systems and structures must be watertight to prevent any 
form of corruption. For those who have manipulated the system for self-gain, they 
ought to be severely punished by the law. Thus, transparent and accountable 
systems have to be established in all state institutions. 
 A negative impact was created by economic sanctions that were imposed on the 
Zimbabwean leadership by the western countries. The sanctions were in pursuit 
of human security and good governance. These economic sanctions were 
conditional and exhorted the Government of Zimbabwe to comply with 
international best practices on governance and the respect of human rights. 
Primary and secondary data sources indicated that the imposed sanctions caused 
more harm than good and hence achieved the opposite of what they were 
designed to accomplish. The study recommends that government implement the 
reforms required for the sanctions to be lifted. Politics plays a major role in the 
removal of sanctions. In this regard, all political parties must join hands and work 
on the removal of sanctions.  
If the Government of Zimbabwe, private sector, civic organisations, citizens of 
Zimbabwe and international community all join hands to earnestly implement the 
above recommendations, this will bring back economic, social, cultural and political 
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3. What role does the local authorities play in the national economic policy cycle and 
what kind of support (or lack of it) do they get from the central government? 
 
4. How do you assess the linkages (or relationship) between the central government 
economic policies and developmental plans/policies for local authorities?  
 
5. Were there adequate coordination mechanisms in place to attain policy goals and 
objectives? If not, what are the challenges? 
 
6. Are all the stakeholders (citizens, public & private sector, civic society organisations, 
non-governmental organisations) adequately involved in all the stages of national 
economic policy cycle? If not, state reasons. 
 
7. Do you think all stakeholders are clear on economic policy visions, goals and 
objectives? If not, why? 
 
8. Do you think the institutions such as public (executive i.e government ministries & 
departments, judiciary, parliament, senate, independent commissions etc.), 
parastatals and state owned enterprises in place were effective and responsive to 
attain economic policies’ goals and objectives? If not, state the challenges faced. 
 
9. How do you assess politicisation of civil service and patronage of public institutions 
and what is the effect in the attainment of economic policies? 
 
10. How do you explain the clear separation of powers between the three arms of 
government (executive, judiciary and parliament)? What is the effect in the attainment 
of economic policies? 
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11. How do you assess conflation of party and government business?   What is the effect 
in the attainment of socio-economic development? 
 
12. Were the National Budgets linked to economic policies’ goals and objectives?   
  
13. Do you think adequate resources (human capital and funding) were availed to 
support implementation/action plans to improve economic policies for socio-economic 
development in Zimbabwe? If not, what were the challenges? 
 
14. What mechanisms were available to monitor/supervise the usage of resources to 
promote accountability, transparency and fiscal discipline? What were the major 
challenges in this area? 
 
15. What is your opinion regarding corruption in the public sector? If it exists, how does it 
manifests itself, give examples? 
 
16. Do you think economic sanctions are affecting the implementation of economic 
policies? What should be done to remove these sanctions? 
 
17. What was the level of political will available to support the economic policies in 
Zimbabwe? 
 
18. Was there a favourable political environment to support the policy? If not, what is 
causing political instability and what should be done? 
 
19. How does national (and corporate) governance and democracy affect economic 
policies? Highlight the major challenges if any. 
 
20. Identify key challenges affecting the realisation of economic policy goals and 
objectives.  
 
21.  To what extent do economic sanctions affect the realisation of economic policies’ 
goals and objectives? 
 
22. What are the critical success factors of economic policies in Zimbabwe? 
 
23. What are your recommendations to achieve the policy economic goals and objectives 
by: 
a) Government 
b) Private sector 
c) Development partners 






ANNEXURE D: ZIMBABWEAN CURRENCY RATE 1980-2015 
Growth with Equity Policy 





0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
A Framework for Economic Reform  





0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 
Zimbabwe Millennium Economic Recovery Plan 





0.044 0.055 0.055 0.698 5.074 22.389 
The Medium Term Plan 





0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 
Source: The World Bank. 2021. IBRD.IDA/Data- Official Exchange Rate (LCU per US$, period 
Average)- Zimbabwe. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
